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3PREFACE
This book gives to the reader the opportunity of examining some important issues and problems of
the new political initiative of the European Union known as the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP). The publication of the book is the result of an important project of the Faculty of Political
Sciences of the University of Catania. A grant of the European Commission Jean Monnet Project –
Heading A-3022 (Support for European integration activities organised by the academic world, 2003)
covered the fifty per cent of the costs of the Project but this Project belongs to a long tradition of studies
in the Faculty.
The University of Catania is innately concerned with the development of the relations between
European Union and Mediterranean countries. The Faculty of Political Sciences has been constantly
supporting research on Mediterranean politics, history and economy. However, this book and the
Project that shaped this book are a step forward to renovate this practice and bring it up to the present
challenges. Over the last ten years, the change of Europe and the surrounding areas has been creating
new conditions, problems and responsibilities. The new European Neighbourhood Policy is the outco-
me of this change in terms of policy action of the European Union. To match with the change, the
Faculty of Political Sciences decided to create this research project.
The main aim of the Project was to create a group of researchers concerned with the broad area of
the analysis of the problems of the relations between European Union and neighbouring countries. The
true challenge of the Project, however, has been networking young researchers of the EU and non-EU
countries in order to make a screening of the problems they recognize as crucial in the European
Neighbourhood Policy. Indeed, the Project was not invented to diffuse ideas and strategies cooked-in-
Brussels but create a community of scientists engaged in the study of neighbourhood building. The
young researchers got knowledge and experience from the analyses provided by senior scientists that
represented various disciplines as well as different EU and non-EU countries. Some of them have
contributed to this book.
The Faculty of Political Sciences believes that the Project has been an effort to give impetus to the
study of ENP. Her aspiration is also to contribute to the venture of making friendship and cooperation
between the peoples of Europe and nearby countries a real fact.
Giuseppe Vecchio
The Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences
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This book focuses thematically on issues relating to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is conside-
red a response to the new challenges and opportunities that the European Union (EU) has to address after the historic
enlargement on May 1st 2004. The new EU with 25 member states and with its extended borders is facing both internal and
external relevant developments and needs accordingly to reframe its external relations. The new geopolitical environment
increases the importance for the EU to establish innovative forms of cooperation within its new geographic proximities,
considering the fact that EU’s most successful instrument to build cooperation - the prospect of membership – is not
anymore sustainable. Quoting Chris Patten: “Over the past decade, the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument
has undeniably been the promise of EU membership. This is not sustainable. For the coming decade, we need to find new
ways to export the stability, security and prosperity we have created within the enlarged EU. We should begin by agreeing on
a clearer vision for relations with our neighbours”1 . Or again referring to the Commission’s Communication on Wider
Europe where it is stated that: “the incentive for reform created by the prospect of membership has proved to be strong –
enlargement has unarguably been the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument” (European Commission, 2003a).
Political conditionality seems to work when the “carrot is enticing enough” (Haukkala, 2003: 12). Candidate governments
overcame domestic resistance against political and economic reforms and accepted the Acquis Communautaire for the
incentives of full membership (Wallace, 2003: 3). However, the Commission realised that the enlargement cannot be
extended to the infinite. The integration process will loose of the selectiveness and meaning that are drawn from creating
distinctions in terms not only of territorial boundaries, but also of normative ones. Not to consider the institutional
overstretch and the EU structures viability in facing an everlasting enlargement. As pointed out by Romano Prodi, “we
cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just
a free trade area on a continental scale” (Prodi, 2002). What is needed, then, is to draw on successful experiences with new
Member States, and exporting these experiences to other countries, however, without prospecting the membership.
Neighbourhood Cooperation Background
EU’s interest in developing close cooperative relationships with near countries is not obviously a novelty within EU’s
external actions and has been a top priority also in the past. Expressly, after the end of the Cold War the EU has fostered
regional cooperation, in a context that was facing what has been considered a new wave of regionalism2  (Mansfield and
Milner, 1999). New regionalism becomes an attempt to “regain some measures of political control over processes of
economic globalization that have curtailed national policy instruments” (Katzenstein, 1996:127). In order to face problems
derived from the new global trends governments promote cooperation with neighbourhood countries, as they find that “a
neighbour’s action or inaction on a cross-border problem directly affect their own policies” (Attinà, 2003:183), and
therefore “to provide states with political stability, people with personal security, societies with economic growth, and groups
with social and cultural protection, cooperation with neighbouring countries is of the greatest importance to national
policy makers” (Attinà, 2003:183).
Regional approach has undeniably become a key factor of EU’s own identity. Regional cooperation is defined by the
Commission as a “general concept that refers to all efforts on the part of (usually) neighbouring countries to address issues
of common interest” (European Commission, 1995). This definition implies that the EU should clarify the classification of
neighbouring countries and the meaning of common interests. These notions are not fixed forever and came across a
continuing redefinition over the time. For instance, recently there has been a change in EU partners hierarchy. “The
‘pyramid of privileges’ has shifted over time: in the 1980s the ACP partners were unquestionably at the top, now the EU’s
immediate neighbours are certainly crowding the top spot. This reflects the new post-Cold War priorities of integrating
Central and East European countries into the EU, stabilizing South Eastern Europe, and spreading security to the southern
shore of the Mediterranean” (Smith, 2003: 56).
In June 1992 the Lisbon European Council was calling on a Foreign Policy co-operation based on “geographical
1 Commissioner Chris Patten, Directorate General External Relations, 11 March 2003
2 According to Mansfield and Milner, regionalism has “occurred in two waves during the post-World war II era. The first took
place from the late 1950s through the 1970s and was marked by the establishment of the EEC, EFTA, the CMEA, and a
plethora of regional blocs formed by developing countries…[While] the most recent wave of regionalism has arisen in a
different context than earlier episodes. It emerged in the wake of the Cold War’s conclusion and the attendant changes in
interstate power and security relations” (Mansfield and Milner, 1999:600-1).
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3 Lisbon European Council (26-27 June 1992): Conclusions of The Presidency
4 “Near abroad” was named in Russia foreign policy in the 1990s. The concept was drawn from that period and context
and used for EU, however with the necessary distinguishes (Christiansen et al, 2000: 393; Charillon, 2003:253). States
belonging to the “near abroad” were considered as “independent neighbours but taken for granted as not quite foreign,
in which [one has] tangible interests [and] economies are inextricably linked to the … centre (Page, 1994: 789 quoted
in Christiansen et al 2000).
5 For a comparison between EMP and ENP policy see Moschella’s chapter in this volume
6 “Ten-year bilateral treaties that se out the political, economic and trade relationship between the Eu and the signatories”
(White et al, 2002:138)
7 For an overview of Partner and Cooperation Agreement with Russia see Akatov’s chapter in this book.
8 EU relations with Moldova are discusses in Bencheci’s chapter.
proximity,”3  The three components included in the so called “EU Near abroad4 ”, at the time were: 1) the Central and
Eastern European Countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-
nia), 2) the Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia, Former Yugoslavian Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia and Montenegro,
Albania) at the exception of Slovenia, which is included in the first group; 3) the Mediterranean (Cyprus, Malta, Turkey,
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine Authority, Lebanon and Syria) (Charillon, 2003: 254).
In the last decade, the EU adopted different strategies towards the three areas with various levels of cooperation, which
produced also a variety of outcomes. The different impact depended also on the dissimilar geopolitical context of the regions
interested. For Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) the EU created the Central European Free Trade Agree-
ment (CEFTA) and offered and granted membership with a complete integration. The various association agreements with
CEECs (known as ‘Europe Agreements’) presented some similarities in terms of conditionality, political dialogue and aid
programmes, however they were agreed on a bilateral basis (Smith, 2003: 81). The Pact for Stability, launched under French
initiative, represents, instead, EU’s effort to promote regional cooperation in Eastern Europe.
Towards the Balkans, EU policies ranged from an unsuccessful conflict management at the early stage of the armed
conflict, followed by peace monitoring and post conflict peace-building activities funded with the reconstructions OBNO-
VA and CARDS programme. The EU Regional Approach and Royaumont Process of 1995/96 were, later, followed by the
launch of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the establishment of the Stabilization and Association Process,
and the recently perspective of membership.
With the Mediterranean the EU established a broad range of initiatives framed under the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship (EMP), launched in Barcelona in November 1995, which consist of political, economic, social and cultural cooperation.
Instruments to foster this process include MEDA aid programmes, Euro-Med association agreements and multilateral
dialogue5 .
The EU efforts towards these regions were characterized by a multidimensional scope: peace, stability, development,
integration, free trade are the main issues included (Uvalic, 2002:321). Past EU approaches towards its neighbours, may be
grouped, in two main categories: 1) approaches promoted for “stabilization” and “based on fostering regional cooperation
and broad partnership (regionalism)” and 2) approaches aimed to a real integration and with the goal of bringing neighbou-
ring countries into the EU through conditionality (Missiroli, 2003: 9). The latter was the approach typical for to the
CEECs, while the former characterized the relations with the Mediterranean and the Balkans. In particular towards the
Balkans the stabilization aim was stressed, while towards the south-Mediterranean countries
The mentioned cooperation initiatives were also a mixture of bilateral and multilateral dimensions. Bilateral agreements
were not neglected for the membership negotiations with CEECs countries.
Russia and the former Soviet countries stand in a different position. This area was never seen by the EU as a “region”,
however Finland and Sweden were calling for more EU efforts towards the Northern Dimension. “The Northern Dimension
currently provides the only regional framework in which the EU participates with its Eastern partners to address trans-
national and cross-border issues. But participation is restricted to Russia”. (European Commission, 2003a: 8).
Russia and the former soviet countries were mentioned in the Lisbon European Council Conclusions among the areas of
possible joint actions and some forms of cooperation were established also with them. In 1994-1995 Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements6  (PCAs), signed with Russia7  Ukraine and Moldova8 . Technical Assistance to the Commonwe-
alth of Independent States (TACIS ) programme was the aid fund for the CIS states.
European Neighbourhood Policy
10 years later, the definition of near abroad changed and neighbouring countries became the ones that do not have
currently membership perspective within the EU. The Commission realised that enlargement may create tensions between
members and non-members, and hinder, by the rise of new borderlines, the previous cooperation which existed between
10
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new insiders and outsiders (Haukkala, 2003:5). So the EU needs to reframe its new steps towards the world and expressly
towards its neighbours or towards what someone would rather call New European Periphery. The enlarged Europe put on
the Union new responsibilities and offers chances to play a new role in the emerging political space. Consequently, the
European Security Strategy9  and the Europe Neighbourhood policy were created to frame the new European diplomacy.
Considering geographical coverage, neighbourhood countries are now listed in three new groupings: The Mediterranean,
the Western Balkans, and Russia and Eastern Countries, plus Switzerland and other states for whom the status quo is fine
(Patten and Solana, 2002). While for the Western Balkans the accession is already foreseen and it is considered just a
question of time, for the Mediterranean is explicitly excluded. The Eastern countries seem to lye in between the other two
conditions.
At the General Affairs and External Relations Council of November 2002, the EU accepted the challenge of increasing
the ties with the old and new neighbouring countries and launched the EU’s future tasks in this area. This intention was
confirmed Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. On this occasion, “the Union’s determination to avoid
drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the
Union” was emphasized.
Also the awareness to develop policies on the new challenges towards the new neighbours rose within the European
Parliament (EP). Expressly on 12 February 2003 the EP called for attention to draw towards the issues surrounding the new
neighbours.
The Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: “Wider Europe-Neighbourho-
od: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, known as Wider Europe Communication,
is dated 11 March 2003. The partner countries initially included in the policy were 14: Russia, plus ten Southern
Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia)
and three Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus).
A Chronology of ENP
April 2002: The General Affairs Council (GAC) requests the Commission and the High Representative
for Common Foreign and Security policy ‘to work up ideas on the EU’s relations with its
neighbours’.
September 2002: The GAC initial outline, presented to an informal meeting of foreign ministers, meets
with a general lack of interest.
December 2002: At academic conference, the Commission President proposes ‘A Policy of Proximity’
arguing that the enlarged EU needed ‘a ring of friends’.
December 2002: the Copenhagen European Council declares that The Union remains determined to
promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union.
March 2003: European Commission publishes Communication 104: Wider Europe— Neighbourhood: A
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours
June 2003: the Council of Ministers declares the EU wishes to define an ambitious new range of policies
towards its neighbours
July 2003: European Commission publishes Communication 393: Paving the way for a New Neighbou-
rhood Instrument
December 2003: the European Council adopts the “Solana document” A Secure Europe in a Better World
May 2004: the Commission presents Communication 373 European Neighboorhoud Policy Strategy
Paper
EU intention with this policy is to assure “political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and
social divisions” (European Commission, 2003a). The rhetoric of the EU’s mission is rather eloquent since the beginning of
the document, where it is stated that the EU after the enlargement feels “duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the
new member states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic
dynamism” (Commission 2003a: 3).
The membership Copenhagen criteria10  seem to be adapted in the ENP process. Neighbours countries, indeed, became
EU’s essential partners “to increase our mutual production, economic growth and external trade, to create an enlarged area
of political stability and functioning rule of law, and to foster the mutual exchange of human capital, ideas knowledge and
9 Presented by Javier Solana at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 and adopted by the European Council in
December 2003.
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culture” (European Commission, 2003a).
The main objective is to “create an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration,
intensified political relations, enhanced cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between
the EU and its neighbours” (ibidem). Thus political stability and economic development are the mainstream ideas of the
policy and of EU effort to promote worldwide sustainable security. The EU will guarantee the neighbours “further
integration and liberation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital” (ibidem :10). Concerning
work plans March 2003 Communication lists several incentives11 .
The approach is characterised by some new arrangements that may reflect the EU assessment of previous pitfalls in its
former cooperation initiatives. The differentiation between partner countries is at the basis of the neighbourhood policy.
While stating the importance of a standard and coherent approach, the Commission recognises the big difference, in terms
of regional economic cooperation, administrative and institutional capacities of the neighbouring partners. A step-by-step
or progressive approach towards EU neighbouring countries is also required in order to introduce a gradual engagement for
each state depending on its willingness to progress with economic and political reform. The way to pursue this policy is not
anymore political conditionality but rather benchmarks: clear and public definitions of the actions that the EU expects the
partners to implement. Political or economic benchmarks may be carried out, depending on which targets and reforms are
agreed.
The Thessalonica European Council in June 2003 regarded the Wider Europe Communication as a good starting point
for “developing a new range of policies towards” neighbourhood countries12  and reconfirmed the overall goals and
principles within the policy, which “should be seen as separate from the question of possible EU accession”. The document
identified new possible incentives and offered more relevance to the field of Justice and Home Affairs, as another context
where it is possible to assess reform achievements by neighbouring countries. Regarding the presence of a numbers of
existing arrangements with the same countries, the Council Conclusions emphasize that neighbourhood policies should not
override those agreements. Action Plans will be the political documents, which considering existing agreements will spell out
benchmarks and timetable and will be functioning as key policy instruments in the medium term.
Soon after, on July 1st 2003, the Commission through a new Communication “Paving the Way for a New Neighbourho-
od Instrument”, addressed the European Council request and assessed the possibility to create a New Neighbourhood
Instrument. The Commission proposed a two-step approach: from year 2004 up to year 2006 it is planned to seek a better
coordination between the existing financial instruments (INTERREG, PHARE, TACIS, CARDS, MEDA); while after
2006 the New Neighbourhood Instrument will be established providing cross-border and regional cooperation around the
external border13 .
Meanwhile the Commission established a Wider Europe Task Force and a Wider Europe Inter-Service Group.
The Wider Europe Task Force, which reports to Commissioner for Enlargement (Günter Verheugen) has the responsi-
bility to:
· “Develop further the political concept of a European Neighbourhood Policy;
· Draw up action plans for countries concerned (Eastern European and the Southern Mediterranean countries) in
consultation with these partner countries and in close cooperation with the High Representative/Secretary General of
the Council;
· Pilot the action plans through the Commission;
· Prepare proposals for the “European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)” which will finance projects involving the
enlarged EU and neighbouring countries;
· Draw up plans for handling European Neighbourhood Policy in the next Commission”.
10 “Stable democracy, respect of human rights, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities; functioning market
economy; and adoption of the common rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law.” (Copenhagen
European Council, 1993)
11 “Extension of the internal market and regulatory structures; Preferential trading relations and market opening,
Perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons, Intensified cooperation to prevent and combat common
security threats, Greater EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management, Greater efforts to
promote human rights, further cultural cooperation and enhance mutual understanding, Integration into transport,
energy and telecommunications networks and the European research area, New instruments for investment promotion
and protection, Support for integration into the global trading system, Enhanced assistance” (ibidem pp10-14).
12 Concerning  the partners, it is interesting to notice that the Council Conclusions on Wider Europe–New Neighbourho-
od, underlines the special EU-Russia strategic partnership. The distinction between the different neighbouring regions
is vanished, being the other 13 neighbouring countries listed all together. The Council Conclusion also declared  EU plan
to examine Southern Caucasus position in a later stage.
13 Regarding the existing cross-border and regional cooperation instruments see Domaranok’s chapter in this volume
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The mainstream of security, however, was not dismissed and indeed ”building security in our neighbourhood” is one
of the main strategic aims proposed in the European Security Strategy in December 200314 .
On May 12th 2004 the Commission presented another Communication called Strategy Paper and delivered seven
Country Reports15 . In the Strategy Paper it is mentioned the possibility to extend the policy to the Southern Caucasus
states.  Indeed, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were officially included in ENP by the European Council in June 2004.
The Strategy Paper also introduced some new concepts like “joint ownership”, “monitoring” and “added value”, defined
the European Neighbourhood Instrument steps, promotes the issue of the Action Plan and advanced the negotiation of
European Neighbourhood Agreements, when Action Plan priorities are met.
In a first assessment of the ENP preliminary documents, it is interesting to observe that room for manoeuvre of the
partner countries seems to be very little. If this is true, more than partners the states should be better regarded as “targets”.
For instance concerning bench markers and action plans, it said that they “should be developed in close cooperation with
partner countries”, but only “whenever possible”. However, as pointed out by the Strategy Paper “exploratory talks to
identify elements for inclusion in possible Action Plans have begun” with some partners. Moreover even if the ENP is an
offer made by the EU, “joint ownership of the process … is essential”
Furthermore, an underlying concern brings the EU officials to stress that the Union’s aim is to approach neighbouring
countries in a coherent and efficient way. The idea is not to override the existing arrangements, but rather to offer a general
framework. The achievement of ENP vision of increasing stability, security and well being relies also on cost-effective
measures and practices, and above all on sharing them with other states. The procedures may play a strategic impact in the
EU’s stability promotion.
A first critical evaluation of the ENP
ENP seems to use a narrower and less principled approach compared with previous EU cooperation initiatives, like for
instance the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. However, this change in prospective may reflect a critical and weighted
assessment of failures and success of previous EU policies and might reveal a more realistic and less diplomatic way to
express EU’s goals. What might be considered, at a first reading, limited objectives, with a deeper insight might be regarded
as cost-benefit procedures in order not to recreate identical policies. What in many cases was an only pretended partnership
is now substituted by a joint ownership. It is too early to assess whether it will be a real common and joint effort. The
regional approach in this policy has been put aside, possibly responding to the fact that regionalism has not long life when
is not really wanted by the interested countries. Preferences for more concrete issues at stake like EU’s internal market and
free movement may have more success. Further studies will analyse the extent to which ENP has introduced a real change
in EU cooperation approaches and in EU foreign policy, or whether the shift remains only constrained within the languages
and terms introduced. Further investigations may also question whether the changes advanced within this policy be read in
a different way. The marginalised role relegated to the neighbouring countries, which on some occasions seems may or may
not agree with EU’s plans and offer for them… may be the signal of a EU which is starting to believe in its potentiality to
become a powerful global actor.
However, ENP had the incomparable value to put forward in the post-enlargement environment agenda some of the
puzzling issues that the following chapters have tried to address.
Book Outline
This book addresses some political, economic, social and cultural processes involved within the framework of the
European Neighbourhood. These issues are tackled principally by the young researchers that participated in the study
seminars on ENP held in Catania University in March and July 2004. However other scholars, whose works best fitted
within the general framework of the book, also enrich the book. Authors’ background is heterogeneous in terms of
disciplinary and geographic area, and research experience, which made possible to treat ENP in a comprehensive way. This
book consists of 13 chapters divided into three sections.
The first section is made up of four chapters that deal with political and institutional issues and are mainly focused on
the challenges of security and democracy promotion. Fulvio Attinà frames ENP’s major aim - building security – within his
study on regional security arrangements and explains how it is based on improving domestic conditions, mutual confidence
and coordination among and between neighbouring countries. Sven Biscop argues that the ENP and EES may offer to the
Security Dimension of Euro Mediterranean Partnership a second life by developing a security community. Elena Baracani
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14 On the European Security Strategy and its links and prospects with the ENP see Attina’s and Biscop’s chapters in this
volume.
15 Ukraine, Moldova, Israel, Jordan,  Morocco, Tunisia, Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
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presents an analysis of EU strategy in promoting democracy to ENP countries. Democratization is one of the most
important trend in the international system and the European Union is one of the most important international actor which
promotes democracy towards third states, in particular through the policy of enlargement. Elena Baracani analyses the main
aspects of the European Union democracy promotion in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),
focussing in particular on content or political priorities and instruments of this strategy, and compares them with the main
aspects of the strategy of democratization pursued through the enlargement policy. Manuela Moschella regards the new
Neighbourhood Policy as an instance of region-building, stressing its distinctive elements, as they result in comparison with
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s main characteristics – i.e. the special Neighbourhood Policy designed for Mediter-
ranean countries.
The second section deals with economic and financial issues. The four chapters are interested mainly in economic
cooperation and aid. Ali Hemal examines growth of North African Countries trough FDI and trade. For the North African
countries, trade and FDI are needed to provide new engines of growth and stability. With more trade and FDI they will be
able to achieve higher rates of growth, create more jobs, and improve the knowledge and skills and productivity of their labor
force. This is the main objective of these countries’ Association Agreements with the EU. With reference to ENP, Ali Hemal
argues that EU political stability and security concern may undermine the socio-economic development of partners
countries. For this reason he analyses the impact of the Euro-Med association on aid and FDI flow to North African
countries since 1995, so as to verify how far it has been consistent with the main objective of the European Neighborhood
Policy. Brian Portelli examines past trends and future potential of FDI flows in the Mediterranean region. As Ali Hemal, he
believes that foreign direct investment (FDI) represents a distinct form of international economic integration for developing
countries and is increasingly sought after as a medium for the injection of capital and knowledge and the generation of
economic growth in host countries. He argues that although past trends highlight the Mediterranean region’s relative
marginal share of global FDI flows, there is great potential to increase flows to the region given the current pace of economic
reform and institutional development are sustained. In particular, the consolidation of the Barcelona process, particularly
the enhancement of economic reform and particularly regional trade, are expected to provide the scale and scope for greater
FDI activity in the region. Oleg Akatov analyses EU and Russia relations with reference to economic cooperation within the
framework of EU enlargement. Ekaterina Domorenok deals with cross-border cooperation within the ENP and assesses the
differences with previous borders regional cooperation arrangements. She points out the incentives that the Neighbourhood
Policy brings in for regional cooperation and draws up the output picture of the interaction between the Neighbourhood
Initiative and cooperation at regional level.
The third and final section consists of five chapters that look into social and cultural aspects. Diana Bencheci presents
a study on EU relations with Moldova. Tahar Haffad and Ljudmila Kudrina concentrate on migration flows in the area.
While Kudrina debates on Muslim immigration in Europe, Haffad is more interested in the flux and politics migratory. Olena
Shestavina compares the Ukrainian’s system of higher education with the European Union’s countries systems, in the
framework of Bologna process. She believes that also the new European Neighbourhood Policy opens up new opportuni-
ties of mutually advantageous cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union’s universities. Finally, Arno Tusch
argues that development is not linked with culture but policies. He believes that not a Huntingtonian development failure
of “Muslim culture” is to blame for many of the ills of the region, but the policies based on the “Washington Consensus”.
References & Documents
ATTINÀ Fulvio (2003), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views, in “European
Foreign Affairs Review”, vol 8, n.2, pp 181-199
CHARILLON Frédéric (2003), Sovereignty and Intervention: EU’s Interventionism in its “Near Abroad” in  CARL-
SNAES Walter, SJURSEN Helene and WHITE Brian (eds), Contemporary European Foreign Policy, London, Sage
Publishers.
CHRISTIANSEN Thomas, PETITO Fabio and TONRA Ben (2000) Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: The
European Union’s Near Abroad in “Cooperation and Conflict”, vol 35(4) pp389-415.
HAUKKALA Hiski (2003), A Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism and EU’s New Neighbourhood Policy, The Finnish
Institute Of International Affairs, UPI Working Papers n. 41, 2003
KATZENSTEIN Peter (1996), Regionalism in Comparative Perspective, in “Cooperation and Conflict”, vol 31(2),
pp.123-159.
MANSFIELD Edward D. and MILNER Helen (1999), The New Wave of Regionalism in “International Organizations”
vol.53 (3) pp589-627
European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective
14
MISSIROLI Antonio (2003), The EU and its changing neighbourhoods: stabilisation, integration and partnership, in
LYNCH, MISSIROLI, ORTEGA, TRIANTAPHYLLOU “Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a Wider Europe”,
Chaillot Paper n.64, Paris, Institute for Security Studies
PRODI Romano (2002), A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability. Speech at the Sixth ECSA-World
Conference. Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 6 December 2002
PATTEN Chris and Javier SOLANA Joint letter by EU Commissioner und the EU High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy on Wider Europe, August 2002
SMITH Karen E (2003), European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge, Polity Press.
SOLANA Javier (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels 12 December
2003
UVALIC Milica (2003), Regional Cooperation and the Enlargement of the European Unon: Lessons Learned? in
“International Political Science Review” vol. 23 n. 3, pp.319-333
WALLACE William (2003), Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25, Groupement
D’Etudes et de Recherches Notre Europe, Policy Paper n.4, July 2003
WHITE Stephen, McALLISTER Ian, LIGHT Margot (2002), Enlargement and the New Outsiders in “Journal of
Common Market Studies” vol. 40 n. 1 pp. 135-153
Council Conclusions on Wider Europe- New Neighbourhood June 2003
European Commission (2004) Communication from the Commission “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy
Paper”, COM (2004), 373 final, Brussels,12 May 2004
______ (2003a), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament “Wider
Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”. COM (2003)
104 final, Brussels 11 March 2003.
______ (2003b) Communication from the Commission “Paving the way fro a New Neighbourhood Instrument”
COM (2003) 393 final Bruseels, 1 July 2003
______ (1995) “Communication on European Community support for regional economic integration efforts
among developing countries” COM (95) 219 final, Brussels 16 June 1995
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
16
Fulvio  ATTINÀ
Europe Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is the name of the ambitious project launched in March 2003 by the European
Commission of President Romano Prodi in agreement with the European Council. The policy objective is to soften the
meeting of the European Union with the enormous problems of the countries in the areas surrounding the Union, and
build strong, durable and productive cooperative relations with the neighbouring countries. This outcome will make the
European Union a credible foreign policy actor.
A single policy towards countries as different as Morocco and Russia, Libya and Belarus, is momentous assignment
to EU’s foreign and external relations policy-makers and professionals in Brussels. Two founding ENP documents1
explicitly address the problem of difference among the neighbouring partners, and adopt the method of bilateralism
(namely, single nation action plans) rather than genuine regional cooperation2 .
On the other hand, ENP wants to be a centralized policy without the vagueness of the “common strategy” instru-
ment that was adopted for conducting relations with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean states but evaporated in the
corridors of the Brussels buildings. The current instrument invented by the Commission, instead, seems to be directed
to circumvent single EU governments’ pressure to spend common resources for improving relations with “their”
geographical and political neighbours with no regard for the relations with the neighbours of other EU countries.
Security is a major aim of ENP (See, especially, Biscop, 2004). In this respect, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova
and the Mediterranean countries are expected to become partners of the Union in the progressive construction of a
security community extended from the Atlantic to the Urals, from the Caucasus and the Middle East to the Artic Sea.
This paper analyses some theoretical and practical aspects of this security project which is far from being fully fudged
in the Brussels factory, appropriately known in the European capitals and heartedly supported by the member
governments.
In the first section, different regional security arrangements are portrayed and compared. The section is inspired by
the belief that geographical groups of countries have a number of arrangements at their disposal to chose from when they
decide to climb the road of security cooperation. In the following two sections, a single arrangement – the regional
security partnership - is analysed taking into consideration the security system created in Europe over the last thirty
years, and in other parts of the world in current times. The last section deals with ENP as the early plan of a project of
security cooperation which exhibits the intention of the people in Brussels to extend the European security partnership
to the areas on the Southern and Eastern border of the Union.
Regional security arrangements
In a recent study (Attinà, forthcoming), I propose to order regional security systems according to the level of institutio-
nalization of security co-operation and social integration of the members. This order varies from zero-level, i.e. no
agreement on co-operative measures of security, to the most institutionalized structure of co-operation, i.e. the amalgama-
ted security community defined by Karl Deutsch. The graphic representation of this classification is given here below.
No single process of change is implied by the assumptions that guided the construction of this taxonomy. Accordingly,
neither positive feedback and successful interactions in a geographical group of countries necessarily produce the move-
ment of the group from an existing arrangement to the next one on the right-side of the line, nor negative interactions
necessarily produce less co-operative arrangements. It is assumed, instead, that change depends on the political decisions
of the leaders of the participating states. Decisions on increasing the level of co-operation depend on the expectation of
better welfare conditions of the participating countries as effect of additional security co-operation. In other words,
increasing organized security cooperation and the institutionalization of peaceful management of international conflicts
depend on the elite’s perception of the gains that derive from extending the successful experimentation of previous security
cooperation. Lastly, this assertion is based on the belief that social practices induce social learning and evolution of social
systems, including international systems. Briefly, it is assumed that security cooperation in a region expands on as much as
formal institutions and social practices mutually reinforce each other, and decision-makers perceive additional gains from
future cooperation.
1 COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels 11.3.2003, and COM(2003) 393 final, Brussels, 1 July 2003.
2 Early studies of ENP are Batt, Lynch, Missroli, Ortega, Triantaphyllou (2003) Emerson (2003), Pelczynska-Nalecz
(2003), and Wallace (2003). Information on the study of ENP is given in the Jean Monnet Centre at the University of
Catania website http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/a3022home.htm
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Leaving apart the left-hand extreme of the line, i.e. regions in which states refute to create stable security arrangements
by explicit agreement3 , in the left-hand part of the line only the opposite alliance system is an historical example of concerted
forms of regional security arrangement. In this case, however, governments do not agree on any form of collective solution
of security problems. Concert is only the tacit accord of keeping on with the existing condition of (military) power
equilibrium rather than formal negotiation for developing a regional co-operative system. Military alliances are formed
according to the traditional concepts of state security (i.e. self-defence, military preparedness for the worst case, secrecy,
etc.) that exclude co-operation from the means used to manage security issues at the region level. Accordingly, military
alliances are formed on the belief that the coordination of military force with likeminded countries is more successful than
self-defence in dissuading potential aggressors. When a military alliance is created, in most of the cases the formation of
opposite military alliance(s) is very probable because the rise of a strong collective actor incites other governments to unite
in opposite alignment(s). For this reason, in many cases military alliances do not improve the security condition of the
member states but crystallize conflict relations that make constant or increase instability according to circumstances.
Conflict stabilization, for example, is caused by conditions curbing the number of the members of the opposite alliances, i.e.
circumstances favourable to neutrality as far as incentives for neutrality are available. The European security system has
been a system of opposite alliances for forty years. The European governments have been able to make it a stable system
and, on the early 1970s, headed for a different security arrangement, as it is explained later in this paper.
The systems of collective security occupy the centre of the line because with this arrangement, governments prefer to
keep armed forces under strict national control but agree to make them available on request, instantly forming a collective
force to intervene in case of need against an aggressor. In other words, for the low level of cooperative practices and social
integration, national commitment to cooperation neither leads automatically to the constitution of collective military forces
nor to the formation of permanent security mechanisms. At the region level, as for example in Africa with the Organisation
of African Union, collective security did neither bring the constitution of permanent military forces nor the signature of
agreements on obligatory co-operative measures for conflict management. In contemporary Europe, collective measures
and the support of mechanisms for their effective implementation are the content of the security system created in Europe
with the Helsinki Process and the institutionalization of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE),
later changed into the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). But these measures and mechanisms,
associated with other instruments, created a different regional security arrangement which is better defined as regional
security partnership, as later explained in this paper.
A security community, as initially theorized by Karl Deutsch, is a group of people that have become integrated and
consider war as an obsolete instrument of conflict resolution (Deutsch et al., 1957). A security community is brought into
being by the high level of transaction and communication flows that bind together a group of people who think of
themselves as a community, and produce favourable conditions for the establishment of institutions of peaceful conflict
resolution. Deutsch made a distinction between amalgamated security communities, which are formed by the states that
3 This is the case of the regions in which military confrontation is currently practiced (like the Middle East) or is
maintained by the governments as the unavoidable means of the state (like in the African sub-regional systems). In
addition, this is the case of the regions in which governments do not have important strategies for building structures
of security co-operation. Arie Kacowicz (1998) cites Southern America as the symbolic case of these regions in which
states are “satisfied” - primarily of the territorial order – and, consequently, abstain from either expanding national
security strategies and negotiating on security co-operation.
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abandon their full sovereignty and merge into an expanded state, and pluralistic security communities in which states retain
their legal independence but develop common institutions and a sense of “we-ness” and “we-feeling”. As Adler and Barnett
remark (1998), pluralistic communities vary between two forms - the loosely and tightly coupled form - on whether they
are close to persistent state sovereignty separation or emerging government centralization. Therefore, the right-hand part of
the line of regional security systems is populated with three forms of arrangements. An example of amalgamated security
communities is the formation of federal states like Germany in the 19th century. Scandinavia, Canada and the United States,
and the Euro-Atlantic community are examples of the loosely coupled form of pluralistic security community. Finally, the
European Union is example of the tightly coupled form of security communities, but the whole European continent is
hardly a security community, and the wider Europe and its surrounding area is still far from being qualified as a case of this
arrangement.
The ‘regional security partnership’ model
The regional security partnership arrangement is based on a concept of security building very different from those of
opposed military alliances and collective security, and partially different from the various forms of security community.
The best way to understand the concept of regional security partnership is to bear in mind the approach to international
security that developed in Europe with the Helsinki Process (See, among others, Flynn and Farrell, 1999; Ghebali, 1989;
Ghebali and Warner, 2001, Hopmann, 2003). In this approach, it is believed that the objectives of dissuading the aggressor
states and avoiding the use of international violence are attained by including all (or almost all) the states of the region and
also extra-regional powers in a single regional security arrangement rather than pooling national armed forces in opposed
military alliances and alignments. Second, in this form of regional security, measures of cooperative security (like exchange
of information on military policies and structures) and comprehensive security (i.e. the military and non-military aspects
of security) are constitutive means of regional security, and are explicitly defined in international agreements. Furthermore,
regional security partnership attributes importance to both international and internal measures to improve the security
conditions of the region and preserve geopolitical stability. Third, security partnership agreements, in contrast to security
communities, are formed by groups of countries characterized by conflict divisions, not-large flows of transactions and
communication, and a small sharing of values and institutions. These conditions apply to the whole group of the countries
of the partnership project, but some countries of the group are not divided by conflict lines, are linked by large flows of
mutual transactions and communication, and share the same cultural and institutional values. In addition, the countries of
the region have different security cultures but these are not so distant from one another as to prevent the formation of
consensus on introducing cooperation on security problems. In other words, for some political and practical reasons, these
countries are inclined to act together for the reduction of the risk of violent confrontation, and allow the flow of mutual
communication and material transactions to increase on their own. Fourth, in as much as security cooperation in a regional
partnership becomes strong and durable over time, the observance of common practices by the partner states produces
common orientations towards problems and values and, consequently, reduces the security culture difference. On their
turn, common practices and orientations lead to the formation of we-ness and common identities of the people of the
partner states. Hence, it is possible that a regional security partnership turns into a security community.
In general terms, the regional security partnership is the arrangement that originates from the consensus of the states of
a region to cooperate on the reduction of violence and enhancement of stability and peace by making use of different types
of agreements and mechanisms like formal security treaties, security international organizations, joint action agreements,
multilateral dialogue processes, peace and stability pacts including confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy
measures, and also measures for influencing the domestic structures and processes of the countries at risk of internal
violence.
In empirical terms, this model is derived from the observation of historical and current experiments aimed at changing the
nature of security management in some regions, namely in Europe and Asia. The construction of the European security
system since the early Seventies, i.e. from the opening of the Helsinki Process, is the most important case of regional
security partnership building in international politics but other current initiatives in Asia – namely in the East Asia/Pacific
(i.e. the ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF) and in Central Asia (i.e. the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) – are
examples of this form of regional security co-operation. This observation reveals that a regional security partnership is
based on a set of documents, i.e. one or few fundamental agreements, and a number of related operative agreements. In the
fundamental agreement shared principles of peaceful relations are proclaimed, commitment to avoid power confrontation
is given, and sources of conflict, tension and instability are made public by the partner governments. Within the frame of the
fundamental agreements, the regional states agree to establish also the operative agreements and mechanisms that are needed
to implement co-operative measures for the management of the common security problems. With the operative agreements,
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the partner governments create multilateral offices and make use of existing and new created international organizations to
deal with the perceived security threats. Multilateral offices and organizations are the most important collective instrumen-
ts of the security partnership, especially in as much as they are responsible for peace-making and peace-keeping operations.
In these conditions, a certain extent of defence de-nationalization and, in the long-term, also the constitution of a security
community can be expected as consequences of the establishment of a regional security partnership.
The main attributes of the regional security partnership model are summarized as it follows.
Pre-conditions
• awareness of the countries of the region for interdependence and the local effects of global problems,
• relaxed or no power competition in the international politics of the region and restrained use of violence in international
conflicts.
Conditions
• consensus of the governments of the region on building security cooperation by reducing violence in international
relations, improving international and domestic stability, and promoting peace and economic growth,
• no system of opposite military alliances.
Structures and means
• written fundamental agreements,
• operative agreements, multilateral offices and international organizations,
• a set of international and internal measures and mechanisms of conflict management and prevention,
• involvement of extra-regional powers (very probable).
Consequences
• reduction of the gap between the security doctrines and cultures of the countries of the region,
• increase of defence de-nationalization,
• development of security community (possible).
Security partnership in Europe and Asia
The present security arrangement of Europe is properly defined by the concept of regional security partnership and is
neither a system of opposed military alliances, as it was in the past, nor in the condition of becoming any soon a security
community in deutschian terms, i.e. “a group of people which has become integrated”.
The European security partnership arrangement developed after the launching of the Helsinki Process in the early 1970s
and matured in the 1990s. It includes all the states of Europe, the non-European members of the OSCE (i.e. the United
States and Canada) and the former Soviet Union countries of Caucasian Asia (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia). On the
contrary, the five former Soviet countries of Asia (Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan),
which are formal members of OSCE, cannot be considered any more members of the European security system because
their security policies are tightly linked to the Central Asia security complex. Indeed, at the exception of Turkmenistan,
they are members of the Central Asia security partnership, which is presented here below. This condition signals the
overlapping of regional security arrangement, which is worth of future analysis.
The fundamental agreements of the European security partnership are the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter
of Paris for A New Europe. Many operative agreements have been made within the Helsinki Process, which gave birth to
the offices, mechanisms and activities of the CSCE/OCSE4 . They have been added to a number of agreements signed by
European governments during the past fifty years. All these agreements are de facto complementary with the European
partnership fundamental agreements (Attinà and Repucci, 2004). This is the case of NATO and NATO’s Eastern projec-
tion mechanisms known as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the EU’s
mechanism known as the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) created within the European security and defence policy (ESDP),
and EU’s economic cooperation programs (like PHARE and Tacis).
The European security partnership has been put to a test in various occasions during the Nineties, namely in former
Soviet states and the Balkans. Performance has not been always good, sometimes deceptive. However, the positive role of
the security mechanisms cannot be denied in several cases in which the direct intervention of peacekeeping forces helped to
restrain violence, and the programs of relief and rehabilitation helped to restore civilian conditions in countries ravaged by
internal violence. As of today, OSCE displays a range of 18 field missions in member countries in need of assistance
European Neighbourhood Policy and the Building of Security around Europe
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on Freedom of the Media, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and 18 Mission and other Filed Activities in
member countries.
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for security, political and economic problems.
Since the last Nineties, the European security partnership is under the challenge of the current worldwide in-security
environment (see, for example, Biscop, 2004). Accordingly, the European governments’ preference for cooperative and
comprehensive security has been tempered by the so-called “new discourse of threat and danger” (Krause and Latham,
1999: 39). To cope with the problem of containing the policies of governments which are perceived as aggressive, irrational
and unreceptive of the cooperative mechanisms (like the Milosevic’s regime), and the problem of dealing with the threats
of global terrorism, the European governments have focused on the need for upgrading their countries’ military prepared-
ness. This policy change has many aspects including the development of the ESDP for worldwide use and, in some cases,
the enhancement of the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international stability and peace.
The development of the Asia/Pacific security partnership is centred in the ASEAN Regional Forum, also known as the
ARF (See Attinà and Zhu, 2001; Cossa, 2000; Johnston, 1998; Kivimaki, 2001; Narine, 2002). The membership of this
initiative increased from initial 18 to 23 countries including the United States and European Union. The fundamental
agreement is the First ARF Chairman’s Statement, issued in 1994. ARF objectives are to foster constructive dialogue and
consultation on political and security issues of common interest, and make significant contributions towards confidence-
building and preventive diplomacy in the region. Despite its rather long life, ARF has been unable so far to develop operative
agreements and create permanent offices for security issues.
The summit meeting of five states - China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - in the Chinese city of
Shanghai in April 1996 is the founding event of the Central Asia security partnership (See Attinà and Zhu, 2001; Zhang,
2001). The meeting launched the so-called Shanghai Five Initiative, which was turned into the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) on June 15, 2001. On this occasion, the fundamental agreement of the Central Asia security partner-
ship system was signed. After Uzbekistan’s admission in 2001, the SCO counts on six member states. Since the first
summit meeting, a series of operative agreements have been concluded and practical measures have been agreed on to
strengthen effective cooperation in various fields and mutual trust among member states. The “Agreement on Confidence-
Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas” and the “Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the
Border Areas”, signed in 1996 and 1997, are the most important agreements to implement security partnership building
among the five countries. Lastly, in January 2004, the SCO’s secretariat office opened in Beijing, and the SCO’s Antiterro-
rism Center was created in Tashkent. Cracking down on international terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal
migration and other forms of cross-border crimes are perceived as the most urgent task of the Organization. These measures
are pertinent to the building of regional security cooperation, but the implementation of existing confidence-building
measures and their development are still uncertain. However, taking into account the peculiarities of the region, this first
step is recognized as the inception of the “Central-Asian way” of building a regional security partnership.
The Euro-Mediterranean project
A Euro-Mediterranean project of security cooperation was implicitly launched in Barcelona in 1995 with the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) agreement while the explicit negotiation started in the late Nineties with the launch of the
initiative for the Mediterranean Charter of Peace and Stability.
The EMP approach to security is a multidimensional approach as stated in the Barcelona Declaration which includes
three Chapters on Politics and Security Affairs, Economic and Financial Affairs, and Human, Social and Cultural Affairs. For
this reason, the Barcelona Declaration has the nature of the fundamental agreement of a regional security partnership, but
it will have full effect only if the partner governments agreed on operative agreements to implement multilateral mechanisms
and measures of cooperative security. The negotiation of the Mediterranean Charter of Stability and Peace was claimed to
be as the most important step towards introducing operative measures and mechanisms. The aim of the proposal of the
Stability Charter for the Mediterranean was to achieve the solemn commitment of all the Mediterranean governments to
political stability and abstention from war to solve conflicts and disputes over border and national issues. Agreement about
starting negotiation at the level of Senior Officials and experts was reached on 1997, but very soon it was understood that
the Mediterranean governments had divergent perceptions of threats and challenges to political stability. Discussions
among experts continue to be held by the EuroMeSCO network, but the Charter negotiation has been interrupted.
By all means, the project has been confronted with many obstacles like the derailment of the Middle East Peace Process,
the post-9/11 anti-terrorism policies of the Western governments and the post-Iraqi war problems. All these events slowed
down the partnership building process and, finally, made the Charter negotiation to die. However, it is noted that the 9/11
events and the spread of global terrorism had the positive effect of reinforcing efforts to include domestic security and police
co-operation in the agenda of the Barcelona Process. At the same time, the true consequences of the Iraqi war are still unclear.
Finally, the new EU “neighborhood policy” affects the Mediterranean security partnership building process, as it is
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analyzed later in this paper.
The EMP security project, however, is not the only multilateral initiative for building a new security arrangement in the
Mediterranean.
• In 1994, OSCE decided to establish an informal contact group with experts from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Morocco and Tunisia with the aim of sharing information on confidence-building measures with the representatives of
these countries. OCSE’s projection in the Mediterranean dates back to the early years of the Helsinki Process. On the
assumption that security in Europe was closely linked with security in the Mediterranean and the process of
improving security could not be confined to Europe but extended to other parts of the world, in particular to the
Mediterranean area, a chapter on “Questions relating to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean” was included
in the Helsinki Final Act (1975). Starting in 1995, annual seminars were organized by the OSCE and Mediterranean
partners. The OSCE initiative has been loosing momentum with the passing of time, but the Seminars are regularly
celebrated.
• In 1995, NATO made a proposal to the governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, and
later to Algeria, to open direct Dialogue with a view to achieve better mutual understanding and foster the process of
regional stabilization. The Dialogue focuses on civil issues, like exchange of information and technical assistance in the
area of civil emergency planning, but develops also a military dimension which includes observation visits of officials
of the Six non-NATO members to NATO exercises and military bodies, exchange of staff officers and port visits to
Dialogue Countries by NATO’s naval forces. Except for seminars, conferences and other information sessions, the
dialogue has been strictly bilateral between NATO and the single dialogue country. The Iraqi war and Bush’s strategy
of attention to North Africa have negatively influenced the NATO’s Mediterranean policy. However, it has not been
formally closed.
The OSCE and NATO initiatives and the importance of the military presence of the United States in the Mediterranean
area signal the need for taking into consideration the problem of including external actors in the negotiation on the
Mediterranean security partnership. It is worth to remind that the European and East Asia/Pacific security partnerships
demonstrate the importance of including external actors as partners of the regional security arrangement. The European
Union had to pay more attention to the positive results that the convergence of the Euro-Mediterranean project with other
multilateral initiatives could produce. A EU-NATO-OSCE-Mediterranean conference could perhaps provide a good start
for intensifying co-operation in the region. Such a conference was suggested by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office at the last
annual OSCE Conference on Security Policy in Munich (February 11, 2004). The construction of the Mediterranean
security system will become more probable if the existing multilateral initiatives are coordinated, and also multilateral
initiatives develop on the opposite side of the Mediterranean, that is among the Arabic countries of North Africa.
Wider Europe-Neighbourhood as security policy
The March 2003 Communication of the Commission names fourteen countries as neighbouring countries and partners
to the project of creating a new framework of relations. They are Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Libya and all the
members of the Barcelona Process but Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey (namely Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon,
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Palestinian Authority). The two Mediterranean islands are new members of the European
Union. Turkey’s candidacy to EU makes this country not eligible to participate in ENP. However, in the July 2003
Communication on the Neighbourhood Instrument, Rumania and Bulgaria, which are formal candidates, and the Balkan
countries, which are prospective candidates, have been made partners of the ENP programmes5 . Lastly, in the Solana
document on A Secure Europe in a Better World, firstly released in Brussels on December 12, 2003, the Southern Caucasus
is included in the “ring” of special interest for the EU.
The new policy plan is expressly aimed at developing a zone of prosperity and a ‘ring of friends’ with whom the EU
can enjoy close, peaceful and co-operative relations. Political and economic interdependence is recognized as a reality
that puts on the European Union the duty to creating an enlarged area of political stability and functioning rule of law.
The European Union offers the prospect of a stake in the EU’s internal market to those countries that make concrete
progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms.
5 In order to ensure a comprehensive approach, the Instrument should also cover those neighbouring countries which
benefit from CARDS and Euro-Med partnership, even though the Western Balkans fall outside the political scope of the
Wider Europe Communication. Following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, their
borders with the Western NIS and the Western Balkans will be future external borders of the Union, and are therefore also
considered (COM(2003) 393 final, page 3).
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ENP proposed incentives
1. EXTENSION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET AND REGULATORY STRUCTURES
2. PREFERENTIAL TRADING RELATIONS AND MARKET OPENING
3. PERSPECTIVES FOR LAWFUL MIGRATION AND MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
4. INTENSIFIED COOPERATION TO PREVENT AND COMBAT COMMON SECURITYTHREATS
5. GREATER EU POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
6. GREATER EFFORTS TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS, FURTHER CULTURAL COOPERATION AND
ENHANCE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
7. INTEGRATION INTO TRANSPORT, ENERGY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AND THE
EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA
8. NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
9. SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM:
10. ENHANCED ASSISTANCE, BETTER TAILORED TO NEEDS
11. NEW SOURCES OF FINANCE
Neighbouring countries are invited to take political and legislative measures to enhance economic integration and
liberalization, and measures to promote human rights, cultural cooperation and mutual understanding. Besides these
measures, which are coherent with the European view of regional security, neighbouring countries are explicitly
invited also to make steps towards regional security co-management and participate in initiatives aimed at (a)
improving conflict prevention and crisis management, and (b) strengthening co-operation to prevent and combat
common security threats. In such a perspective, it is apparent – as Biscop (2004) has extensively demonstrated - that
the Neighbourhood Policy approach to security consists of the classical concepts that distinguish the European
regional security partnership of the last thirty years: i.e. the concepts of comprehensive security – as the interdepen-
dence between the political, socio-economic, ecologic, cultural and military dimensions - and cooperative security –
as the constant exercise of dialogue and exchange of information, knowledge and expertise.
 INTENSIFIED COOPERATION TO PREVENT AND COMBAT COMMON SECURITY
THREATS: Cooperation, joint work and assistance to combat security threats such as terrorism and
trans-national organised crime, customs and taxation fraud, nuclear and environmental hazards and
communicable diseases should be prioritised. Both domestic measures and intensified bilateral and
multilateral action are indispensable to fight organised crime. Particular attention should be paid to
drugs trafficking, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants, fraud, counterfeiting, money
laundering and corruption. The EU should explore the possibilities for working ever more closely
with the neighbouring countries on judicial and police cooperation and the development of mutual
legal assistance. The approach taken in the EU/Russia Action Plan against organised crime and the
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Action Plan for Ukraine, which includes a scoreboard, could be
developed for other neighbouring countries. The EU should capitalise on the cooperation initiated in
the Mediterranean to introduce reforms to the judicial system, improve police training and other
cooperation in the fight against organised crime. The fight against terrorism is a potential area for
closer cooperation. The new neighbours should also be assisted in the implementation of all the
relevant international instruments in this field, notably those developed in the UN. EU political focus
and assistance must continue to support efforts to take forward nuclear clean-up in north west
Russia and follow-up to the closure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Efforts to combat trans-
boundary pollution - air, sea, water or land - should be modelled on the collaborative approach taken
by the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) and the Danube-Black Sea Task
Force.
 GREATER EU POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CRISIS
MANAGEMENT: Shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the
need to institutionalise respect for human rights will open the way for closer and more open dialogue
on the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the development of the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). A shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues
23
responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity. The EU
should take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over Palestine, the Western
Sahara and Transdniestria (in support of the efforts of the OSCE and other mediators). Greater EU
involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible demon-
stration of the EU’s willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the
neighbouring countries. Once settlement has been reached, EU civil and crisis management capabili-
ties could also be engaged in post-conflict internal security arrangements. Additional sources of
funding for post-conflict reconstruction and development would be required. COM(2003) 104 final,
pages 11-12).
Concluding remarks
In this paper, the main aspects of regional security cooperation in contemporary international politics have been
examined and the analysis of the initial steps of a new policy of the European Union for building security in the
surrounding areas has been introduced. Catching up the challenge of a fast changing world and coping with a hard to
understand security environment is the preoccupation of the people in Brussels that drew up and on March 2003
released the document on the Wider Europe-Neighbourhood Policy. In the document, the European Union policy-
makers declared commitment to take responsibilities that are as huge as the challenge they want to face in the
economic and financial area as well as in the political and security area. An enormous amount of material and human
resources are needed to cope with those responsibilities for a long period of time to come. Such an endeavour cannot
be assessed in a short time because it needs a progressive and flexible implementation. However, initial steps can
already be estimated as appropriately or inappropriately fitting the objective. In such a perspective, the Neighbou-
rhood Instrument document (July 2003) is quite deceptive as it declares that the Union is ready to put already
existing programmes for economic and technical cooperation under the umbrella of the Neighbourhood Instrument
but not to add one Euro to them.
In the security area, the European Union is firmly committed to the long-range strategy of building security by
improving the domestic conditions (both economic and political) of the neighbour and partner countries, and by
furthering mutual confidence and understanding of the states. At the same time, to face the threats of trans-national
crime and terrorism, it urges intense coordination and the use of new instruments. A Secure Europe in a Better World
is, in a certain sense, the twin document for the political and security area of the neighbourhood policy as the July
document on the Neighbourhood Instrument is in the economic and technical area. A Secure Europe in a Better World
is a wide-range document that devotes special attention to relations with the neighbouring countries. In this regard,
the message of the document is ambivalent in the sense that commitment to dialogue with the partners is sided with
commitment to the full-round development of the military capabilities of the Union. In fact, this is an obligation of
the Union since it committed itself to develop ESDP.
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On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS), ‘A Secure Europe in a
Better World’, the first ever common strategic vision of the Member States, filling the void that had existed ever since the
beginning of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the late 1990s.1  Although since Amsterdam the Treaty
on European Union mentions the types of operations the EU can undertake – the Petersberg Tasks or humanitarian,
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations – the role of ESDP in the whole of EU external action and the conditions
for the use of the military instrument had been left undecided for lack of consensus between the Member States. The ESS
now offers an ambitious agenda with a global scope that, because of its comprehensive approach to security, has the
potential to serve as a reference framework and a driving force for policies in all fields of external action, from trade and
development to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP. ‘Building security in our neighbourhood’ is
among its explicit objectives.
Furthermore, in March 2003 under the heading of ‘Wider Europe’ the Commission proposed a Neighbourhood Policy
as an enhanced framework for relations with the EU’s neighbouring states.2 The first draft Action Plans in that regard were
submitted to the Council in June 2004. The European Council of that was also to consider an enhanced strategic partnership
with the Mediterranean and what has been dubbed the ‘Wider Middle East’.
EU policies with regard to its neighbourhood are thus going through significant changes. The aim of this chapter is to
assess whether these developments – the ESS, ‘Wider Europe’ and the ‘Wider Middle East’ – open up new possibilities for
the – hitherto flawed – attempts to give substance to the security dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP), specifically with regard to politico-military or ESDP-related issues.3 The paper will also take into account the
impact of other simultaneous developments such as the proposed upgrading of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the
American ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’.
The European Security Strategy: Affirming the Partnership Approach
In fact, the ESS affirms the comprehensive approach to security that is underlying – inter alia – the EMP and makes it
into a general strategy for EU external action.4
The starting point of comprehensive security is the recognition of the interdependence between all dimensions of
security – political, socio-economic, cultural, ecologic, military – hence the need to formulate integrated policies on all of
them. In the EMP, this approach is evident from the composition of its three baskets, which cover the whole range of
relations between the EU and its Southern neighbours: a political and security partnership, an economic and financial
partnership and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. The EMP added a politico-military dimension to the
traditionally economic focus of Europe’s Mediterranean policies, but firmly embedded it in a broad framework of relations.
In this framework, there is a strong emphasis on dialogue and co-ownership. This cooperative approach, i.e. addressing
third States as partners for cooperation rather than as mere objects of policy, is inherent to comprehensive security: on the
one hand, unilateral policies would be politically unacceptable to the Mediterranean partners and would lead to an
antagonization of North-South relations; on the other hand, cooperation and partnership cannot be built solely on the field
of security, but require a much broader base.
In the ESS, the comprehensive approach is translated into the overall objective of ‘effective multilateralism’, i.e. ‘a
stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’. At the global
1 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003’.
http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/78367.pdf.
2 COM (2003) 104 final, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern
Neighbours’.
3 The specifics of the short-term prevention and prosecution of terrorism, which is considered to necessitate increased
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation between the judiciary, police and intelligence services rather than in the politico-
military field, therefore falls outside the scope of this paper. Tackling the root causes of terrorism is of course an
inherent part of the multidimensional EMP.
4 For a detailed analysis of the ESS see Sven Biscop, ‘The European Security Strategy – Implementing a Distinctive
Approach to Security’. Brussels, Royal Defence College (IRSD-KHID), March 2004, Sécurité & Stratégie No. 82, http:/
/www.irri-kiib.be/papers/Artikel%20V&S%20ESS.pdf.
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level, the EU seeks to pursue this objective mainly through the UN, which the ESS sees as the core of the international
system, and through the other global and regional partnerships and organizations. With regard to its neighbourhood, the
EU will itself assume a leading role in order to ‘promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European
Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’. The same
approach is to be followed at both levels: dialogue, cooperation and partnership in all fields of external action, putting to
value the whole range of instruments at the disposal of the EU.
De facto, this approach amounts to promoting effective global governance, which can be best understood as a system
that at the global level ensures access to the same core public goods which the state provides to its citizens at the national
level. These global public goods (GPG) can e.g. be summarized as: international stability and security, an open and
inclusive economic system, an enforceable legal order, and global welfare in all its dimensions as an equivalent to national
welfare systems. At a certain level of inequality in terms of access to these core GPG, the resulting political instability
and extremism, economic unpredictability and massive migration flows risk to become uncontrollable. This gap between
haves and have-nots therefore represents the ultimate systemic threat to international security.5 GPG are not explicitly
mentioned in the ESS, but: ‘spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption
and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the
international order’. So without any doubt, emphasis in the ESS is on a long-term policy of stabilisation and conflict
prevention through the promotion of global governance.
But of course, dialogue, cooperation and partnership cannot be unconditional. States violating the norms of beha-
viour vis-à-vis the international community or their own population ‘should understand that there is a price to be paid,
including in their relationship with the European Union’. Partnership with the EU can thus be cut back or enhanced
according to performance, for: ‘We want international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting
threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken’. In certain
cases this can include the use of force, but certainly not exclusively – implicitly, the ESS considers the use of force as an
instrument of last resort, in principle to be applied only with a Security Council mandate.6 The EU aims for ‘early, rapid,
and when necessary, robust intervention’, but this applies to ‘the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management
and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development
activities’.
On the whole, the ESS is a positive project, emphasizing positive objectives – ‘effective multilateralism’ or the core
GPG. ‘What for’ rather than ‘against whom’ is the question that determines policy. Thus the comprehensive approach
avoids the classic security dilemma. The added value of comprehensive security lies in the integration of all fields of
external action under this single agenda of ‘effective multilateralism’. ‘Securitization’ of policy fields other than ESDP,
i.e. treating issues as politico-military or ‘hard’ security problems and consequently applying politico-military instru-
ments to solve them, is equally avoided however. Under the global heading of promoting ‘effective multilateralism’, the
politico-military is just one dimension of external action, at the same level as the other fields. Thus, the implementation
of the ESS should lead to the opposite of ‘securitization’: issues should be dealt with as development, human rights,
ecologic problems etc. and should only be put in a politico-military or security perspective when developments threaten
to have direct security consequences for the population of the state concerned, for the region or for the EU itself. In fact
therefore, the ESS really is more than a security strategy – it is a strategy for external action.
Even though until December 2003 no formal strategic concept existed, a distinctive European approach to security
had already been emerging over the last few years. EU policies towards its neighbouring States have been particularly
revealing with regard to the EU’s preference for a comprehensive and cooperative approach, aiming at cooperation rather
than confrontation. Obviously, there have been exceptions to this line – in the Mediterranean, the conclusion of an
Association Agreement with Algeria, quite regardless of ongoing violence in the country, is a case in point – and there will
continue to be so. Nevertheless in the ESS, the concept of comprehensive security has now been rubberstamped as the
European approach to security.
From Affirmation to Implementation: ‘Wider Europe’
Simply reaffirming the ‘spirit of Barcelona’ in the ESS is insufficient however, in view of the EMP’s need of revitalisa-
5 Rik Coolsaet & Valérie Arnould (eds.), ‘Global Governance: The Next Frontier’. Brussels, Royal Institute for Interna-
tional Relations, April 2004, Egmont Paper No. 2.
6 Although it can be argued that on this issue, if at all, an unambiguous position was called for, in order to prevent further
paralyzing divides like on the invasion of Iraq, and because of the exemplary role of the EU: who will yet stand up for
the collective security system of the UN if not Europe?
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tion. With regard to the Mediterranean specifically, the ESS, under the heading of ‘Building security in our neighbourhood’,
states that it ‘generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved
conflicts. The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more
effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process’.
This emphasis on the EU’s neighbourhood does not contradict the global scope of the ESS. This is not a question of a
hierarchy of priorities: an effective system of governance at the regional level is a component of the overall objective of
global governance; because of globalisation, stability of the world order as such is as important as stability in our neighbou-
rhood. Rather the modus operandi differs: whereas at the global level the EU chooses to act primarily through the
multilateral architecture, in its neighbourhood it also seeks to assume leadership itself. The EU and its neighbourhood can
be considered a ‘security complex’ as defined by Buzan: ‘a group of States whose primary security concerns link together
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’.7 Therefore, in
this area the onus is on the EU to assume responsibility and take the lead: a stable neighbourhood is a necessity for its own
security and promoting stability in that area is its duty, since the EU is the local actor with the means to do so.
Although – surprisingly perhaps – it is not explicitly mentioned in the ESS, the objective of ‘building security in our
neighbourhood’ and the call to render existing partnerships, including the EMP, more effective, correspond perfectly to the
Neighbourhood Policy proposed by the Commission. The aim of the Neighbourhood Policy is to achieve ‘an area of shared
prosperity and values’ by creating close partnerships with the EU’s neighbouring States, bringing them as close to the EU
as possible without being a member, which should lead to in-depth economic integration, close political and cultural
relations and a joint responsibility for conflict prevention. To that end, the EU is to offer very concrete ‘benefits’, basically
a stake in the EU’s internal market, to be accompanied by further integration and liberalisation to promote the free
movement of persons, goods, services and capital – ‘the four freedoms’. Through a process of ‘positive conditionality’,
these benefits will be linked to political and economic reform. As the Commission proposes: ‘The privileged relationship
with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good
governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the
principles of market economy and sustainable development. Commitments will also be sought to certain essential aspects
of the EU’s external action, including, in particular, the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, as well as abidance by international law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution’.8 The Neighbourhood Policy
thus has a wide stabilizing and preventive scope.
The Neighbourhood Policy’s overall objectives could thus be summarized as:9
- preventing conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood and acts of aggression against the EU itself;
- settling ongoing disputes and conflicts;
- establishing close economic and political partnerships based on shared values, prosperity and security;
- controlling migration and all forms of illegal trafficking into the EU;
- protecting the security of EU citizens living abroad.
The Neighbourhood Policy does not aim to replace existing frameworks for relations, such as the EMP; rather it wants
to supplement and build on them. The idea is to strike a balance between, on the one hand, bilateral Action Plans, so that
benefits and benchmarks for progress can be tailored to specific needs and circumstances, in agreement with the individual
– in casu Mediterranean – partners, and, on the other hand, multilateral partnerships such as the Barcelona Process, in order
to deal with regional issues and to promote regional integration between partners. The latter is the key to mending the
institutional unbalance within the EMP, which sees a closely integrated EU of now 25 Member States facing ten partner
States that are only loosely involved in any kind of regional consultation. The Action Plans, to cover the next three to five
years, are to address five key areas: ‘political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually
obtaining a stake in the EU’s internal market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment
and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts’.10 The next step, if Action Plan priorities are
met, could be the conclusion of European Neighbourhood Agreements to replace current bilateral agreements.
Actually, most of the measures that are now being proposed in the framework of Wider Europe are already among the
established objectives of the EMP. This holds true for both substance and progress. E.g. in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration
7 Barry Buzan, ‘People, States and Fear. Second Edition. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold
War Era’. Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
8 Communication from the Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper’, 12 May 2004.
9 Rik Coolsaet & Sven Biscop (eds.), ‘A European Security Concept for the 21st Century’. Brussels, Royal Institute for
International Relations, 2004, Egmont Paper No. 1.
10 Communication from the Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper’, 12 May 2004.
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partners agreed to create ‘an area of shared prosperity’, to be based on ‘the progressive establishment of a free trade area’,
economic cooperation and ‘a substantial increase in the EU’s financial assistance to its partners’. The EMP already
comprises a mix of multilateral and regional activities on the one hand and Association Agreements and associated program-
mes that are negotiated bilaterally with the partners on the other hand. There has certainly never been a lack of ideas to
advance the EMP – it is their implementation that has been rather more problematic. There is a lack of ‘cross-pillar’
functioning in the EMP; each basket is run in a more or less autonomous way, without much coordination with the others.
The Association Agreements ought to include provisions on political dialogue, human rights, rule of law etc., but in the
actual agreements these remain limited to very general stipulations, and even those have never been invoked. The regulations
on the MEDA Programme link economic support to the promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and good-
neighbourly relations, but here too in actual practice conditionality is very limited if not non-existent.11 As a result,
comprehensive security has been insufficiently translated into practice. The impression created is that the EU prefers
stability over democratization and reform.
On the other hand, for positive conditionality to be effective, a real ‘carrot’ should be offered by the EU. Currently, it
seems as if the Mediterranean partners are suffering all the hardships entailed by economic reforms necessitated by the
projected free trade area, but without gaining much in terms of effective benefits in return, or even the near-term prospect
of benefits. Undoubtedly, the most sensitive area in this regard is the EU’s agricultural policy, the protectionist character of
which produces major negative effects for its Southern trade partners.12 But in the textile sector as well, limits have been
imposed; real free trade applies only to oil, gas and industrial products. It has been argued that the result of these half-
hearted policies has actually been a worsening of socio-economic conditions in the partner countries.13 For this situation to
be amended, a substantial effort would be needed on the part of the EU.
With regard to the Mediterranean, the added value of the Neighbourhood Policy therefore is not in the substance of the
measures and working methods proposed.14 Care should rather be taken to preserve the acquis of the EMP, so as not to lose
its rich and varied approach to the many dimensions of Euro-Mediterranean relations.15 What the Neighbourhood Policy
does offer is an opportunity to re-launch the EMP, the possibility to have a fresh start. To grasp that opportunity, the
Member States will have to muster the necessary political will to invest sufficient means and offer the neighbouring States
real benefits.16 Even if membership is not on offer for the remaining Mediterranean partners – except Turkey – other,
‘silver’ carrots can be devised.17 Opening up to agricultural exports for one, or subsidizing major infrastructure
projects. In the longer term, perhaps a ‘Marshall Plan’ for the Mediterranean could be the next grand project of the
EU after enlargement, a major scheme as the only way to substantially and durably improve conditions on the
Southern shore.18 These real benefits should be related to clear benchmarks, to ensure real progress towards reform.
As partners agreed at the latest ministerial meeting (Dublin, 5-6 May 2004): ‘The level of EU support to the
implementation of reforms should be related on a mutually agreed basis in a spirit of co-ownership, to the intensity
of the efforts of the partners assessed under the framework of agreed evaluation instruments’.19
Without a substantial effort the Neighbourhood Policy will suffer the same fate as the ‘old’ EMP: well-intentio-
ned principles, but very limited implementation. Promises only of the proverbial carrot will be insufficient, for they
11 Erwan Lannon, Kirstyn Inglis & Tom Haenebalcke, ‘The Many Faces of EU Conditionality in Pan-Euro-Mediterra-
nean Relations’. In: Marc Marescau & Erwan Lannon (eds.), ‘The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies. A
Comparative Analysis’. New York, Palgrave, 2001, pp. 97-138.
12 Not to mention for the EU budget.
13 Fred Tanner, ‘North Africa. Partnership, Exceptionalism and Neglect’. In: Roland Dannreuther (ed.), ‘European
Foreign and Security Policy. Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy’. London, Routledge, 2004, pp. 135-150.
14 The Commission proposes inter alia the following incentives: extension of the internal market and regulatory struc-
tures; preferential trade relations and market opening; perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons;
integration into transport, energy and telecommunications networks and the European research area; new instruments
for investment promotion and protection; and support for integration into the global trading system.
15 Martin Ortega, ‘A New EU Policy on the Mediterranean?’. In: Judy Batt et al., ‘Partners and Neighbours: A CFSP for
a Wider Europe’. Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 64, 2003, pp. 86-101.
16 William Wallace, ‘Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25’. Paris, Notre Europe, Policy
Paper No. 4, July 2003.
17 Antonio Missiroli, ‘The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood. Stabilization, Integration and Partnership’. In: Roland
Dannreuther (ed.), op. cit., pp. 12-26.
18 Martin Ortega, op. cit., p. 93.
19 ‘Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Dublin, 5-6 May 2004) – Presidency Conclu-
sions’. On conditionality see Dorothée Schmid, ‘Interlinkages within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Linking
Economic, Institutional and Political Reform: Conditionality within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’. Lisbon,
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, 2003, EUROMESCO Paper No. 27.
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have been made too often already. Implementing the Neighbourhood Policy should be nothing less than a top priority.
In the long term, if it is successful, the Neighbourhood Policy could, through permanent close interaction and sharing
of norms and values, lead to the progressive emergence of new ‘security communities’20 encompassing the EU – a
‘security community’ in itself that is expanding through enlargement – and the neighbouring regions or sub-regions.
What of the Security Dimension?
Even though no direct security threats to the EU are emanating from the Mediterranean, the EMP and the
Neighbourhood Policy cannot do without a politico-military or security dimension as a necessary component of a
comprehensive approach. The security dimension, which is included in the first basket of the EMP, must comple-
ment policies in the other fields of external action. On the one hand, politico-military cooperation is an aspect of the
long-term stabilization and conflict prevention that the comprehensive approach aims for: exchange of information,
exchange of liaison officers, observing exercises, joint manoeuvres and eventually joint operations, arms control, non-
proliferation and disarmament all increase mutual trust, both in North-South and South-South relations. Secondly, in
the event of crises that require some sort of military intervention, involving the threat or use of force or not,
established politico-military cooperation provides a much more effective framework for consultation and, preferably,
joint action than ad hoc arrangements or unilateral initiatives on the part of the EU or one or more of the Mediterra-
nean partners. As ESDP continues to develop, the EU becomes an ever more capable actor in this field.
This politico-military dimension, including the willingness to use force if necessary, is not contradictory to the so-
called ‘civilian character’ of the EU or the EMP, contrary to what inter alia Jünemann and Smith21 fear. The defining
question is when, under what circumstances, and not if force can be used. Maintaining the option of the use of force
as an instrument of last resort, to be used according to international law, is in line with Maull’s definition of ‘civilian
power’ as including military power ‘as a residual instrument’.22 Without the willingness to apply pressure, sanctions
and, if need be, force, EU external action will not acquire the credibility it needs to be effective. This leads Stavridis
to the assertion that ‘thanks to the militarising of the Union, the latter might at long last be able to act as a real civilian
power in the world’.23 Keukeleire too concludes that what he terms ‘structural foreign policy’ can be effective only
‘if it goes hand in hand with an effective traditional foreign policy which can be supported by military instruments’.24
The deciding factor is that since it has acquired a military capacity, the EU still presents itself, not as a ‘traditional’
power, but as ‘a power which is unique because it will be able to use military means as an integrated part of a much
broader range of political, economic and diplomatic means’.25 As Gnesotto states, ‘the great debate of the 1980s over
Europe as a civil power or a military power definitely seems to be a thing of the past […] what the Union intends to
become is a sui generis power’.26 ‘Comprehensive security’ therefore is a term better suited to the EU than ‘civilian
power’, as it emphasises the integration of all fields of external action, and avoids the paralysing debate on the validity
of the claim to ‘civilian power-status’ when possessing a military dimension that is inherent in the literature on the
latter.27
Proposals to enhance the security dimension of the EMP are abundant. In its 2000 Common Strategy on the
Mediterranean Region the EU already stated its intention ‘to make use of the evolving common European policy on
security and defence to consider how to strengthen, together with its Med partners, cooperative security in the
20 Adler & Barnett define a ‘pluralistic security community’, that can evolve from ‘loosely’ to ‘tightly coupled’ as ‘a
trans-national region comprised of sovereign States whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful
change’. (Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett (eds.), ‘Security Communities’. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1998).
21 Annette Jünemann, ‘Repercussions of the Emerging European Security and Defence Policy on the Civil Character of
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’. In: Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 8, 2003, No. 2-3, pp. 37-53. Karen E. Smith,
‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or a Cause for Concern?’ In: The International Spectator, Vol. 35,
2000, No. 2, pp. 11-28.
22 Hans Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, 1990, No. 5, pp.92-93.
23 Stelios Stavridis, ‘“Militarising” the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Revisited’. In: The International Spectator,
Vol. 41, 2001, No. 4, pp. 43-50.
24 Stephan Keukeleire, ‘Reconceptualising (European) Foreign Policy: Structural Foreign Policy’. Paper presented at the
ECPR First Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, Bordeaux, 26-28 September 2002.
25 Henrik Larsen, ‘The EU: A Global Military Actor?’. In: Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 37, 2002, No. 3, pp. 283-302.
26 Nicole Gnesotto, ‘European Strategy as a Model’. In: EU Institute for Security Studies, Newsletter No. 9, January 2004,
pp. 1 & 4.
27 This division within the literature on ‘civilian power’ is already apparent in the earliest authors’ writings. Whereas the
‘founder’, Duchêne, used the term ‘civilian power’ to refer to the EEC, which did not possess a military capacity at all,
Maull applied the concept to Germany and Japan, which do have armed forces. (François Duchêne, ‘Europe’s Role in
World Peace’. In: Richard Mayne, ‘Europe Tomorrow’. London, Fontana, 1972).
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region’. So far however, all efforts to add substance to it have failed in the face of the unwillingness of the Mediter-
ranean partners. Consequently, political dialogue has remained at a low level and only a few partnership measures
have been implemented: a network of contact points for political and security matters; training seminars for diploma-
ts; the EUROMESCO network of foreign policy institutes; a register of bilateral agreements among the partner
countries; exchange of information on partner countries’ adherence to international conventions on terrorism, human
rights, arms control and disarmament, armed conflict and international law; and a pilot project on natural and man-
made disasters. These measures are limited not only in number, but also in scope: they are mainly declaratory and deal
with neither military cooperation nor crisis management. Measures regarding arms control, disarmament or non-
proliferation are conspicuously absent, even though these are among the region’s most important security issues.
The Valencia Action Plan adopted by the 5th Euro-Mediterranean Conference (22-23 April 2002), an important
attempt to define concrete actions to further the EMP, listed ‘effective dialogue on political and security matters,
including on the ESDP’ among the measures to be taken. Subsequently, on 19 March 2003, the Council endorsed a set
of proposals aiming to open up ESDP to the Mediterranean partners.28 An enhanced dialogue has been created,
including meetings between the troika of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the heads of mission of the
Mediterranean partners once each Presidency, as well as meetings at expert level; partners can also establish contact
with the Secretariat General of the Council and with the Commission. Flexibility has been introduced – partners can
themselves decide on the scope and intensity of their participation – and progressiveness. The initial aim is to
familiarize partners with ESDP objectives and procedures. In a mid-term perspective partners that are willing can be
invited to observe manoeuvres, to appoint liaison officers to the EU Military Staff and to participate in EU training
courses. This gradual process should pave the road to participation by Mediterranean partners in actual EU-led crisis
management operations, to which the Council can invite them on a case-by-case basis.29 In spite of this offer on the
part of the EU, partner countries have remained extremely reluctant to engage however; so far, the dialogue has gained
little substance.
Foremost to explain this lack of political will is the Middle East conflict. On a par with socio-economic condi-
tions, notably the poverty of the majority of the population, and the lack of democratic institutions, leading to de-
legitimization of existing regimes, extremism and internal instability, the eternal conflict between Israel and Palestine
continues to be the main cause of instability in the region. As such, it is the main stumbling-block for an enhanced
security partnership between both shores of the Mediterranean. One cannot expect partners to engage in far-reaching
security cooperation when they are divided on the question of an armed conflict hanging over the whole region, and
when moreover a number of them criticize EU policy on the issue as too passive. Furthermore, authoritarian regimes
abuse the conflict as a ground of legitimacy. Significant steps towards a resolution of the conflict are a necessary
prerequisite for a security partnership to really take off. Proposals for a security partnership that ignore resolution
of ongoing conflicts are not taken seriously. The same actually holds true for other unresolved conflicts and disputes
in the area: Western Sahara, Algeria and, in spite of recent mediation efforts with a view to the island’s undivided
accession to the EU, Cyprus – although it is far from certain that in all these cases all parties concerned would
welcome any EU involvement. Since EU enlargement on 1 May 2004, the importance of the Middle East conflict for
the EMP has become even more pronounced, for with the accession of Cyprus and Malta, and with Turkey having
a special status as a candidate member and as a NATO Ally, the partners comprise only the Mediterranean Arab
countries and Israel.30
The dissatisfaction with the EU’s limited investment in the financial and economic chapter is a second reason. It
is often felt that the EU puts undue emphasis on the security aspects of the EMP, to the detriment of the economic
basket which the Mediterranean partners consider to be the field for priority action.
Thirdly, there is certain distrust with regard to ESDP itself. With the Gulf War and the intervention in Kosovo in
mind, there is a fear to become objects of ‘Western interventionism’. In the mid-1990s the formation of two
multinational military units, EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, by the EU’s Southern Member States was already
viewed with considerable suspicion. Indeed, states on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean considered the units to
28 On proposals to deepen the security partnership see Sven Biscop, ‘Opening up the ESDP to the South: A Comprehen-
sive and Cooperative Approach to Euro-Mediterranean Security’. In: Security Dialogue, Vol. 34, 2003, No. 2, pp. 179-
193. Ibid., ‘Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership’. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003.
29 The situation is different for Turkey: like the other non-EU European members of NATO, it is already involved in a
close dialogue on ESDP, it is automatically invited to participate in all EU operations using NATO assets and it can be
invited to EU only operations on a case-by-case basis.
30 Fred Tanner, op. cit., p. 140.
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be mainly directed against them. In view of the initial absence of a strategic concept, it was easy to see the development
of the ESDP and the creation of a rapid reaction force for the EU in a similar light. It is not difficult to imagine how the
debate on ‘pre-emption’ can fuel this fear of ‘interventionism’. Research shows however that more important than
actual distrust is a generalized lack of information about ESDP – which can of course easily be abused to create distrust,
notably by nationalist and Islamist sectors of society. This lack of information either leads to scepticism regarding the
ability of the EU to become an effective international security actor or, quite the opposite, to unrealistically high
expectations regarding a potential EU role in the Middle East conflict. There are positive views of ESDP also however,
because its development is seen as evidence of multilateralism and as a way to balance the US.31 These positive
sentiments must be built upon.
Fourthly, on a more general level, in the partner countries there is limited interest in the Mediterranean as an
organizing concept of policy, both among policy-makers and academics. The EMP is mostly seen as a way of addressing
relations with the EU; regional dynamics and South-South regional integration between the Mediterranean partners
receive far less attention. From the perspective of the EU, security is an obvious dimension of its Neighbourhood Policy,
but for the partners themselves, ‘Mediterranean security in itself does not seem to have an autonomous raison d’être’,32
hence their lack of enthusiasm for multilateral security cooperation at the regional level. It should also be acknowledged
that Mediterranean partners are less familiar with notions such as comprehensive security, cooperative security and
confidence and security-building measures.
Finally, it must not be ignored that with regard to those partner States that have authoritarian forms of government
and where the armed forces play an important part in politics, politico-military cooperation with the EU is a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, it could serve to enhance the status of the current regime – which might in some cases run
counter to EU objectives in the field of democratization, human rights and the rule of law. On the other hand, cooperation
that is conditional upon reform in precisely those fields would undermine the position of these regimes, which explains
why they are not very forthcoming. Furthermore, large parts of public opinion are often not in favour of security
cooperation with ‘the West’, which again would have negative consequences for the regimes’ internal power base.
Enhancing the Security Dimension: An Incremental Process
Obviously, in view of the lack of political will on the side of the Mediterranean partners, enhancing the security
dimension of the EMP cannot be but a very incremental process. In the field of security, the EU has a major problem of
credibility vis-à-vis its Mediterranean partners, which rules out any grand schemes in the near future. But as this lack of
credibility is to a large extent based on a lack of information, which is at the same time an important source of distrust,
it is not without mending. Two concrete initiatives might be considered by the EU.
Firstly, the EU could step up its efforts to communicate about the aims and nature of ESDP. The absence of a
strategic concept for ESDP was an important cause of suspicion regarding the true intentions of the EU. Now that the
ESS has filled this strategic vacuum, offering as it does a strategic framework for the whole of EU external action, the
document should be publicized much more than it is. Even within the EU, the ESS is little known outside the small circles
of policy-makers and experts. The EU could consider an exercise in outreach, not only in the limited framework of the
EMP dialogue on ESDP, but also to academia, journalists and NGOs in the partner countries. The EUROMESCO
network for one could play an important role in this regard.
Perhaps in a later stage such a dialogue about the ESS could lead to a truly joint reflection on the specifics of the
Mediterranean region, along the same lines as the ESS – the challenges posed by the security environment, the objectives,
and their policy implications – in order to arrive at a common document at the regional level, next to the bilateral Action
Plans, which could put down guidelines for cooperation and serve as a framework for an enhanced security partnership
similar to the way the ESS does – or should – for EU external action. By tackling it from this new angle, the debate on
the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, which has been moribund ever since at the 1999 Stuttgart
Ministerial it was decided to postpone its adoption until ‘political circumstances allow’, could be given a new impetus,
be it not in the short term.
Secondly, the EU need not wait for the dialogue on ESDP to have advanced further to invite partner countries to
participate in its operations. At its Istanbul summit in June 2004, NATO decided to hand over operations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (SFOR) to the EU by the end of the year; the EU will stage an operation making use of NATO assets under
31 Alvaro de Vasconcelos, ‘Launching the Euro-Mediterranean Security and Defence Dialogue’. Lisbon, Instituto de
Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, 2004, EUROMESCO Brief. Annette Jünemann, op. cit., pp. 45-6.
32 Gamal A. G. Soltan, ‘Southern Mediterranean Perceptions and Proposals for Mediterranean Security’. Lisbon, Instituto
de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, 2004, EUROMESCO Brief.
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the Berlin+ framework. The take-over of SFOR presents an excellent opportunity for the EU to invite its Mediterranean
partners, for a number of them have already taken part in NATO operations in the Balkans in the past or are still present
with their forces today. In the first half of 2004, Morocco had 350 troops in SFOR and a field battalion in Kosovo (KFOR);
Egypt and Jordan have taken part in IFOR, SFOR’s predecessor, in the past, while the latter has also participated in KFOR.
For these countries at least, taking part in an EU operation using NATO assets, i.e. in a very similar framework, on familiar
terrain, ought to be politically feasible. The EU and NATO could very well take a joint initiative to put the proposal to all
the States involved in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia
– and to the other Mediterranean partners of the EU. Taking part in an actual EU operation and witnessing ESDP
functioning in the field should go a long way to improve the credibility of the EU. Participation would of course be on a
voluntary basis, open at all times to the Mediterranean partners that are willing.
As Ministers noted at the Naples Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2-3 December 2003), ‘some of the Mediterranean
partners already work with the EU in peacekeeping activities (Balkans, Africa) under the UN aegis’. E.g. in the first half of
2004 Morocco and Tunisia contributed with contingents of 826 and 465 respectively to MONUC, the UN mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, while Algeria, Egypt and Jordan were also present with military observers and/or civilian
police. On the EU side in that same period Sweden was present with a contingent of 86, with Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, France, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the UK contributing observers and/or police. From June to
September 2003, the EU at the request of the UN also implemented an operation of its own, ‘Artemis’, to secure the area
around the city of Bunia in the Eastern province of Ituri. Such common participation in a UN operation could be the subject
of a fruitful exchange in the framework of the EMP dialogue on ESDP, on lessons learned, best practices etc. It could also
lay the foundations for involvement of Mediterranean partners in future EU operations, in Africa e.g., particularly
operations at the request of the UN. Would an intervention in crises such as that in the Darfur region of Sudan e.g., if the
international community could muster the necessary political will that is, not lend itself to Euro-Mediterranean coopera-
tion? The EU has recently adopted a new Common Position on conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa,
outlining an ambitious comprehensive approach, with a strong emphasis on empowerment of African actors.33 Britain,
France and Germany have launched the idea to create 1500-strong rapidly deployable ‘battle-groups’ to contribute
primarily to UN operations. As the EU gradually takes on a more ‘expeditionary’ role, as can be expected, taking on more
responsibility for international peace and security and implementing the ESS, those Mediterranean partners that are willing
could easily be involved. This would answer the call from the latest Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial, in Dublin, to explore
cooperation in concrete activities.
These very concrete steps would all contribute to increasing confidence between both sides of the Mediterranean and
to enhancing the credibility of the EU as an international actor, thus to prepare the ground for a deepening and institutiona-
lization of the security dimension of the EMP in the longer term. The next steps could then firstly include the measures
already foreseen by the Council: a more substantial and perhaps also more regular dialogue at PSC and expert level,
detaching liaison officers to the EUMS, and taking part in EU training and manoeuvres.
In the longer term further-reaching steps can be imagined:
- standard procedures for joint crisis management in the event of crises in the EMP area, to allow for joint decision-
making and action; taking into account partners’ sensitivities, it would seem recommendable to provide for – at least
– automatic consultation whenever the EU considers an intervention in the region; an automatic invitation to partici-
pate in any EU operations in the Mediterranean could perhaps follow in an even later stage;
- a Euro-Mediterranean situation centre, to collect and analyze data – provided on a regular basis by partners on both
sides of the Mediterranean – on a number of agreed items, and to monitor developments with crisis potential;34
- multinational forces including contingents from the Mediterranean partners, e.g. on the basis of EUROFOR and
EUROMARFOR;
- joint action on landmines and air/sea search and rescue;
- a wide range of confidence and security-building measures, e.g. prior notification of major manoeuvres, participation
in the UN system of standardized reporting of military expenditure, an encyclopaedia of terminology on security.
Finally and more generally, in the longer term an update of the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region can be
considered. A new text, concise, along the lines of the ESS, but also more precise, to be elaborated in much closer
33 ‘Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004 Concerning Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution in Africa and Repealing Common Position 2001/374/CFSP’. In: Official Journal, 2004, L021, pp.25-29.
34 On the idea of a conflict prevention centre see Stephen Calleya, ‘Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean: A Regional
Approach’. In: Bo Huldt, Mats Engman & Elisabeth Davidson (eds.), ‘Euro-Mediterranean Security and the Barcelona
Process. Strategic Yearbook 2003’. Stockholm, Swedish National Defence College, 2002, pp. 41-59.
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consultation with the Mediterranean partners than the current document, could summarize the new approach, based on the
ESS, the Neighbourhood Policy and the joint reflection on security proposed above, and translate this into operational
objectives.
Obstacles posed by the International Context
For the time being however, the EU had better concentrate on small, incremental but concrete steps, as for more
substantial advances to be possible in the security field, the regional context as such must improve significantly as well.
This context imposes that on the one hand, the EU should make an earnest effort and invest sufficient means to
implement the Neighbourhood Policy, to answer the socio-economic concerns which the Mediterranean partners hold
to be most important, but also to ensure the comprehensive nature of its approach, i.e. to maintain the link between
politico-military cooperation, political reform and economic support that is at the core of ‘Wider Europe’. Politico-
military cooperation had best been put in the context of the bilateral Action Plans, in which mutual commitments and
objective benchmarks must be clearly defined. Even if politico-military cooperation cannot be obligatory, participation
in certain activities could certainly be included among the steps meriting the accordance of specific benefits. In the
absence of conditionality, politico-military cooperation might be counterproductive with regard to the objective of
promoting democratization, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Security sector reform should actually be
among the explicit objectives of the EU, especially in the context of the ongoing fight against terrorism, the label of which
is all too easily abused by security agencies and armed forces to silence legitimate opposition.
On the other hand, significant steps towards a settlement of the Middle East conflict are a conditio sine qua non for
the establishment of any durable security arrangement in the Mediterranean. As the ESS itself states: ‘Resolution of the
Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other
problems in the Middle East’. This can only be achieved through a major joint effort by the EU and the US. Again this
view has been included in the ESS: ‘The two state solution – which Europe has long supported – is now widely accepted.
Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United
Nations and Russia […]’. Regardless of the position of the US though, as the Commission has stated, ‘The EU should
take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over Palestine [and] the Western Sahara […] Greater EU
involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EU’s
willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries’.35
Because of the predominance of the Middle East conflict, without significant steps towards its resolution other
schemes for the region have very limited chances of success. The American ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’
(GMEI) is a case in point.36 This originally very ambitious scheme to promote democracy in the ‘Greater Middle
East’, which in the American definition includes the Arab States, Israel, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran,
has already been watered down in the running-up to the different summits taking place in June 2004 (EU-US, Arab
League, European Council, NATO), because of the extremely reluctant reactions of the Middle Eastern States
concerned.37 It is difficult to see how such an initiative on the part of the US could have met with any other reaction
in the current context of the widely contested American-led occupation of Iraq and of American passivity with
regard to, or even outright support for, unilateral actions by the Sharon government that run contrary to the agreed
road to peace, with regard to the Middle East conflict.38 It could be said that the Bush administration just lacks the
moral authority in the region to propose democratic changes.39 The GMEI also seems to span just too large an area,
which comprises States that are too different for a single unified approach to be workable, and which does not constitute
a single ‘security complex’.40 The area of application seems to have been defined by the needs of the US’ ‘war on
35 COM (2003) 104 final, p. 12.
36 Robin Wright & Glenn Kessler, ‘Bush Aims for “Greater Mideast” Plan. Democracy Initiative to be Aired at G8 Talks’.
In: The Washington Post, 9 February 2004.
37 At is May 2004 Summit, the Arab League adopted a ‘Pledge of Accord and Solidarity’, in which leaders called for
‘broader participation in public affairs’ and human rights and the strengthening of the role of women ‘in line with our
faith, values and traditions’. The document can be seen as a local response to the external GMEI, although its value on
the ground is questionable. ‘Arabs Set Rules for Use of Troops in Iraq’. In: International Herald Tribune, 24 May 2004.
38 US Secretary of State Colin Powell paints a positive picture of US policy under the Bush administration, stressing its
part in the creation of the Quartet and the promotion of reform of the Palestinian Authority, and emphasizing the
negative role of Yasir Arafat: ‘[…] it is now clear to all where the real problem lies’. Colin L. Powell, ‘A Strategy of
Partnerships’. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, 2004, No. 1, pp. 22-34.
39 Martin Ortega, ‘Options for the Greater Middle East. Report of the Seminar held in Paris on 3 May 2004’. EU Institute
for Security Studies, www.iss-eu.org.
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terrorism’ rather than by any inherent characteristics. These differences imply that even if a stabile, democratic Iraq
emerges in the short term, a democratic domino-effect in the region is highly unlikely. Furthermore the GMEI has at least
been perceived as putting too much emphasis on external intervention – or on ‘imposing’ democracy – ignoring the
internal dynamics that are necessary to achieve any durable change. And popular criticism of current regimes does not
necessarily translate into support for external intervention; in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, any American or British
involvement in particular is highly sensitive.41 These criticisms seem to have been taken into account when on 9 June
2004 the G8 summit finally adopted a much more moderate ‘Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the
Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa’. The G8 document mentions the need to coordinate different
initiatives and includes a detailed list of measures envisaging to support internally driven economic and political reform,
but lacks references to budgets and concrete implementation.
All this is not to say of course that promoting reform is not necessary in the States of the region, which is precisely
one of the long-standing objectives of the EMP – the EU has not ‘discovered’ the need for democratization after ‘9/11’.42
In the current context therefore, US efforts would seem better spent supporting the established EMP rather than by
launching a separate initiative, with a joint EU-US shift to a higher gear being possible after steps have been taken with
regard to the Middle East conflict. The watered-down US proposals are in fact very close to what the EU is already
doing – or attempting – in the framework of the EMP.
As to the countries outside the EMP, the ESS states that ‘a broader engagement with the Arab world should also be
considered’. This can be seen as a reference to the report on the EU’s relations with the Arab world that Romano Prodi,
Javier Solana and Chris Patten submitted to the December 2003 European Council, in which they recommend, for the
States outside the Barcelona Process, ‘to explore proposals for a possible regional strategy for the Wider Middle East,
comprising relations with GCC43 countries, Yemen, Iraq and Iran’.44 This one sentence in the Strategy thus ambitiously
extends the EU’s definition of its neighbourhood, but rightly so, for relations with these States are less developed, while
at the same time certain security issues affecting the members of the EMP, notably in the Middle East, obviously cannot
be tackled without them. These States would not be included in the Neighbourhood Policy or the EMP, but an additional
framework is envisaged which would be closely linked to both existing frameworks. A strategy document to that end was
adopted by the June 2004 European Council, the ‘EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East
or ‘Wider Middle East’. Again, the US could support this initiative and envisage further joint steps in a later stage.
Indeed, an effective partnership with the Mediterranean and the Greater/Wider Middle East is more crucial to the EU
than to the US, because of geographic proximity, the EU’s greater energy dependence and the large Arab population
living within the EU. But within the EU itself as well, an exercise in coordination seems absolutely necessary, as it is far
from clear yet how exactly the different policy framework – EMP, Neighbourhood Policy, Wider Middle East – will
relate to each other.
EU-US cooperation is the key, with regard to the Middle East conflict, as each is only accepted as an impartial
mediator by one party to the conflict, and with regard to comprehensive partnerships in the Mediterranean and the Gulf
regions, as only their combined financial and other efforts will have a sufficient impact. The rapid succession of
international initiatives with regard to the region certainly calls for thorough coordination. Unfortunately, Brussels and
Washington continue to differ, the former considering the Middle East conflict as the absolute priority to be dealt with
before there is the slightest chance of success of dealing with any other matter, while the latter still seem to hope that
somehow, the problem will disappear almost by itself if only Iraq can be stabilized and then the process of democrati-
zation of the ‘Greater Middle East’ can be launched. As Ottaway and Carothers frankly put it: ‘The attempt to launch
a new initiative without discussing the peace process is a triumph of abstract logic over political reality’.45 In fact, it can
be argued that the US has already missed an enormous opportunity to re-launch the peace process by opting for
support for harsh and un-reconciling Israeli policies, under the guise of anti-terrorism, instead of brokering an
agreement when, immediately following ‘9/11’, a lull in the violence occurred as all Palestinians were stunned by the
40 E.g. India is much more central to Pakistan’s security than the Middle East.
41 Tim Niblock, ‘Reform and Reconstruction in the Middle East: Room for EU-US Cooperation?’. In: The International
Spectator, Vol. 38, 2003, No. 4, pp. 47-58.
42 Volker Perthes, ‘America’s Greater Middle East and Europe. Key Issues for the Transatlantic Dialogue’. Berlin, Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2004, SWP Comments No. 3.
43 The Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
44 ‘Strengthening EU’s Relations with the Arab World’. http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/78372.pdf.
45 Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, ‘The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start’. Washington DC,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, Policy Brief No. 29.
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horrendous events and their potential impact on the region. The conclusion is that an EU-US forum for permanent
consultation and coordination of policies on the Mediterranean and the Greater/Wider Middle East is more than
necessary.
Coordinating with NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue
For the large part, the Southern States’ objections with regard to the security dimension of the EMP also apply
to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), except for the fact that NATO, which is generally associated with the US,
does not suffer the same lack of credibility as ESDP. In the current context, this perception of American domination
of the Alliance has a rather negative impact on NATO’s image however.
Without any doubt, the participation of Dialogue countries in NATO operations (IFOR/SFOR and KFOR) is a
great success; it is probably the most important achievement of the NATO MD. The Dialogue suffers from an
inherent limitation however. Because of the nature of the Alliance, the NATO MD obviously concerns only the
politico-military dimension, which renders the implementation of the comprehensive approach, linking security
cooperation to commitments in other fields, difficult. E.g. Algeria, which originally was not invited to join the MD
because of its internal crisis, was admitted in 2000, in spite of ongoing violence in which both the government and
extremist Islamists were involved; the political opportunity of this move was highly questionable. Clearly, the EMP,
which is more comprehensive in terms of both membership and substance, is the framework offering the better
prospects for partnership with and reform in the South, which is not to say that the NATO MD is not very valuable
as a North-South confidence-building measure.46 It could be argued however that the existence of several frameworks
for security dialogue with the Mediterranean alongside each other – the EMP, the NATO MD, and the OSCE as well
has its ‘Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation’47 – in itself is one of the causes of Mediterranean States’ reluctance
to engage in security partnership, as it is not clear to them what is the purpose of all these separate schemes.
NATO decided to enhance the MD at its June 2004 Istanbul summit, deepening the partnership with current
Dialogue countries as well as offering a framework to the States of the GCC through the ‘Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative’. The Alliance is facing the same reluctance on the part of the Southern States as the EU however, so
scepticism is in order with regard to the actual implementation of these intentions. Some have also been pleading for
a NATO role in support of the GMEI. One has to fear overstretch of the Alliance however: given NATO’s difficulties
to find the capabilities to fulfil its commitments in Afghanistan, the Alliance appears to lack the capacity and, under
the current circumstances, the legitimacy to play such a role.48
In view of their similar objectives, and in order to ensure that all actions, including those in the economic and social
baskets of the Barcelona Process, are mutually reinforcing, increased coordination of the NATO MD and the EMP
certainly is the way ahead. Currently, coordination is limited to informal exchanges of information between NATO
and the EU. Perhaps in the longer term, in view of the more comprehensive nature of the EMP, NATO MD activities
should be focussed on the EMP agenda, in order to achieve maximal complementarity. This would also meet at least
part of Southern partners’ concerns regarding coordination between the different dialogues. EU-NATO cooperation
on promoting Mediterranean partners’ participation in the EU successor operation to SFOR would be a very
concrete and extremely useful example. Furthermore, such an arrangement would better reflect the emerging division
of labour between NATO and the EU, in which the latter gradually assumes first-level responsibility for security
issues in its neighbourhood, as witnessed e.g. by the planned take-over of SFOR. This evolution springs from the
long-standing demand, on the part of the US, for more burden-sharing within the Alliance, and the increasing capacity
of the EU to respond to that demand, because of the ongoing development of ESDP. Whether the US, apart from
welcoming increased military involvement in the Balkans, is also looking forward to an enhanced EU profile in the
Mediterranean, and particularly in the Middle East, is rather a different question though.
Conclusion
The current international situation is extremely unfavourable to any initiatives with regard to the Mediterranean
46 Sven Biscop, ‘Network or Labyrinth? The Challenge of Co-ordinating Western Security Dialogues with the Mediterra-
nean’. In: Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, 2002, No. 1, pp.92-112. Helle Malmvig, ‘From Diplomatic Talking Shop to
Powerful Partnership? NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the Democratisation of the Middle East’. Copenhagen,
Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004, DIIS Brief.
47 Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.
48 Nick Fiorenza, ‘A Greater NATO Role in the Greater Middle East ?’. In: ISIS-Europe NATO Notes, Vol. 6, 2004, No.,
pp.1-2.
The European Security Strategy and the Neighbourhood Policy: a New Starting Point for a Euro-Mediterranean
Security Partnership?
36
and the ‘Greater/Wider/Broader Middle East’. The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, transgressing the
bounds of international law, in combination with an attitude of at best passivity towards the Middle East conflict, but
often even of quasi unconditional support for the Israeli government, has cost the US dearly in terms of leverage in
the region. The invasion of Iraq has certainly increased the appeal of extremism; if anything, a settlement in the
Middle East and democratization of the wider region now seem further off than before. The EU as such has
maintained a degree of credit with its Mediterranean partners and in the wider region, but rather for not joining in with
the US than because of any concrete action it might have taken. In the present circumstances, joining the US in the
administration of Iraq, even in a UN framework, would certainly lose the EU its remaining credit, thus removing the
alternative channel for action in the region which the EU, in a limited way, still presents, while the added value would
be very limited. Militarily, the limited capabilities that the EU Member States that are not already present could
deploy, would make little or no difference on the ground. But politically as well, the EU – and the UN and NATO too
– would most probably simply be drawn into the bath with the US and forfeit their remaining legitimacy, without the
occupation gaining any. For these reasons, a trade-off like some propose, EU involvement in Iraq for a US initiative
on the Middle East conflict, would in practice be unworkable. Only a request by a legitimate Iraqi government that
truly enjoys the support of the majority of the population would provide sufficient basis for EU involvement.
The time is not ripe for grand schemes, unless it be with regard to the Middle East conflict. While continuing to
put pressure on its partners in the Quartet for a settlement of the Middle East conflict, as the precondition for any
major progress, the EU should in the meantime concentrate on the implementation of its Neighbourhood Policy, in the
hope that the offer of concrete benefits will succeed in revitalizing the EMP; can take small, but equally concrete
steps with regard to the security dimension of the EMP, paving the way for more substantial steps later; and can
gradually enhance its relations with States in the ‘Wider Middle East’, also in preparation of a more substantial
partnership in the longer term. The EU still enjoys credit – making use of that, it can prepare the ground for a major
initiative in the future, hopefully in close partnership with the US, for in spite of huge differences on how to achieve
them, Brussels and Washington ultimately do share the same objectives.




In this paper we start to address two main questions: whether it is possible to talk of a strategy of democracy
promotion in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and what are similarities and differences –
in particular as concerns method and content – with the main EU democracy promotion strategy.
We have decided to analyse the topic of democracy promotion in the framework of the ENP for three interrelated
reasons. First, democratization is one of the most important trend in the international system; second, the EU is one of
the most active external actor in the promotion of democracy towards third-States; and third, the ENP is going to be
developed in the next years, and is going to become an important part of the EU external relations.
The argument is developed into three main parts. The first part deals with definitions of democracy and democrati-
zation, and we are going to explain why democratization may be considered one of the main important trend in the
international system. In the second part we describe the main juridical basis for EU democracy promotion and what are
the main policies in the framework of which the Union promotes democracy: enlargement towards candidate countries
and stabilization and association towards potential candidates in the Western Balkans, focussing on the first one. In this
part, we are also explaining why the EU is one of the most active international actor in the promotion of democracy
towards third-States and how the Union makes use of its experience in democracy promotion today. In the last part we
analyze which could be – on the basis of the Commission formal documents – the strategy of democracy promotion in
the framework of the ENP, focussing, in particular on method and content of this strategy.
As concerns recent scholarship on the role of international institutions in democratization reforms, much scholar-
ship has focused on the role of the EU, within this literature most attention goes to analyzing the democratic
transformation of the formerly communist Central and Eastern European countries (CEEs). Several studies have
touched on EU democracy promotion efforts in certain regions – for instance, in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
framework and in EU relations with the ACP countries. After March 2003, the attention of European policy-makers
and commentators is beginning to shift towards the new neighbours: in northern Africa, southern and eastern
Mediterranean and in the Southern Caucasus. As the ENP is a new policy, we are starting to explain which could be,
in the following years, a strategy of democracy promotion in the framework of this policy, and to compare it – in a
systematic way - with the main European democracy promotion strategies.
1. Democracy and democratization
In this part we start with definitions of democracy, to arrive to give a meaning to democratization, which is one of
the most important trends in the international system. The literature on democracy and democratization is very
broad, we refer to the works and definitions of Morlino.
1.1. Definitions of democracy
For long time the meaning of democracy has been discussed. In the last decades, when we talk of democracy, we
refer to the liberal mass democracy developed in the western experience. According to Morlino 1, to understand the
democratic genus, it is important to distinguish six different definitions of a democratic political regime2: general,
procedural, genetic, minimum and normative (see figure 1).
 A general empirical definition has been given by Dahl [1979]: all political regimes, which guarantee the real
participation of the wider male and female adult population and the possibility to dissent and opposing, may be
considered democracies.
A procedural definition of democracy stresses the formal norms and institutions of a democratic regime, in
particular the followings: formal norms or procedures which regulate the vote at universal suffrage; free, fair, compe-
titive and periodic elections; a parliament with decision-making and control powers elected with the above mentioned
1 L. Morlino, Democrazie e Democratizzazioni (Bologna: il Mulino, 2003), pp. 18-31.
2 With ‘regime’ we mean institutions and norms of specific political asset. In a narrow sense, do no make part of a regime
all bureaucratic apparatus, like administration, magistracy, police, army and all other structures existing in modern
democratic countries. These bureaucratic apparatus make part of the ‘state’, which may coexist with different regimes.
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norms; a first minister and a government responsible in front of the parliament or the result of direct election; and
intermediate structures as political parties and interest organizations.
A genetic definition of democracy focuses on how such a regime has formed: on norms and procedures which
result from an agreement-compromise for the peaceful resolution of conflict among politically relevant social actors
and other institutional actors present in the political arena.
After the procedural and genetic definition, and if we want to conduct an empirical analysis of democratic
transitions and instaurations, it is very important to give a minimum definition of democracy. In this perspective, all
political regimes with a) universal suffrage, male and female; b) free, fair, competitive and periodic elections; c) more
than a political party; d) different and alternative sources of information; should be considered democratic.
According to Morlino, an ideal democracy may be defined as the regime which should create the best institutional
opportunities to realize liberty and equality. Dahl [1998] and Beethan [1999] suggest some principles to assure
liberty and equality: political inclusion for all adults, equality of the vote, effective participation of all citizens, clear
and correct information for all, and accountability and responsiveness of those who govern. In their attempt to realize
these principles, contemporary democracies may not leave environment protection, health right, assistance for old
and disabled people, right to work, support to unemployed persons and promotion of dignified standards of living,
and the promotion of equity in the private controversies or between public and private interests. Providing and
protecting the above mentioned values and rights needs some institutional instruments. Dahl [1970 e 1982, 10-11]
suggests the necessity of eight institutional guarantees: liberty of association and organization, liberty of thinking and
expression, right to vote, right of the political leaders to compete for the electoral support, alternative sources of
information, possibility to be elected, free and fair elections, institutions that make the government policies depend
on the vote.  The rule of law must be added to all these instruments. It comprises not only the respect for the existing
laws, but also the realization of an efficient administration, the existing of an independent magistracy and of a working
system to solve private and public conflicts, the absence of corruption and criminality, the presence of a pluralist
system of information.
1.2. Democratization: a trend in the international system
According to Morlino, democratization means both the transition from non democratic political regime, in particular
authoritarian ones, to different democratic regimes, and eventually following processes of instauration, consolidation, crisis
or growing of democratic quality 3 (see figure 2). It is important to define each of these processes 4 and to keep in mind that
democratization is an open process and the result of the interaction of internal and external factors.
With transition we mean the intermediate period, in which the regime has lost some fundamental aspects of the
authoritarian regime, without having acquired all new characters of the regime that will be set up. In particular, the transition
starts when basic civil and political rights start to be recognized, and it may be considered concluded when it is clear that a
democracy will be established. That is clear with the first free, competitive and fair elections.
The process of democratic instauration involves a complete enlargement and a real acknowledgement of civil and
political rights; the complete civilization of the society; the emergence of more political parties and of a party system, and
other collective organization of interests; the adoption of the main democratic institutions and procedures like the electoral
law or the establishment of the relationship between executive and legislative.
It is important to underline that the democratic consolidation is one of the possible results of a democratic instauration.
The consolidation starts when the new relevant institutions and norms have been created and start to work. For example the
instauration may end with the approval of the Constitution and the emergence of the party system after the elections; and
the consolidation may start immediately after. The democratic consolidation may be defined as the process of definition,
fixation and adaptation of the different structures and norms of the democratic regime.
There is a democratic crisis when limits to the expression of political and civil rights appear.
The democratic quality grows when a democracy is over the minimum standards and move towards liberty and equality,
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues
3 See L. Morlino, cit., p. 11.
4 For these definitions see L. Morlino, cit., p.122, 125, 147, 84, and p. 228.
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which are the main goals of an ideal democracy. A quality democracy or a good democracy is a stable institutional asset,
which realizes liberty and equality among citizens, through correctly working mechanisms and institutions.
If we go back to the last century we can observe that democratization has become one of the most important trends in
the international system. The findings in table 1 show a dramatic expansion of democratic governance over the course of the
century, associated to a growth in the number of sovereign states and of the world population. In 1900, there were no states
which could be judged as electoral democracies by the standard of universal suffrage for competitive multiparty elections5.
The states with restricted democratic practices (countries which denied universal franchise to women, racial minorities, and
the poor and landless) were 25 in number and accounted for just 12.4 percent of the world population. By 1950, the defeat
of Nazi totalitarianism, the post-war momentum toward de-colonization, and the post-war reconstruction of Europe and
Japan resulted in an increase in the number of democratic states. At mid-century, there were 22 democracies accounting for
31 percent of the world population. By the close of last century democracies clearly predominate, and have expanded
significantly in the Third Wave, which has brought democracy to much of the post-Communist world and to Latin America
and parts of Asia and Africa. In 2000 democracies are 120 in number and represent 62.5 percent of the global population.
In table 2 it is possible to see the evolution of the political regimes that governed actual EU members, candidates,
potential candidates, and neighbours, at three equidistant points in the 20th century. In the last column it is also possible to
compare the ratings of freedom, according to the last annual survey of Freedom House. On this basis, and as concerns third
countries, we should expect that EU will promote democratic quality towards free countries, democratic consolidation
towards partly free country and democratic transition toward not free countries. Only an accurate analysis of European
democracy promotion towards each third country could confirm this hypothesis.
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5 The U.S., Britain, and a handful of other countries possessed the most democratic systems, but their denial of voting rights to
women, and in the case of the U.S. to black Americans meant that they were countries with restricted democratic practices.
6 According to Freedom House, to qualify as an electoral democracy, a state must have: a) a competitive multi-party political
system; b) universal adult suffrage for all citizens; c) regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy,
reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud that yields results that are unrepresentative of the public will;
d) significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through  the media and through generally open political
campaigning.




11 The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgement based on Freedom House survey results. For more details see the essay on
Freedom in the World 2003 Survey Methodology.
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12 Northern Ireland (disputed territory): Free, 2-2.
13 Cyprus (T, disputed territory): Free, 2-2.
14 Kosovo (disputed territory): Partly Free, 5-5.
15 Chechnya (disputed territory): Not Free, 7-7.
16 Transnistria (disputed territory): Not Free, 6-6.
17 Israeli-Administered territories (disputed territory): Not Free, 6-6; and Palestinian Authority-administered territories
(disputed territory): Not Free, 5-6.
18 Western Sahara (disputed territory): Not Free, 7-6.
19 Nagorno-Karabakh (disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan): Partly Free, 5-5.
20 Abkhazia (disputed territory): Not Free, 6-5.
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2. The European Union and democracy promotion
In this part we analyze the juridical basis for the activity of democracy promotion by the European Union; then
we focus on internal and external factors that may help us to understand why the Union is one of the most important
international actor as regards democracy promotion; and last, we describe how, the EU utilizes, today, its experience
in democracy promotion, in particular in the framework of the enlargement policy.
2.1. The principle of democracy in the EU
From a juridical perspective the European Union recognizes the principle of democracy as a fundamental princi-
ple for the Union and as a common principle to the Member States21. It is a recent juridical acknowledgement, which
dates back to May 1999, with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty22, and which was not emended with the
entry into force of the Treaty of Nice23.
A reference to the principle of democracy can also be found in the Charter of fundamental rights of the European
Union, proclaimed by the Nice European Council of December 2002 (it makes part of the second part of the Draft
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe), which reiterates that the Union is based, among others, on the
principle of democracy24.
The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe25 has many important references to democracy. From
our perspective, most important are in article 2 and in article 193. The first one indicates democracy among the Union’
s values26 and the second one, which deals with the Union’s external action, states that the principle of democracy
should inspire the Union’s action on the international scene and should be advanced in the wider world, through
common policies and actions in order to consolidate and support democracy27.
The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 28, had already two references
to democracy, which haven’t been emended by the following Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. The first one is in the
framework of the provisions on a common foreign and security policy: according to article 11(1), in fact, the
development and consolidation of democracy is among the objectives of the Union’ s common foreign and security
policy 29. The second one is in the framework of the provisions on development cooperation: according to article 177
(2) of the Treaty Establishing a European Community (TEC), Community policy in the sphere of  development
cooperation should contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy 30.The Treaty of
Nice contains a new reference to democracy, in the framework of provisions on economic, financial and technical
cooperation with third countries. According to article 181a(1) TEC, in fact, Community policy in this area should
21 ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States’ (Article 6(1) Treaty on the European Union (TEU)).
22 The Amsterdam Treaty was signed on 2 October 1997.
23 The Treaty of Nice entered into force on 1 February 2003.
24 ‘Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity,
freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law’.
25 Adopted by consensus by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003.
26 ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect
for human rights. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity
and non-discrimination’ (Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Part I, Title I: Definition and objectives
of the Union, Article 2: The Union’s values).
27 ‘1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement: democracy, the rule of law, the universa-
lity and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and
for international law in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union shall seek to develop
relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations, which share
these values … 2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of
cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: (a) safeguard the common values, fundamental interests,
security, independence and integrity of the Union; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights
and international law …’ (Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Part III: The Policies and Functioning of
the Union, Title V: The Union’s External Action, Chapter I: Provisions having general application, Article III-193).
28 Entered into force the 1 November 1993.
29 ‘The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security
policy, the objectives of which shall be: … to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Article 11(1) TEU).
30 ‘Community policy in this area [development cooperation] shall contribute to the general objective of developing and
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Article
177(2) TEC).
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contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy 31.
On the basis of this brief reconstruction we can make two sort of considerations. First, today, the principle of
democracy, as a common value of the Union, should be respected not only within its borders, but also in the context of the
Union’ s external relations, in particular in the common foreign and security policy, in the development and cooperation
policy and in the economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries. Second, the EU democracy promotion
activity has a strong juridical basis.
2.2. Why focus on the EU?
Among regional and international institutions the EU has been unique in developing the most diverse and advanced set
of legal and institutional strategies to promote democracy in third countries. Morlino identifies five internal factors and five
external ones which have prompted EU to develop a range of strategies for promoting democratization in countries and
regions nearby as well as farther away.
The internal factors are the following:
• From its inception in 1957 the EEC was meant as a grand exercise in peace building through integration. Hence, the
EU’ s own raison d’être serves its Member States as a compass for promotion of Western-democratic values.
• Although the Community began its life with an emphasis on economic cooperation as a means of securing peace,
it has evolved to become more and more a ‘Community of values’; transforming itself into something resembling
a constitutional order.
• The EU’ s military weakness has spurred it to become a ‘civilian superpower’ which tries to promote stability in
neighbouring countries and regions through economic and trade development, democracy, good governance and the
rule of law.
• As a regional institution the EU is able to offer incentives - such as membership - that one-country cannot.
• Over the last half-century the Community has evolved a sophisticated supranational bureaucracy, with organiza-
tional capacity, substantial material resources to affect policy and with a growing confidence about the future role
of the EU on the global stage.
The main external experiences that have prompted the EU to develop novel democracy promotion strategies and
instruments are as follows:
• In the middle 1970s and early 1980, the Community had to cope with the need to facilitate democratic
consolidation in formerly authoritarian Greece, Spain and Portugal, as a key aspect of these countries’
accession into the Community.
• The collapse of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, confronted the EU with dangers of potential
instability and hyper-nationalism in countries emerging from under the yolk of Communism, the response
culminated in the formal decision, made in December 2002, to enlarge the Union to ten new Member States.
During this process the EU has developed the bulk of its concepts, strategies and instruments in the area of
democratization. The special EU dynamic created in the process of preparation for accession produced some
of the most extensive, detailed and intrusive democracy promotion policies ever conceived.
• The EU’ s geographical location and relative prosperity mean that it had to cope with the necessity of
promoting political stability and economic development not only among candidate and potential candidate
states but also in North Africa, Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, WNIS,32 NIS,33 Russia and the Gulf.
In all these areas the EU views the promotion of democracy as being inseparable from the attainment of peace
and sufficient levels of material development. In other words, the promotion of democracy is also a security
issue for the EU.
• The colonial history of several key EU Member States (Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK)
has meant that since the 1960s, the Community has been engaged in more traditional forms of democracy
promotion through its aid and development policies, particularly vis-à-vis the African, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) countries.
• The EU is increasingly asserting its evolving identity as a ‘community of values’ on the world stage.
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31 Community policy in this area [economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries] shall contribute to the
general objective of  developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to the objective of respecting human
rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Article 181a(1) TEC) .
32 Western Newly Independent States (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus).
33 Refers to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine
and Uzbekistan.
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2.3. The EU and democracy promotion today
Democracy promotion through enlargement has been the most important and successful EU strategy of democratiza-
tion. Indeed, looking at the whole EU experience in democracy promotion, it is difficult not to be struck by the democratic
transformations occurred in those Central and Eastern European countries (CEEs) that have joined, on May the 1st , the EU
as full members 34. According to Morlino, emerging from under the yolk of communist rule in 1989-1990, the CEEs have
made a remarkable transition from authoritarianism to consolidated democracy in just over a decade – a transition that is
unparalleled in scope and depth.
As underlined by many authors, the use of conditionality has been the key element of the last enlargement process
to structure relations with candidate countries. Indeed, the last and the current pre-accession process, with Opinions,
Accession Partnerships, National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis, and Regular Reports is entirely structu-
red around the progressive meeting of the Copenhagen criteria35, and progress towards membership is measured in terms
of compliance.
The Copenhagen criteria state that membership requires that the candidate State has achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a
functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the
Union; and the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic
and monetary union 36.
Following article 49 TUE 37, the Commission addresses to the Council its Opinion on the country application for
membership of the EU. In this document, the Commission, after having described and analysed the current situation of
the country as regards the criteria for membership, may recommend or not the opening of accession negotiations.
The first Accession Partnerships were decided in March 1998 38 to set out in a single framework the priority areas
for further work towards membership of the European Union, the financial means available to help the country
implement these priorities, and the conditions which will apply to that assistance. The main priority areas identified for
each candidate state relate to their ability to take on the obligations of meeting the Copenhagen criteria and they are
divided in short term and medium term priorities. The Accession Partnerships are decided by the Commission, after
consulting the candidate country and on the basis of principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions decided
by the Council. Every candidate country has to adopt a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, to explain
how it will implement the Accession Partnership. Both the Accession Partnership and the National Programme for the
Adoption of the Acquis are updated regularly to take into account new developments in the candidate countries.
At the end of 1998 the Commission has started to report every year, to the European Council, on progress made by
each of the candidate countries in preparations for membership, focussing on political and economic criteria for member-
ship and on the ability to assume the obligations of membership 39. Prior to these reports, implementation of the
Accession Partnerships is examined with each applicant State in the Europe Agreement bodies. The Commission’s
Regular Reports serve as a basis for taking, in the European Council context, the necessary decisions on the conduct of
the accession negotiations.
It is clear that the main instrument to promote democracy through enlargement has been political conditionality.
As we have already said, the political criteria for accession to be met by the candidate countries and laid down by the
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34 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
35 Laid down by the Copenhagen European Council, in June 1993.
36 At its meeting in Madrid, the European Council stressed the need for the candidate States to adjust their administrative
structures to ensure the harmonious operation of Community policies after accession and at Luxembourg, it stressed that
incorporation of the acquis into legislation is necessary, but not in itself sufficient; it is necessary to ensure that it is
actually applied. The Feira and Gothenburg European Councils, in 2000 and 2001 respectively, confirmed the vital
importance of the applicant countries’ capacity to implement and enforce the acquis, and added that this required
important efforts by the applicants in strengthening and reforming their administrative and judicial structures.
37 Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union. It
shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after
receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members. The
conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails,
shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted
for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
38 It was the European Council to decide, at its meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997, that the Accession Partnership
would be the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy, mobilising all forms of assistance to the candidate
countries within a single framework.
39 See Agenda 2000 and European Council of Luxemburg (December 1997).
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Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, stipulate that these countries must have achieved ‘stability of institu-
tions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’. In particular, the
European Union has asked CEEs to implement the following main political priorities: reform of the judiciary (in particular
independence of the judiciary), fight against corruption, reform of the administration and decentralization, real guarantee of
political, civil, and economic and social rights and protection of minorities (in particular Roma and Russian speaking) 40.
Today democracy promotion through enlargement of the Union continues to be pursued with Bulgaria, Romania,
Croatia and Turkey. But EU democracy promotion does not end with these candidate countries and the related enlargement
policy (see table 3). First, there do exist structured efforts of democracy promotion vis-à-vis  potential candidate countries
– notably in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Fyrom, Serbia and Montenegro) in the framework of the
stabilization and association policy. Second, the Union  has declared the intention to promote democratic reforms in the
framework of the neighbourhood policy, towards Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine and Moldova), Southern Mediterranean
(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and Syria) and  Southern Cauca-
sus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).
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40 For further details on political priorities see L. Mattina, La sfida dell’allargamento (Bologna: il Mulino, 2004).
41 Negotiations are well advanced with aim to join the EU in 2007.
42 Negotiations are well advanced with aim to join the EU in 2007.
43 On 29th October 2001Croatia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which is not still entered into force. On
20th  February 2003 Croatia applied for the EU membership. In April 2003 the Council requested the Commission to
submit its Opinion on the application. In July 2003 a series of questions was transmitted to the Croatian authorities. In
October 2000 the Croatian government responded to the questions. After an exchange of questions and information
between the Commission and the Croatian government, on 20th April 2004 it was published the Commission’s Opinion
on Croatian application. The last European Council of Bruxelles (18th  June 2004) has decided to open negotiations with
Croatia since 2005, giving Croatia the status of candidate country.
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3. Which could be democracy promotion in the framework of the neighbourhood policy?
In the second part we have seen that the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights; and that in its relations with the wider world, it aims at upholding and
promoting these values. In this part, we are going to analyze how the European Neighbourhood policy seeks to promote
commitment to shared values. First, we are going to sum up the main legal and institutional developments concerning this
policy, secondly we are going to describe the main procedural and substantive features of which could be the EU democracy
promotion strategy in the framework of the neighbourhood policy.
3.1. Main juridical and institutional developments
Commission Progress Reports on the candidate States from 1999 onwards have contained references to the enlarged EU’s
relations with its neighbours. In Strategy Papers attached to the pre-accession country Reports in 200150 and 200251 the
outlines of a more substantive so-called proximity policy begin to emerge.
Since April 2002 the New Neighbours initiative has regularly appeared on the agenda of the Council. An initial joint position
paper by Solana and Patten was discussed in September 2002.
The Copenhagen European Council – of December 2002 – states that enlargement ‘presents an important opportunity to
take forward relation with neighbouring countries based on shared political [democracy, respect for human rights and the rule
of law] and economic values’ and that the Union is ‘determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability
and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union’ 52.
In particular, according to the Presidency Conclusions, enlargement ‘will strengthen relations with Russia’ and the EU also
‘wishes to enhance its relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the southern Mediterranean countries based on a long-
term approach promoting democratic and economic reforms … and is developing new initiatives for this purpose’ 53.
In March 2003, the Commission initiates the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 54 intended to provide a
framework for new relationships with the countries of  Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) and Southern
Mediterranean (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and Syria) 55, that do
not have the perspective of membership of the EU.
According to the Commission ‘[i]n return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation
of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’ s neighbourhood
should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU … the prospect of a stake in the EU’ s Internal
Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital’ 56.
The Commission makes clear some essential prerequisites for political stability: democracy, pluralism, respect for human
rights, civil liberties, the rule of law and core labour standards 57, and describes the political situation in the two regions of the
neighbourhood policy: ‘[n]early all countries of the Mediterranean, the WNIS and Russia have a history of autocratic and non-
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44 The Commission will present before the end of 2004 a report on Turkey’s fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria,
along with a recommendation on the possible opening of accession negotiations.
45 At the moment Albania is negotiating to arrive at a Stabilization and Association Agreement.
46 On 18th November 2003 a Feasibility Study for BiH was published, sixteen conditions for progress were set out down the
Stabilization and Association Process, but there was not significant progress in fulfilling these conditions, so the Commis-
sion could not recommend to the Council the start of Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations.
47 On 9th April 2001 the Stabilization and Association Agreement was signed. It has been ratified by all Member States and will
enter into force shortly. On 22nd  March 2004 fYrom applied to the EU for membership.
48 The Commission is  working with Serbia and Montenegro authorities to solve some outstanding problems with a view to a
rapid launching of a Feasibility Study.
49 Western Newly Independent States.
50 Commission Strategy Paper, 13 November 2001, “Making a Success of Enlargement”.
51 Commission Strategy Paper, 9 October 2002, “Towards the Enlarged Union”.
52 Presidency Conclusions – Copenhagen, 12 and 13 December 2002, p. 6.
53 Cit., p. 7. Furthermore: ‘The European Council welcomes the intention of the Commission and the Secretary General/
High Representative to bring forward proposals to that end’ [joint letter to the Council by the High Representative Mr
Javier Solana and Commissioner Patten in August 2002] and ‘The European Council encourages and supports the further
development of cross-border and regional cooperation inter alia through enhancing transport infrastructure, including
appropriate instruments, with and among neighbouring countries in order to develop the regions’ potential to the full’.
54 Communication on ‘Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern
Neighbours’(COM(2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003.
55 Southern Caucasus countries might be added in the scope of this policy.
56 COM(2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 4.
57 COM(2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 7.
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democratic governance and poor records in protecting human rights and freedom of the individual. Generally, the countries of
the WNIS and Russia have taken steps towards establishing democracy and market institutions over the past 12 years. Yet
political reform in the majority of the countries of the Mediterranean has not progressed as quickly as desired’ 58.
In June 2003 the Council affirms that ‘the EU wishes to define an ambitious new range of policies towards its neighbours
based on shared values such as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’ 59.
It underlines also that these new policies should not override the existing framework for EU relations with Russia, the Eastern
European countries, and the Southern Mediterranean partners, as developed in the context of the relevant agreements, common
strategies, the Northern Dimension Initiative and of the Barcelona Process and that implementation of existing agreements
remains a priority. Furthermore, according to the Council, new policies should have two goals: first, working with the partners
to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values; and second,  anchoring the EU’ s offer of concrete benefits
and preferential relations to progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform as well as in the field of
Justice and Home Affaires. The Council indicates some incentives, on which the EU’ s approach could be based; the basic
principle for the new EU policies towards its neighbours, which is differentiation; and the key policy instrument through
which policies will be implemented: Action Plans. According to the Council, these Action Plans should be political documents,
building on existing agreements and setting out the over-arching strategic policy targets, common objectives, political and
economic benchmarks used to evaluate progress in key areas, and a timetable for their achievement which enable progress to
be judged regularly.   After the Thessaloniki European Council, of June 2003, which endorses the Council conclusions and looks
forward to the work of the Council and the Commission, in July 2003, the Commission tables a Communication ‘Paving the
Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument’60 and establishes a Wider Europe Inter-Service Group.
 In October 2003, the Council invites the Commission, with the contribution of the High Representative, where appropria-
te, to present detailed proposals for the relevant Action Plans early in 2004, in order to take this matter forward by June 2004;
and the Brussels European Council urges the Commission and the Council to take it forward.
In October 2003 and February 2004 the Commission makes two oral progress reports to the Council and contributes to
detailed discussions in the Permanent  Representatives Committee and the relevant Council working groups, concerning the
elements to be included in ENP Action Plans.
Since then, the Commission has held exploratory talks with partners in Eastern Europe (Moldova and Ukraine) and the
Southern Mediterranean (Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestinian Authority and Tunisia), which have Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreement or Association Agreement in force 61, to confirm their interest in European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and
to ascertain their views on the priorities to be addressed in the Action Plans 62.
On 12th May 2004 the Commission has presented a Strategy Paper 63 and seven Country Reports (for Moldova, Ukraine
Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestinian Authority and Tunisia) 64. The Strategy Paper sets out principles and scope, the
participation of other neighbouring countries, Action Plans, regional cooperation, and supporting the ENP. Country reports,
covering progress in implementation of bilateral agreements and related reforms, reflect the political, economic, social and
institutional situation in the countries and focus on priority areas of the European Neighbourhood Policy.
The Commission has transmitted the Communication to the Council and European Parliament. On the basis of the
conclusions that will be drawn by the Council, the Commission will implement the policy as set out in the Strategy Paper. In
the coming months, the Commission will complete talks with the countries concerned and present draft Action Plans. The
Action Plans put forward by the Commission, with the contribution of the High Representative on issues related to political
cooperation and CFSP, should be approved by the respective Cooperation or Association Councils.
3.2. Main procedural and substantive aspects
As concerns the geographic coverage of the ENP, it is addressed to three main areas. In Eastern Europe, it covers Russia,
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58 COM(2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 7.
59 GAER Conclusions on Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood, p. 1.
60 COM(2003) 393 final.
61 In Eastern Europe, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements provide the basis for contractual relations. In the
Mediterranean, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership  provide a regional framework for co-operation which is comple-
mented  by a network of Association Agreements.
62 According to the Commission, the development of Action Plans with other neighbours should begin, once those
currently under preparation have been presented. The Commission suggests that it begin to explore in the second half
of the 2004 the possibility of drawing up Action Plans with countries in the Mediterranean which have themselves
ratified Association Agreements, that is Egypt and Lebanon.
63 COM(2004) 373 final.
64 SEC(2004) 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570.
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Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova; in the Southern Mediterranean, it applies to all the non-EU participants in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Palestinian Autho-
rity), with the exception of Turkey; and, according to the Brussels European Council of 17-18 June 2004, the ENP has been
extended to the Southern Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). Two observations should be made as
concerns respectively Belarus and Libya. First, according to the Commission Strategy Paper, it is not yet possible to offer the
full benefits of ENP to Belarus, because an authoritarian political regime is in place, since 1996 elections have failed to meet
international democratic standards and democratic structures are lacking; so the EU will support democratic parliamentary
elections, in the autumn, working in coordination with the OSCE and the Council of Europe and will strengthen assistance to
Belarus, with a clear focus on civil society65. Second, as concerns Libya, full integration into the Barcelona Process is the first
step towards a negotiation of an Association Agreement, which will allow participating in the ENP66.
The European Neighbourhood Policy has two main objectives: strengthening stability, security and well-being for EU
member states and neighbouring countries, and preventing the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its
neighbours 67.
These two objectives won’t be reached through membership to the Union. In the short term, neighbour countries will be
offered reinforced relations68 through the chance to participate in various EU activities through greater political, security,
economic and cultural co-operation; while in the long term, the Union will offer partner countries an increasingly close
relationship, going beyond cooperation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration69.  Two observa-
tions are needed. As concerns the short term, eleven incentives have been indicated (for a complete list see table number 4).
Second, it is important to underline, that in enriching relations with partner countries the Commission will draw on the
experience gained in supporting the process of political and economic transition in the new member states and in candidate
countries.
In change of the above mentioned offer, the Union asks neighbours their commitment to common values, principally within
the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good
neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development. Commitments will also be sought
to certain essential aspects of the EU’ s external action, in particular, the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, as well as abidance by international law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution.
In the short term the main instrument to realize the policy will be Action Plans, while in the long term the main instrument
should be European Neighbourhood Agreements.
In the May Strategy Paper, the Commission has given many details as concern the realization of Action Plans. Main
principles which will guide the drafting and realization of Action Plans are joint ownership and differentiation. The first one
means that priorities will be defined together with partner countries, and will thus vary from country to country; while
differentiation means that priorities will reflect the existing state of relations with each country and its needs and capacities.
Action Plans will cover two broad areas: first, commitments to specific actions, which confirm or reinforce adherence to shared
values and to certain objectives in the area of foreign and security policy; secondly, commitments to actions which will bring
partner countries closer to the EU in a number of priority fields.  In particular these documents will incorporate a set of
priorities in the following key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners
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65 EU-Belarus relations stalled in 1996-7 as a consequence of serious setbacks in the development of democracy and human rights in
Belarus, in particular the replacement of the democratically elected parliament with a national assembly nominated by the President
in violation of the 1994 constitution. The GAC reacted in 1997 by freezing conclusion of the PCA, signed in 1995, and restricting
ministerial level contacts and the scope of EU assistance to Belarus. Since 1997 Belarus has applied a constant policy of deviation
from its commitments to the Council of Europe and OSCE. Confrontation with the OSCE over its representation in Minsk led to
a decision of 14 member states to impose a visa ban on government representatives in November 2002. In the Communication of
March 2003, the Commission notes that the EU should engage Belarus in a process focused on creating the conditions for free and
fair elections, and once achieved, the integration of Belarus into the neighbourhood policy. In the Strategy Paper, the Commission
notes that Belarus is already eligible to participate in three of the Neighbourhood Programmes (Baltic Sea Programme, Latvia-
Lithuania-Belarus, Poland-Ukraine-Belarus) and will also be eligible under the New Neighbourhood Instrument.
66 The EU currently has no contractual relationships with Libya. In April 1999, following the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya
acquired observer status in the Barcelona Process and was invited to become a full member as soon as the UN Security Council
sanctions have been definitely lifted and once Libya has accepted the Barcelona acquis.
67 Commission Strategy Paper, p. 3.
68 Relations between the EU and most countries participating in the ENP are already developed. In Eastern Europe, the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreements provide the basis for contractual relations. In the Mediterranean, the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship (the “Barcelona Process”) provides a regional framework for co-operation which is complemented by a network of Associa-
tion Agreements.
69  Pp. 3 and 5.
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for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’ s Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information
society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts. These priorities for
action will constitute benchmarks which can be monitored and assessed. Progress in meeting the priorities will be
monitored in the bodies established by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or Association Agreements and the
Commission will report periodically on progress accomplished. On the basis of this evaluation, the EU will review the
content of the Action Plans and decide on their adaptation and renewal.
For analyzing the strategy of democratization it will be very important to focus on the content of the first part of the
Action Plans, the one which deals with commitments to shared values. According to the Strategy Paper, priorities
intended to strengthen commitment to these values will include:
· strengthening democracy and the rule of law, the reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption and
organised crime;
· respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (including freedom of media and expression), rights of
minorities and children, gender equality, trade union rights and other core labour standards, and fight against the
practice of torture and prevention of ill-treatment;
· support for the development of civil society;
· and cooperation with the International Criminal Court.
Commitments will also be sought to certain essential aspects of the EU’ s external action, in particular, the fight
against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as abidance by international law and efforts
to achieve conflict resolution.
As concerns human rights and freedom all EU’ s neighbours are signatories of UN human rights conventions, some
are members of the Council of Europe70 and OSCE and have ratified the European Conventions for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and committed themselves to adhere to relevant conventions setting high
democratic and human rights standards as well as to accept mechanisms to ensure that they comply with human rights
obligations. Signatories to the Barcelona Declaration have accepted inter alia a declaration of principles to act in
accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to develop the rule of
law and democracy in their political systems, respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the
effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms. Partner countries are also committed to respecting core labour
standards and to promoting fundamental social rights, as parties to relevant ILO conventions.
The Action Plans will also cover other key areas: political dialogue 71; economic and social development policy 72; trade
and internal market 73; justice and home affairs 74; connecting the neighbourhood (energy 75, transport 76, environment 77,
information society 78, research and innovation79); and people-to-people 80, programmes and agencies 81.
70 Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.
71 Political dialogue should encompass foreign and security policy issues.
72 Participation in the ENP project should be accompanied by active policies to address poverty and inequality.
73 The ENP envisages enhanced preferential trade relations and increased financial and technical assistance. It also offers neighbouring
countries the prospect of a stake in the EU Internal Market based on legislative and regulatory approximation.
74 Important challenges are migration pressure from third countries, trafficking in human being and terrorism.
75 Enhancing the strategic energy partnership with neighbouring countries is a major element of the ENP. This includes security of
energy supply and energy safety and security.
76 Efficient, multimodal and sustainable transport systems is necessary to generate more trade and tourism between the Union and its
neighbours.
77 Environmental pollution does not respect borders.
78 Information and communications technology  is fundamental for the development of modern economies and societies.
79 The opening of the European Research Area to partner countries is a challenge of the 6th Framework Programme for RTD.
80 The ENP will promote cultural, educational and more general societal links between the Union and its neighbourhood.
81 The European Neighbourhood Policy envisages the gradual opening of certain Community programmes, based on mutual interests
and available resources. As participation in programmes designed for Member States can pose practical difficulties to third countries,
the creation of dedicated programmes geared specifically to meeting partner countries’ needs should also be explored.
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On the basis of the Commission Staff Working Paper on ENP - Country Reports, of 12 May 2004, it is possible
to make a list of political priorities, which should be contained in the July 2004 Action Plans. Country reports do not
only reflect the political situation of the countries, they also reflect the economic and social situation; and first of all
they cover progress in the implementation of bilateral agreements and related reforms.
All these Country Reports, respectively for Ukraine 82, Moldova 83, Tunisia 84, Palestinian Authority 85, Moroc-
co86, Jordan 87, and Israel 88, will provide guidance for the preparation of the Action plans, and might also serve as a
basis for assessing future political progress by the Union.
The Commission Staff Working Papers divide, in almost all Country Reports, the description of the political
situation into four parts called:
· democracy and the rule of law;
· human rights and fundamental freedoms;
· regional and global stability;
· co-operation in justice and home affairs.
Through a content analysis of these parts we can indicate for each country political priorities which should be
contained in July 2004 Action Plans. Table 5 contains the results of this analysis.
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89 ‘Media freedom remains one of the crucial issues for political reform in Ukraine. While press freedom is guaranteed by law
and the Constitution, the press has come under increasing pressure since 2003. In terms of ownership, the media landscape
is characterised by a significant degree of control by national and local authorities, in particular over the electronic media.
A number of NGOs have published very critical reports on Ukrainian press freedom in 2003. Privatised or newly established
media are concentrated in a few hands, and often interlinked with government structures. Independent media are often weak
in financial terms and reportedly face numerous difficulties in carrying out their work, with persistent interference by state
organs and an environment in which laws are often open to interpretations. The condition of the media in Ukraine has
attracted the attention of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which in its Recommendation 1589
(2003) on Freedom of expression in the media in Europe noted that “violence continues to be a way of intimidating
investigative journalists”. The PACE branded as “unacceptable” the lack of progress in the investigation of crimes, such as
the murder of journalist Heorhiy Gongadze’ (SEC(2004) 566, p. 8).
90 ‘The UN Committee on Children’s Rights in its Recommendations of September 2002 … stressed the priority that should be
given to the best interests of the child and called for the integration of marginalized children’ (SEC(2004) 566, p. 8).
91 ‘Torture and ill-treatment were among several concerns highlighted in the annual report (2002) of the National Human Rights
Ombudsperson on the situation of human rights in Ukraine. According to the report, around 12,000 individuals alleged that
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they had been subjected to torture and ill-treatment in the previous years, most commonly in the context of interrogation for the
purpose of eliciting a forced “confession”. In its review of Ukraine’s fourth periodic report in November 2001, the United Nations
Committee against Torture noted many ongoing deficiencies in the penal system, including the lack of clarity regarding the time
when a detained person may exercise the rights to counsel, medical examination, and contact with a family member. The 2003
monitoring report for the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly shared concerns expressed earlier by the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) as regards the conditions of detention in Ukraine, and the lack of progress in
numerous areas (especially concerning the ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty by law enforcement agencies, and
overcrowding both in militia and penitentiary establishments)’ (SEC(2004) 566, p. 9).
92 ‘Gender discrimination in political, economic, social, and cultural spheres is prohibited under the Ukrainian constitution and
domestic laws, and Ukraine is also a signatory to relevant international conventions. However, in practice, Ukrainian women
reportedly face obstacles to their full and equal participation in the labour force. In June 2002 the United Nations Committee
on Elimination of Discrimination against Women credited Ukraine with adopting a new law on the prevention of domestic
violence, but expressed concern about the prevalence of violence against women and the need for improved measures for
prosecution and victims’ services’(SEC(2004) 566, p. 9) .
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First of all we have to notice that each country has a different starting political situation. In brief, we may
distinguish three main groups of neighbour countries: those towards which the EU should promote the transition
towards democracy (Palestinian Authority and Tunisia), those towards which the Union should encourage democra-
tic consolidation (Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco and Jordan) and those towards which the EU should support the
growing of democratic quality (only Israel).
Main common political priorities, which could be suggested by the EU for the first group of countries and that
distinguish them from the other groups deals with the recognizement of basic civil and political rights, with the
conduct of free, competitive and fair elections, with the development of political pluralism and with the creation of
free media.
As concerns the second group, Jordan has in common with other countries only the ratification of international
conventions and the elimination of some restrictions to the real guarantee of human rights, while the others should
concentrate also on strengthening the democratic regime, reform of the administration, decentralization, reform of the
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93 Even if, in the Country Reports, the Commission refers sometimes to some of these sources.
94 Commission Strategy Paper, 12 May 2004, p.13.
judiciary and fight against corruption.  All countries of the first group should focus also on these political priorities.
Main political priorities for Israel deals with the full protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in
particular of Palestinians, and with the signing, ratification and observance of international conventions.
A next step of this study could be to compare the political situation described by the Commission in these
Country Reports with other sources as Council of Europe, OSCE, NGOs, academics and literature 93. It will be very
interesting also to evaluate whether political priorities contained in next Action Plans will be in line with the analysis
of the political situation of the Country Reports and how much of the financial resources of the existing support to
ENP and of the ENI will be devoted to democracy, rule of law and human rights; and compare it with the resources
devoted to democracy, rule of law and human rights in the framework of the financial programmes for candidates.
Conclusion
In this paper we wanted to address two main questions: if it is possible to talk of a strategy of democracy
promotion in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and what are similarities and differences
– in particular as concerns method and content – with the main EU democracy promotion strategy in the framework
of enlargement policy.
As concerns the first question, we should consider two main aspects. On one hand, if we look to the official
documents of the High Representative, the Commission, the Council and the European Council, it is possible to
affirm that the EU wishes to realize a strategy of democratization in the framework of the ENP and that it is the
instrument to achieve the European Neighbourhood policy goals (security, stability and well-being for EU member
states and neighbouring countries. On the other hand, if we look to the concrete actions to realize this strategy, we still
do not have materials to answer positively to this question. As we have seen in the case of enlargement, a strategy of
democratization is a long term process, and to affirm that this strategy has started we need at least to look at political
priorities contained in Action Plans with neighbour countries. Taking into account these considerations, we may
affirm that the European Union wishes to develop a strategy of democracy promotion in the framework of the ENP,
and that this process will start as soon as the Union will publish ENP Action Plans with neighbour countries. When
Action Plan will be drafted, it will be interesting to compare the political priorities contain therein, with what we have
expected from the description of the political situation contained in the documents we analyzed (see table 5).
As regards similarities and differences between the strategy of democracy promotion through enlargement and
which could be a strategy of democratization in the framework of the ENP, we can say that the firsts can be found in
content, conditionality and processes, while the main difference has to do with incentives.
The main similarity in content, with the strategy of democratization in the framework of enlargement, can be
found in what the EU asks neighbour countries to do, that is their commitment to common values. As we have seen
in table 5, the Union should ask neighbours the same commitments the EU asks candidate countries: strengthening
democracy and the rule of law,  the reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption and organised crime,
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (including freedom of media and expression), rights of minorities
and children, gender equality, trade union rights and other core labour standards, fight against the practice of torture
and prevention of ill-treatment; support for the development of civil society; cooperation with the International
Criminal Court; the fight against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as abidance by
international law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution.
As regards conditionality, the Commission has made explicit the conditionality attached to shared values, and the
resulting priorities to be identified in the Action Plans 94: increased political, security, economic and cultural coope-
ration is offered in return for political and economic reform.
As concerns structures, it seems that the neighbourhood policy will adopt the same instruments and techniques
based on the evolved pre-accession process for the central and eastern European states, which are judged to have
worked in promoting political reform in candidate countries. In the framework of the ENP, in a first phase, political
priorities will be contained in Action Plans, while for candidate countries they are contained in Accession Partnershi-
ps, both Action Plans and Accession Partnerships respecting the principles of joint ownership and differentiation.  In
a second phase the Commission will report on progress accomplished by the neighbour, as far as every year the
Commission  reports on progress accomplished by candidates; and then, on the basis of this evaluation, the EU will
review the content of the Action Plan and decide on its adaptation and renewal; for candidates countries the Union
updates the priorities contained in the Accession Partnerships almost every year. All these similarities confirm the
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statement of the Commission, that in enriching relations with partner countries, it will draw on the experience gained
in supporting the process of political transition in the new member states and in candidate countries.
  The main difference between the strategy of democracy promotion in the framework of enlargement and the
strategy of democratization in the framework of the ENP has to do with incentives, as only the first foresees the
prospect of full EU membership, which is widely recognized to have had a powerful positive effect on the processes
and outcomes of democratic transformation and consolidation among the CEEs. Indeed, the other foresees, as we have
seen, eleven incentives, in the short term, which aim at reinforcing political, security, economic and cultural coopera-
tion and some political and economic integration in the long term, which is very different from membership. The
emerging question is whether ENP incentives will make neighbours accept the political conditionality.
But external incentives are not enough for a strategy of democratization to be successful. It is very important to
stress,  that to be successful, an external strategy of democracy promotion needs some internal aspects, first of all, the
will of the people concerned to political reforms. Indeed, we believe that democratization is the result of the
interaction between internal and external factors. In giving a judgement of the last enlargement, the Commission seems
to acknowledge this, even if it may seem a bit rhetorical: ‘the credit for this success (the emerging of stable democra-
cies in Central and Eastern Europe) belongs mainly to the people of those countries themselves’ 95.
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Manuela MOSCHELLA
Europe and its approach towards neighbouring countries.
European security, and its connection with its neighbourhood, is an issue of primary importance in the EU political agenda.
Awareness of the matter can be found in several documents: in the Draft Treaty for establishing a European Constitution, for
example, in which is stated that: “The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring States, aiming to establish
an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful
relations based on cooperation” (art. I-56). The European Security Strategy presented by Solana, at the Thessaloniki
European Union Council, sets as a strategic objective that of promoting “a ring of well governed countries to the East of the EU
and on the borders of the Mediterranean, with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations”1.
The Union, then, reserves a special attention to the relation with its neighbourhood, and in this framework we can include
the elaboration of a Neighbourhood Policy, drawn up by the Commission2, able to coordinate and to take in various experiences
already established by the Union.
European integration history, in fact, makes clear how the Community/Union has always reserved a special attention for
its relation with neighbouring countries. During its evolution some of them have become effective members. Others, instead,
have been associated in a close and inclusive relation with the Union through the signature and implementation of several
agreements whose content aims at inducing institutional, economic and social reforms as necessary pre-requisites of the entire
region’s peace, prosperity and security.
Interesting cooperative attempts are represented by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (signed with Russia,
Ukraine and Moldova, between 1994-1995), the Stabilisation and Association Process, (started in 2000 with the aim to bring
peace, prosperity and democracy in the Western Balkans), and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The last was launched in
1995 to affirm the strategic importance of the Mediterranean even if European attention appeared to be more focussed on the
East of the Continent
Practically, the Union, utilising a wide range of instruments (such as trade and custom unions’ agreements, financial aid and
technical assistance, cooperation in different fields), typical of a civilian power3 (Duchene, 1973: 19), has elaborated a security
agenda, which directly regards its neighbours, in which Europe appears to be interested in realizing those reforms (economic,
institutional and social), which are necessary to assure Neighbours’ Stabilisation/Union Security.
Resuming, through Missiroli’s proposed distinction4, over the past decades the European Union has pursued two distinct
approaches towards its immediate neighbours: an approach aimed at integration proper, i.e. at bringing neighbouring countries
directly into the EU, and a second approach aimed, first and foremost, at stabilisation.
The first policy approach makes use of conditionality as the instrument with which to obtain integration, that is the
affirmation of an explicit link between behavioural conformity to the Union fixed criteria and accession process. The integration
goal is based on the membership incentive: extending the Union’s norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to successive
applicants has made instability and conflict on the Continent decreasingly likely.
The second approach – stabilisation as a goal – is based on fostering regional cooperation and broad partnerships
(regionalism). It is the approach EU employs in the Mediterranean, which takes the form of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership, or in the Balkans, through the Stabilisation and Association Process, and it is the same approach used with Russia,
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.
After having stressed this distinction, and clarified Union’s approach towards its neighbours in this paper I would like to
1 European Security Strategy, (June 2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World, presented by Javier Solana at the Thessaloniki
European Council
2 Wider Europe-Neighbourhood:A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003),
104 final, Brussels, March 2003
3 The European Community’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on
armed force is as far as possible to domesticate relations between States, including those of its own members and those with
States outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring international problems the sense of common responsibility and
structures of contractual politics, which have been in the past associated exclusively with ‘home’ and not foreign, that is
alien, affairs. Duchene F.,(1973), The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence, in Kolistam M.
e Hager W., Nation Writ Large:Foreign Policy Problems Before The European Communities, London, Macmillan
4 Missiroli A., (2003) The EU and its changing neighbourhoods: stabilisation, integration and partnership, in Partners and
Neighbours: a CFSP for a Wider Europe,  Chaillot Paper n.64, Paris, Institute for Security Studies.
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discuss about the stabilisation approach, in particular I am interested in applying it to the forthcoming Wider Europe region (i.e.
the region that will result from the implementation of the new European Neighbourhood Policy). Specifically I am going to
consider the Wider Europe-Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as an instance of region-building. In order to better explain the Wider
Europe region’s characteristics, it will be compared to the Euro-Mediterranean region (i.e. the region that results from the
implementation of the Barcelona Declaration). The comparison between the two initiatives will be helpful for the proposals
of some theoretical interpretations of the ENP region-building project.
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Neighbourhood Policy
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership can well be considered a special neighbourhood policy. It means a complex of
mechanisms, agreements and institutions drawn to address the strategic objective of building security throughout European
neighbourhood. Scope of the initiative, in fact, is to turn the Mediterranean into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation
guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity5. Mediterranean policy is challenged at present by European initiatives aiming at
defining a new and comprehensive Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as envisaged in the Commission Communication of March
2003. Implementation of the new Neighbourhood Policy, in fact, is going to impact on Mediterranean countries too, since the
latter are identified as recipient countries together with Russia and the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS), i.e.
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.
It is worth remembering, however, that Neighbourhood is not going to override the existing framework for EU relations
with Russia and the countries of the Western NIS, and the Southern Mediterranean. Instead, it would supplement and build on
existing policies and arrangements6. It means that the EMP and the Neighbourhood Policy are not mutually excluding projects.
At the same time, ENP cannot be considered a simple mechanism of coordination of existing initiatives involving neighbours.
It should be intended, in fact, as a policy with its own specificity, i.e. ENP is something else with respect to the running regional
projects, able to bring them an added value.
As said before, I am going to utilize EMP’s experience to analyse the forthcoming features of the new region EU is going
to create with its neighbours.
The act of comparing the EMP to the Neighbourhood Policy, however, can be criticised with respect to different
arguments.
A first objection could be based on the assumption that European Mediterranean policy can be judged by the results
achieved since the signature of the Barcelona Declaration (1995). The second policy, instead, is a policy in fieri that can be
judged on the basis of the intentions that can be revealed from the preparatory documents.
Second, it is worth noting that the first refers to a specific group of countries, Mediterranean countries, that, despite internal
differences, presents a higher degree of homogeneity, if compared to the degree of homogeneity of the Wider Europe countries’
group. It is particularly difficult, in fact, to assimilate those States that lying at the eastern border of the Union with those facing
the Mediterranean Sea.
Despite the above-mentioned theoretical objections, I sustain the utility of comparing the EMP and the Neighbourhood
Policy to more easily trace the main characteristics of the latter.
I suggest to start listing the specific features of the EU’s experience in the Mediterranean that can be resumed in the
following aspects:
• A regional integration process based on the premise to develop a sense of co-ownership to the initiative among the
regional constituent parts. Practically the EU tried to make partners feel as equals, it tried to avoid Mediterranean
partners’ perception of a unilateral European initiative. These aims have been pursued fostering sub-regional coope-
ration and balancing a bilateral and a regional approach;
• A comprehensive security concept that implies taking in due consideration different security dimensions. It means
attributing the same importance to different fields of activity: political and security, economic and financial, social and
cultural cooperation;
• The relation with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In reality, Barcelona Declaration supports the separateness of the
Partnership from the conflict. However, it is not possible to deny its negative effects over the Barcelona Process.
The above-mentioned points represent the key features of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Now I am going to analyse
these aspects separately, underlining differences and analogies with respect to the new Neighbourhood Policy. At the same
time, I will try to stress in which respects the EMP appears to be more far-reaching than the Neighbourhood project, and in
which respects, instead, the latter appears to be more ambitious than the Mediterranean initiative.
5 Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 27-29 November 1995
6  Wider Europe-Neighbourhood, 2003:15
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Regions and regional integration process
As concerns the first feature, that is region-building process, International Relations literature is characterised by a strong
variety of interpretation of the phenomenon, and by definitional ambiguities. In order to proceed I find useful to list some
interpretations and to assume some working definitions.
We could start by adopting international region’s definition given by Nye. According to him, a region can be defined as: “a
limited number of States linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence”7. So it
derives that regionalism is “the formation of interstate groupings on the basis of regions”.
In order to define international regions, some authors refer to criteria such as geographical proximity, common bonds
(ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historical and social) and a sense of identity, which is emphasized by external States’ behaviour
(Cantori and Spiegel, 1970:6-7). Many authors tried to identify criteria which need to be fulfilled in order to talk of an
international region: Russett’s criteria (1967:11) – social and cultural homogeneity, political attitudes or external behaviour,
common political institutions, economic interdependence, geographical proximity –, or Thompson’s (1973) necessary condi-
tions: geographical proximity, regular and intense relations among regional units, common perceptions of the regional sub-
system. Nye (1971) distinguishes micro-economic organization involving formal economic integration from macro-regional
organization, concerned with controlling conflicts. Deutsch (1981:54) defines a region as a set of countries distinctly interde-
pendent over a broad range of different dimensions. This is often but not always indicated by a flow of socio-economic
transaction and communication. In the 1990s Adler and Barnett’s work on security community, substituted Deutsch behaviou-
ral approach to regional integration with a constructivist standpoint.
In order to explain region-building process International Relations literature makes reference to power distribution in the
international system (realist and neo-realist theories, for example, explain regionalism as a return to a multipolar balance of
power system - Waltz, 1993), economic interdependence  (Keohane and Nye, 1977), cultural affinity (Huntington, 1996),
intensity of transactions and flows of communication (Deutsch’s security communities), intensity of security, political and
military interactions (Buzan’s security complexes, 1991), membership of regional institutions.
Regional integration processes, then, have been interpreted through the lens of various theoretical perspectives, with results
that have contributed to strengthen the subject’s definitional ambiguities. According to Fawcett and Hurrel’s studies (1995) we
can state that in the actual international system region-building presents some specific characteristics: first, the economic
dimension’s prevalence. At the same time, there is a great mixture of economic, political, social and security issues. Practically
region-building is a multi-dimensional process, and economic regionalization can be considered as a first step in order to achieve
wider political and security objectives. A further characteristic is represented by the fusion of developed and developing
countries in a single regional integration scheme. We can cite Mexico and its inclusion in the NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade
Area), but in a list of examples we can easily put regional integration process between the European Union and the Mediter-
ranean countries, in the framework of the EMP.
In the European Union language, fostering regional cooperation and partnership has been widely used as a practice to cope
with the Union security concerns: security issues linked to migration – drug trafficking or organised crime - energy security
matters, not to speak of possible spill-over effects from regional conflicts.
At this point, we should wonder about the characteristics of regional cooperation the Union supports in the Mediterranean
area, and in the Wider Europe region too.
The EMP can be considered as an instance of regional security partnership8 (Attinà, 2002), a format able to evolve towards
the form of a security community9, during time. This evolution is marked by the results achieved in the three Partnership’s
pillars, and it will be possible thanks to the intervention of common institutions, political elites, civil society, and owing to the
complementary tracks: the bilateral and the regional agenda.
If we pass from a theoretical point of view to an empirical assessment of Mediterranean region-building process, an overall
judgement cannot be really positive: Barcelona experience teaches us how difficult is to eliminate reciprocal diffidence and
cultural incomprehension among the constituent parts of a region. It witnesses how much efforts are required to make partners
7 Nye J.(1968), International Regionalism, Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
8 Regional security partnership is the name given to the security arrangement of an international region that originates
from the consensus of the states to cooperate on the reduction of violence and enhancement of stability and peace in the
region by making use of different types of agreements and mechanisms like formal security treaties, security international
organizations, joint action agreements, multilateral dialogue processes, peace and stability pacts including confidence-
building and preventive diplomacy measures, and also measure for influencing the domestic structures and process of the
countries at risk of internal violence. A regional security partnership does not exclude any relevant power of the interna-
tional politics of the region. It includes almost all the countries of a region and also extra-regional powers.  In Attinà F.,
(2002), Security cooperation at the regional level: from opposed military alliances to security partnerships. Is the
Mediterranean region on the right track? Jean Monnet Working Paper n.45
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feeling as equals, especially with respect to the European Union’s cohesiveness. Barcelona’s main achievement is the aware-
ness of the importance of fostering sub-regional cooperation among partners and developing a common identity between the
two shores of the Mediterranean. Diffidence, however, still persists, especially in those partners which interpret European
involvement in the Mediterranean as an action aiming first and foremost at the satisfaction of its own security needs more than
at the solution of economic and social issues which matter them most.
As concerns regionalism envisaged in the Wider Europe Communication, it seems to be much less regardless of partners’
perceptions about European project than the EMP. This assumption is supported by the prevalence of bilateral over regional
dialogue, and, consequently, by the preference for a differentiated rather than a holistic approach. Regional relationships will
be based on the agreements signed by the Union on one side and each country on the other, with all the unbalances deriving from
that, which are going to be accentuated by the lack of sub-regional cooperation. It will result in a fragmented regional scheme
in which is difficult to support the idea of belonging to the same community/region.
To say the truth, developing sub-regional cooperation and a sense of joint ownership are issues introduced, with particular
emphasis, in the recent European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper10. The Paper, however, refers to existing fora (such
as the EMP) in order to strengthen the initiative’s regional dimension. It does not suggest, however, any specific – in the sense
of “new” and “proper of” – ENP’s instrument – whether it be an institution or a decision-making procedure. Doing so, ENP’s
“specificity” and “added value” disappear and the new policy is reduced to a mere coordination instrument of the running
regional projects in place with neighbouring countries.
Moving from these assumptions it is difficult to envisage the realization of a security community11 in the Wider Europe.
This statement is supported, beyond the just-mentioned arguments, by at least one significant explanatory reason. Security
communities are not spontaneous creations: they result from the activities of agents (political elites, individuals, regional and
transnational institutions) who need material and ideological resources for developing political reasons and willingness able to
build collective identities (“cognitive regions”12).
In the Wider Europe Communication there is no an adequate attention towards agents – political actors, institutions and
civil society. Regionalism of the March Communication, for instance, is characterised by a minimum, if not completely absent,
level of institutionalisation. There are no provisions for institutions responsible of Neighbourhood Policy’s implementation.
Regional integration process in the Mediterranean, on the contrary, provides specific organisms, assuring the initiative’s
regional dimension and guaranteeing the effective participation of the southern Mediterranean partners.
Let’s think to the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in which all partners take part, and to
the Euro-Med Committee constituted by the European troika13 and a representative from each partner country. The institu-
tional scheme of the EMP comprises, furthermore, a series of ministerial meetings with the Ministers in charge of specific
cooperation matters, and periodical meetings of the Senior Officials on Political and Security Questions (in relation to the issues
of the first basket). To these organisms we have to add the new Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, launched at the
Ministerial Conference held in Naples, 2-3 December 2003.
It is clear then that the regional integration process in the Mediterranean has an institutional dimension that the Wider
Europe regional integration project doesn’t pursue.
Speaking about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Adler (1998:189) sustains that: “behind the EMP and related efforts
lies the [.] idea that the most promising –perhaps only- way to achieve long-term security, economic welfare, political stability,
and peace in the Mediterranean area is neither an elaborate system of alliances or collective security system, nor a functional
scheme of economic integration, but the socio-cultural process of constructing a region”14 whose success depends on “political
and social engineering of a Mediterranean ‘we-feeling’ or collective social identity”15.
9 Deutsch and his associates defined a security community as a group of countries that has become integrated. It means the
attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough
to assure for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change (Deutsch, 1957: 5). Adler and Barnett (1998: 30)
redefined security communities as transnational regions comprised of sovereign States whose people maintain dependable
expectations of peaceful change. These expectations are driven by the development of trust and the formation of a collective
identity. Trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing: the development of trust can strengthen mutual identification, and
there is a general tendency to trust on the basis of mutual identification (Adler E. and Barnett M., (1998), A Framework for the
Study of Security Communities, in Adler E. and Barnett M., Security Communities, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 45)
10 European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper,Communication from the Commission, COM (2004), 373 final, Brussels,
May 2004
11 According to the meaning explained in the previous footnote
12 Adler E., (1997), Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations, Millennium, 26, 249-277
13 The current and incoming presidencies, the High Representative for the CFSP, the Commission
14 Adler E.,(1998), Condition(s) of peace, in “Review of International Studies”, 24, 5
15 Ibidem
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Paraphrasing Adler we can state that: behind Wider Europe initiative lies the idea that the most promising way to achieve
long-term security, economic welfare, political stability and peace in the neighbourhood area is a functional scheme of economic
and legislative integration in accordance to a differentiated and benchmarked approach, in which the need for the development
of a sense of we-ness, is neither excluded nor explicitly affirmed, but simply absent. The success of the initiative depends on the
degree in which different identities/communities tackle common threats and problems related to regional instability and
insecurity, on the basis of the adoption of the acquis communautaire.
In the long-term period the lack of a sense of common identity, of belonging to the same region, of co-ownership, of common
institutions, could induce neighbours to negatively perceive their asymmetrical relation with the Union. Thus is probably going
to mine the foundations of the Neighbourhood Initiative over time.
Comprehensive security
The second identified characteristic of the EMP is the comprehensive security concept adopted in the Barcelona Declara-
tion. The EU is used to concepts like that of comprehensive and cooperative security – in order to get regional stability –
because of the successful experience of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the so-called Helsinki
Process. 1995 Barcelona Declaration, for instance, is based on the model of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act that incorporates
distinct yet interrelated pillars or baskets – dealing with political and military issues, economic and financial matters, human and
cultural cooperation. It means that the Barcelona Process’ overall goal will result from the complementary of actions carried out
in different baskets.
In the Wider Europe regional integration project the Union doesn’t renounce to a comprehensive approach, like that of the
EMP. Political issues, in fact, are strictly linked with social, economic and environmental concerns. In the Commission’s
perspective, in fact, is of primary importance to assure “political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty
and social divisions” (Commission Communication, 2003:3).
A comprehensive and cooperative security concept, then, is strictly linked to the development of trust and confidence
among the units that constitute a region. Thus implies further attention towards dialogue between cultures.
In the Barcelona Declaration a specific chapter – the third one - is dedicated to the issue. In Naples (December 2003) Euro-
Mediterranean Ministers launched the project of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation “aiming at increasing dialogue and
common understanding between cultures and civilisations”.
In the Wider Europe Communication you can read: “The importance of dialogue between civilisations and free exchange
of ideas between cultures, religions, traditions and human links cannot be overemphasised”16and just en passant it refers to the
necessity of developing a cultural dialogue that aims at eliminating mutual incomprehension and at developing a sense of
belonging if not to the same community at least to the same project.
Fortunately, in the latest Communication (ENP Strategy Paper: 19) the Commission stresses the importance “to stress
mutual understanding of each others’ cultures, history, attitudes and values, and to eliminate distorted perceptions” as the
appropriate way to strengthen societal links.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
We start now analysing the third characteristic of the EMP: i.e. its relationship with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
This conflict, in fact, constitutes an interesting case study for judging the Union’s effective capacity of intervention in
regional conflicts, which involve its neighbours.
With respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the Community/Union can be proud of its coherent position held over time:
starting from the famous Venice Declaration (1980) the Union has always supported specific principles (two States for two
peoples, respect for Security Council Resolutions, condemnation of the use of violence, whatever the side it comes from) so
as to reach a satisfying agreement among the parties.
The Union’s declaratory policy, which is often criticized by both its detractors and by those who claim a more active Union
in world affairs, must be assessed in the general framework that comprises various instruments Europe employs for the conflict
solution.
The EC is, first, together with its Member States, the main financial donor for Palestinians17. Beyond it, it has always
enlarged the range of instruments at its disposal in order to actively participate in the process of conflict solution. Let’s think
to the appointment of the Special Envoy, Miguel Moratinos in 1996, followed by that of Marc Otten July 2003, and to the
16  Wider Europe – Neighbourhood, Commission Communication 2003: 12
17 Data released by the European Commission (www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/indexi) indicate that
in the period 1994-98 the Community has provided for the 50% of the international financial aid for the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank.
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institution of a High Representative for the CFSP so as to raise the level of the Union’s political participation at the negotiating
tables. The Union, then, has always tried to reinforce its international role in the Middle East area supporting a plurality of
multilateral initiatives such as the Madrid Conference (1991), and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995). To say the
truth, Barcelona Declaration separates the Partnership from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, affirming the principle of  “sepa-
rateness” between the two. Anyway, we cannot deny the existence of a mutual connection.
First, the EMP has had the great merit of attributing to the Palestinian Authority the same status recognised to the other
partners, and, at the same time, it has made of Israel a partner accepted by Arab countries. The EMP, then, has provided all
partners with a permanent forum for dialogue.
These merits, however, cannot hide the EMP’s limits: it has not been able to stop violence nor to develop confidence among
the parties involved in the conflict. Even the EMP task of providing a permanent forum for dialogue is fading away: Marseilles
(2000) and Valencia (2002) Ministerial Conferences have been boycotted by the Syrian and Lebanese delegations as a protest
against the Israeli use of violence in the occupied territories.
European efforts, then, are politically important but the limited results achieved till now have weakened Union’s action
efficacy and credibility. The Union appears incapable of adopting those decisions that could mean making relations harder with
both Israelis and Palestinians. The Union, for instance, doesn’t support measures such as embargo on arms selling to Israel, or
revision of Israeli preferential agreement – in order to exclude goods coming from settlements in the occupied territories, or
adoption of economic sanctions against the National Palestinian Authority, blamed for supporting terrorist activities.
The Union must further take in due consideration American policy in the area. The USA, in fact, are recognised as the
mediator par excellence and as the only guarantor of any eventual agreement among the parties. This has undoubtedly
weakened the Union negotiating role.
From September 2000 on, for instance, I mean from the beginning of the second Intifada, the only agreements reached have
been concluded under the US auspices: Sharm-el-Sheikh and Taba negotiations (October 2000, and January 2001), the Mitchell
Plan (May 2001), the Tenet cease-fire (August 2001). With the publication of the road map (April 2003) and its participation
to the Quartet, the Union aimed at raising its political profile in the solution of the conflict, but the continuing violence and the
latest Sharon’s initiatives, do not allow us to think positively about this new peace plan.
Resuming, then, European performance in the Middle East provides the image of a Union that is still far from being a
regional pacifier.
What’s, then, about the Union’s role in regional conflicts’ prevention and management, so as envisaged in the new
Neighbourhood Policy? The answer to this question appears to be more and more relevant considering that in the Wider
Europe region, beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are other areas of tensions: Western Sahara and Moldova-
Transdniestria.
Let’s see what is the content of the new Neighbourhood Policy as concerns regional conflicts: “A shared neighbourhood
implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity. The EU
should take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over Palestine, the Western Sahara and Transdniestria […]
Greater EU involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the
EU’s willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries. Once settlement
has been reached, EU civil and crisis management capabilities could also be engaged in post-conflict internal security
arrangements. Additional sources of funding for post-conflict reconstruction and development would be required”18.  The
Commission, then, claims a Union’s more active role in regional conflicts prevention and management, when regional stability
is at risk.
The High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, expresses the same request: “As a Union of 25 members, spending
a total of 160 billion Euros on defence, we should, if required, be able to sustain several operations simultaneously.    We need
to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. We should think particularly of
operations involving both military and civilian capabilities”19.
Practically, from the aforementioned documents’ analysis, it is possible to reveal a new consciousness: a civilian power, like
the Union is, wants to provide itself with the instruments that allow it to be recognised as an effective regional power.
Probably, with reference to the “active role” Union claims for itself in the Wider Europe, the new Neighbourhood Policy
appears more innovative and ambitious than the EMP. In the EMP Europe excludes itself from the Arab-Israeli conflict,
supporting the realization of a lasting peace in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council
Resolutions and on other multilateral initiatives already in place. In the Wider Europe, on the contrary, Europe assumes a
concrete responsibility as concerns conflict solution in its neighbouring countries.
18 Wider Europe-Neighbourhood, Commission Communication 2003: 12
19 Solana J., European Security Strategy, 2003:13
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The new strategic role, envisaged both in the March Communication and in the Solana’s Security Strategy, is a really
innovative aspect in the framework of relations set up, till now, with neighbouring countries. This element, especially if
compared to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, reveals a more conscious approach towards neighbours’ concerns that
constitute their political priorities.
Theoretical interpretations of the Wider Europe-Neighbourhood Policy
Resuming, we can list some characteristics of the new Neighbourhood Policy, taking in mind that it is considered as an
instance of region-building. It is, in fact, an initiative aiming at establishing a form of regionalism characterised by the following
elements:
• A high degree of heterogeneity among the regional units. It means that the dynamic of interactions among countries
involved will be ruled by bilateral agreements signed by the Union, on one side, and each neighbour, on the other, in a hub
and spoke scheme;
• Progressivism in enhancing regional cooperation, in the sense that it will evolve according to the results achieved. They
will be measured on the basis of specific benchmarks, i.e. precise and verifiable parameters, that can be assessed both
quantitatively and qualitatively;
• Lack of an institutional dimension. Region-building is not supported by regional forums or institutions, which can
guarantee the partners’ effective participation in the new policy’s elaboration and implementation;
• Burden-sharing and joint responsibility in addressing regional conflicts among all partners. The Union, then, as major
partner, should play a more active role to address these matters;
• An asymmetrical political and economic interdependence among regional constituent parts, which is aggravated by a
limited sub-regional cooperation among neighbours and by the lack of regional institutions in charge of safeguarding
mutual interests.
Starting from these points, I am going to suggest some theoretical approaches useful for explaining the Union’s attitude towards
its neighbours.
An interesting analysis results from the application of Waever’s imperial metaphor20.
According to the author, the European Union, as traditional Empires did, appears to be engaged in a pacification and
stabilisation process of its frontiers, through which the Union exports its norms and rules in a radial manner.
As starting point, Waever assumes the so-called English school, specifically Wight (1966,1977) and Watson’s (1992) studies.
The last one, in particular, identified a spectrum of options useful for explaining the international system’s organization: it ranges
from the extreme of the absolute independence among the systemic units to the extreme of the direct rule (Empire), passing through
the intermediate positions of hegemony and dominance.
Different forms of the international system’s organization can be arranged on a temporal continuum, or on a spatial dimension
which is articulated in concentric circles, in which the inner represents the imperial dominance and the outer rings the intermediate
forms. Waever utilises these concentric circles for explaining European regional organization, specifically the levels on which
Europe bases its security (a concept of security “that emphasizes environment, ecology and identity” together with a “renewed
interest in the rather classical military concerns”21- Waever: 68).
The first level of European security, represented by the inner circle, regards the maintenance of stability in the core of the
system. The second level, takes place in the relation between Europe and its near abroad that Waever identifies with the group of
candidate countries. Considering the completion of the enlargement process (May 2004), we can focus on the relation between the
Union and neighbouring countries. At this level the Union’s security objectives are realised through the tool of asymmetrical
interdependence. It is clear, in fact, that the EU shares with its neighbours the costs of economic, political and social interdepen-
dence which globalization process imposes to the different parts of the international system. The problem is that very often these
costs are more expensive for neighbours than for Europe, it means that neighbours are more vulnerable than Europe in their relation
of mutual interdependence. It is sufficient to think about Mediterranean countries heavily dependent on European market in order
to place their exports of textile or agricultural products, and on technical financial assistance, and on foreign direct investments. At
this level, then, the EU exercises a strong power of attraction on its neighbourhood, taking advantage from its economic and
commercial power. Neighbours will result linked to the Union but in a position of asymmetrical interdependence, and since this
asymmetry is an elevate source of power (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 11), this will be translated in a European policy of stabilisation
of its frontiers which makes use of an approach based on an unbalanced relation in favour of the Union.
Waever’s interpretation, subsequently, could be an adequate scheme for explaining the new Neighbourhood Policy. This
policy, in fact, lacks in the impulse to the development of sub-regional cooperation, which can be considered as the only way in
20 Waever O.Imperial Metaphors:Emergine European Analogies to Pre-Nation-State Imperial Systems, in Tunander O.,
Baev P., Einagel V., GeoPolitics in Post Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity, London, Sage 59-93
21 Ibidem
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which asymmetry can be balanced. Lack of an institutional dimension, furthermore, that is the absence of fora in which the parity
among partners is assured and their participation at a decisional level is guaranteed, is another factor that aggravates the unbalance
between the Union and its neighbours.
Waever’s interpretation inevitably leads to the following question: why neighbours should accept a European project in which
they occupy a position of asymmetrical dependence against the Union?
Answering with Joffé, neighbours: “perceive a utility in closer links with Europe, given their economic dependence upon it and
their geographic contiguity with it, and realize that they have very little choice in the matter. The overwhelming size of the EU in
almost every aspect, if compared with any other potential partner, obliges them to accept the European vision of a shared future,
even if they may fear the consequences”22. Starting from the premise that main European concerns are fundamentally security
issues, (security matters linked to migration, energy security problems, negative effects of regional conflicts), he speaks about a
“peripheral regionalism”, in which the most important power bloc forces solution along its periphery “in which mutual benefit is
an incidental consequence of unilateral security concerns”23 (Joffé: 220-221).
Other possible interpretations of the ENP’s project is provided by the notion of open or soft regionalism, that is a form of
regionalism in which a rule-based political space has not been still created, which is still far from “going beyond the mere
functional model, and including confidence-building measures, common rules and procedures, mutual expectations and political
dialogue or cooperation”24 (Telò 2001:90). I sustain that the existence of an asymmetrical relation between the Union and the
other regional units is undeniable. In a certain sense, then, we can talk about an implicit coercion exercised by the Union over
neighbours, in order to accept Europe’s project of a shared neighbourhood. We should not forget, anyway, that neighbouring
countries, though in a subordinate position with respect to Europe, have a lot to gain from an enhanced cooperation with it (a
chance in the Internal Market, technical and financial assistance, an enhanced international status).
ENP, then, is an instance of flexible and evolving region-building process: in the first period it aims at satisfying Europe’s
security objectives allowing it to control what happens in neighbouring countries. In this context mutual benefits are just a
consequence of unilateral European concerns.
In the long run the same benefits will result from the enhanced interactions among the regional constituent units. Thus
should balance the initial European exclusive attention towards its own security matters, highlighting those mutual interests
neighbours share with the Union, making them supporters of the ENP regional integration project. Neighbours’ support,
however, will be dependent on the Union’s capacity to foster trust and a sense of “we-ness” across its neighbourhood.
Conclusions
Europe Neighbourhood Policy reveals the European Union’s urgency to cope with the consequences of the enlargement
process over its near-abroad. Excluding membership prospect, the Commission has elaborated a stabilisation approach
towards its neighbours based on a region-building process. In this paper, in fact, I analysed ENP as an instance of regionalism
trying to highlight characters and dynamics of the new region Union is going to create with its new neighbours.
Built on the assumption to assure its own security through the stabilisation (social, political and economic) of its frontiers,
EU’s new policy should not forget the basic lessons learned from other neighbourhood policies – such as the Euro-Mediter-
ranean Partnership. Despite the limited results achieved, Barcelona’s main attainment is the awareness of the importance to
eliminate the asymmetrical perception between the two shores of the Mediterranean, making partners feel as equals, fostering
sub-regional cooperation and developing common identity.
Wider Europe region, on the contrary, is an area in which the dynamics of interactions among its parts are based on a hub-
and-spoke scheme, in which there is no an institutional dimension (i.e. institutions that guarantee partners’ interests and
partners’ effective participation in policy making and implementation), in which there is no real interest in supporting sub-
regional cooperation and no ambition to create a common identity.
The EU should bet not only on economic and legislative integration with its neighbours – as a way to stabilise them-, but
also on mutual trust and collective identity to make ENP a solid and durable initiative over time.
European neighbourhood project (i.e. the creation of a region of shared values and prosperity) is strictly linked to the
Union’s capacity in involving neighbours in the construction of a common region. EU should induce its neighbours to accept
not only the material benefits deriving from an enhanced relation with it, but also to embrace a far-reaching project of an
inevitable shared future.
22 Joffé G., (2001), European Union and the Mediterranean, in Telò M.,(2001), European Union and New Regionalism,
Burlington, Ashgate, 207-226
23 Ibidem
24 Telò M., Between Trade Regionalization and Deep Integration, in Telò M.,(2001), European Union and New Regio-
nalism, Burlington, Ashgate
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Ali  HEMAL
Euro-Med Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges
In view of the current geopolitical context and uncertainty that characterizes the region, the creation of a Mediterranean
free trade area appears increasingly necessary   for all countries of the region. The high unemployment rate, the stagnation
of average per capita income (which is less then 10 times the European average) and increasing poverty, means that rapid
growth is vital for economic and political stability of the whole region. For South-Mediterranean economies to achieve high
rate of growth and positive changes in productivity, depend heavily on their capacities to integrate into the world economy
and the Euro-Mediterranean free trade Area. For unlike in the 1970s and early 1980s labour migration and official aid and
credit will not be the future engine of growth, instead, increased exports will be needed to finance development.
Although most econometric models indicate that the integration of a smaller economy into a larger one should result in
substantial payoffs, most developing countries find, in reality, that opening up to international trade and FDI in not
sufficient to achieve their development objectives. Without a dynamic enterprise sector, a country will not be able to take
advantage of trade and investment opportunities. Indeed, the most important element in the integration process of the
South Mediterranean economies is related to the enormous amount of technical and financial help that is required by
domestic firms in the region. When the rules of the game changed after more than 25 years of functioning in a closed
economy, local entrepreneurs found it difficult to operate in a more open and competitive environment. One of the main
subjects of discussion these days in the region is how raise the level of productivity and competitiveness in existing firms.
Among other things, this will require proactive policies and programmes aimed at increasing the transfer of technology and
information as well as improving access to financial, infrastructural and export markets.
Beyond the specific costs associated with fiscal adjustment, the euro-med association agreements will result in high
adjustment, costs affecting all the economies of the south-med in the short term. For example in terms of the extent of labour
displacement, estimates range from around 3% in morocco to 9% in Tunisia and to more then 12% in Algeria and, Egypt1.
As for the gains in the long term, they are estimated to be on average in the region of 2% increase in the GDP growth.
However these grains do not accrue automatically and independently of the policies and programmes in place, including
technical and financial assistance to be provided by the European Union partner and FDI inflows to the region.
South-Mediterranean countries expected that the European Union will provide substantial financial and technical
support to partially compensate for the necessary structural adjustments and incentives for European firms to invest in the
region so as to upgrade their economies and eventuality improve there competitiveness and living standards for their
citizens. In other words south-med. countries expected to in the long-term to share prosperity and stability with the
European Union.
“Respect for social cohesion is another decisive factor of economies development that must not be neglected; otherwise
there is a risk of creating even more internal inequalities and this aggravating a situation of exclusion which is often at the
basis of popular rejection of reform”2 . Consequently we may ask how much aid and supportive action to increase
technology transfer and FDI inflows to their South-Med partners?
In financial terms, the MEDA programme constitutes the principal instrument of financial aid with the objective of
facilitating and smoothing the transition to competitive and globally integrated economies. In reality the EU financial
commitments have been much less than their South-Med partners’ expectations and effective needs.
Compared to a total commitment of less than 4.2 b euros for the whole period 1995-2000, estimates for Morocco alone
exceed 4 b euros to carry out structural adjustments and upgrade  its economy. Furthermore the ratio of payments to
commitments during the same period was extremely low: around 29.2%3 In absolute terms, average yearly per capita
payments amounted to less than one euro!
Despite the introduction of the new MEDAII Regulation in November 2000, both commitments and payments remain
much lower the South-Med countries’ needs. However, it must be born in mind that the MEDA programme was conceived
as a supportive mean and consequently South-Med countries should enhance their capacities to attract FDI inflows so as
to overcome the main constraints they face in carrying out the transition.
1 Mustafa Nabli: “ The fiscal Dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Challenge”, http://www.worldbank.org/mdf/mdf1/
dimensio.htm.
2 Commission of the European communities, (2001), Annual Report of the MEDA programme 2000 (Brussels).P.17
3 - Ibid. P.12.
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The Impact of the Euro-Med Partnership on FDI Inflows to North-African Partners
North African countries are centrally located in close proximity to the markets of Europe, Africa and the Middle East.
This presents an opportunity to serve as a hub for transport and other services, as well as export platform. Preferential
access to the European market gives their economies an edge over those of other developing countries. While the expecta-
tions that free trade with Europe will lead to rising FDI from Europe among decision makers, it should be pointed out that
the reverse could well occur, since European enterprises dealing with individual North African countries may prefer to
locate in Europe from where they might have better access to all the markets. Hence the so called hub-and-spoke problem
may arise. Thus it is in the interest of the North African countries to remove the various constraints to regional chid so as
to succeed in their linking process to Europe and the global economy.
Despite the fact that most North African countries have signed their association agreements worth the EU only very
recently, experiences of Tunisia and Morocco suggest that these agreements have not so far resulted in substantial FDI
inflows from Europe, especially when cross-border acquisitions and mergers are excluded. “FDI [to Tunisia] in 2000 more
than double the figure for 1999, yet it is inadequate when one takes into account that a third of this sum is the result of
privatization, and another third represents investments in oil and gas partnership concessions. As a result …. foreign
promoters invested only…1% of GPD”4.
This also applies to Morocco as figures in tables1 & 2 show. Furthermore, FDI in both countries are heavily concentra-
ted in the primary sector and low-value added industrial sectors, especially textiles (see tables 2& 3).
In contrast to Tunisia and Morocco, FDI inflows to Algeria have sharply increased since 2000. The main origins of these
investments are the USA and Egypt (see table 4). However most of these inflows went to the hydrocarbon sector. As for
the share of the European Union, especially France, in total FDI inflows to Algeria, it has substantially improved during
recent years. Despite these recent improvements in the inflows of FDI to Algeria, its sectoral destination does not so far
correspond to the real needs of the recipient economy, as they have neither stimulated local production capacity and supply
nor resulted in employment creation and revenue generation outside the oil and gas sector. Furthermore, export of non-
hydrocarbon goods and services have stagnated or declined while imports have sharply increased.
Enhancing Neighbourhood Policy through FDI (The Case of North African Countries)
4 - Ibid.P.47.
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“Therefore, openness has not resulted in poverty reduction. Thus, the conventional wisdom that persistent poverty is
due to the low level of trade integration with the global economy must be reassessed”.5
Consequently, the essential policy issue is not simply integration into the global market but how to improve the
composition of the exports building competitive and dynamic export capability through improved productive and supply
capacities. The small size and isolation of local enterprises make it difficult for them to access essential factors of production
both inside and outside their domestic economy. This building competitive advantage requires continuous investment,
especially in skills and information.
Despite these weaknesses, foreign investors could increase chances for domestic enterprises to realize trade and
investment opportunities through partnership, networking, training and exchange of information on best practices, and this
helping in building competitive advantages, rather than relying on comparative advantages. Investment projects with
foreign participation could lead to the development of human capital, technology transfer, increasing linkages with global
networks innovation.
At the enterprise level, the vast majority of North African countries suffer from low productivity, poor products quality
or design, and limited ability in problem sowing in repairs and maintenance. Improvements in these areas are essential for
increasing the possibility of local firms’ integration into international networks. Foreign participation ether through equity
or non-equity arrangements and joint ventures in local firms may speed up their level of competitiveness and integration
into the world market.
FDI, also, complements trade by enabling countries to gain from international specialization by expanding the size and
scope of markets, and by providing access to the trading and importation networks of global companies. Moreover FDI
could contribute to upgrading exports, by shifting from low skill and low-value added exports to high value added ones.
Foreign firms may facilitate diffusion of production technology and managerial practices that lack local firms.
Furthermore, foreign operators though their linkages to local sapphire could give rise to positive externalities, thus
removing constraints that limit at present sub-contracting locally, as most local firms are SMEs which generally lack
operating technology and organizational and managerial capability, and having difficulty in meeting the quality
standards and delivery targets required by foreign firms.
The contribution of FDI to the development of the technology capability of local firms could be enhanced.
However proactive policies, including support to domestic firms in the form of technological and manufactured
services and incentives or seed funds to provide for technology upgrading should be undertaken. Finally the long term
objective of deepening linkages with foreign firms should be integrated with the global science and technology
networks.
Studies on the impact of FDI on exports and technology transfer in Egypt show conclusively that the impact was
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues
5 - UNCTAD (Secretariat), March 2003, Enhancing the contribution of the indigenous private sector to African develop-
ment - Opportunities for African-Asian cooperation, UNCTAD, Geneva. P.27.
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extremely weak: “In Egypt there does not appear to be a close association between FDI and exports”6and that. “The
surveyed companies did not feel that theirs affiliation with foreign companies particularly benefited the formation of
linkages with local suppliers”7.This may be so because the country lacks appropriate strategies and policies at both
macro and micro levels that provide local firms with the possibility of access to finance, technology and business
services and greater linkages between foreign firms and local suppliers.
Conclusion
In the light of capital mobility and labour immobility, FDI inflows to the South Mediterranean countries could
contribute to upgrading exports, creating jobs and wealth and improving skills. These in turn lead to the achievement
of the main objectives of the Euro-Med partnership which are: Shared prosperity and social and political stability in
the whole region. However to increase FDI flows from Europe to their southern partners proactive policies that
encourage such flows are required. The Euro-Med. Partnership is likely to enhance FDI flows to South Med.
Countries and performance in their economies in its own right only if the northern partner is willing to enforce
investment encouraging “club rules”. This seems to be very likely as the northern partner has a major interest in the
alleviation of pressures to migrate and in the stability of the whole region. Furthermore, the removal of constraints to
intra-regional trade in the south is a key component of successful linking to Europe and the global market. Otherwise
the so-called hub-and-spoke problem may arise as the hub (the E.U) sucks firms and investment out of the spokes
(the south-med partners).
6 - UNCTAD , 1999: Investment Policy Review-Egypt, UNCTAD, Geneva, P.12




Over the past two decades, the growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational enterprise (MNE)
activity has increasingly been regarded as one of the defining characteristics of the world economy and an important
engine of economic growth for host countries1. Developing country attitudes towards FDI have changed, with
dramatic improvements in the FDI policy regimes2. Governments in developing countries have not only reduced
barriers to FDI but have also been offering special incentives to attract foreign firms and foster relationships between
MNEs and local firms3. FDI is deemed to be a catalyst for output growth, (through) capital accumulation, and
technological progress. The less developed a country is, the greater the need for MNE externalities, as a means to
alleviate resource and skill constraints normally associated with underdevelopment and overall, developing countries
actively seek FDI to strengthen industrial competitiveness and enhance their growth prospects4. The debate on the
merits and de-merits of FDI started in the 1960s (Reuber et al 1973, Lall and Streeten 1977) and is still far from over.
FDI and its developmental effects is a topic which has started to attract considerable attention in the Mediterranean
developing countries, notably those countries which form part of the so called MEDA region5. In order to attempt to
achieve both growth and stability in the region, the European Union (EU) and the 12 non-EU Mediterranean
countries signed the Barcelona Declaration in 1995, creating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, with the aim to
promote stability and economic growth in the region. The envisaged free trade zone between the EU and the
Mediterranean countries by 2010 is expected to bolster the prospects of increased FDI flows to the MEDA region6.
In this context of future economic growth potential, the MEDA countries have recognized FDI as an important engine
for respective economic development.
This article has two objectives. First, it evaluates the increasingly important role of FDI in the MEDA developing
countries in the context of the analytical arguments relating FDI to economic development. Second, it empirically
examines past trends in FDI performance in the MEDA region and analyse the potential for future performance in the
context of the evolving regional location factors. After this introduction, Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
analytical background highlighting the role of FDI in economic development. Section 3 focus on the empirical
evidence of the trends in FDI flows and stocks in developing countries and main MEDA trends and performances.
Section 4 presents an overview of this performance and potential in relation to the location factors driving FDI to the
region. We finish this article with some concluding remarks.
Analytical framework
From the point of view of host developing countries, the central questions concerning the role of FDI in develop-
ment are to what extent FDI and MNE activity contribute to the generation of host country economic growth and
1 In this paper, FDI is defined as an investment involving long term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and
control of a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in
an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor. An MNE is an incorporated or unincoporated enterprise
comprising parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates.
2 This is particularly so in the case of those developing countries which until some time ago practised the outright barring
of FDI activity (Caves, 1982).
3 In 1998, 103 countries offered tax concessions to foreign companies that set up production or administrative facilities
within their border (Hanson, 2001).
4 The relevance of FDI vis-à-vis economic development stems from a number of potential benefits to be realized in the
host economy. For example, FDI is less volatile than other private capital flows and provides a stable source of finance
to meet capital requirements in developing contexts (Reisen and Soto, 2001).
5 The 12 Mediterranean countries which participate in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Gaza & West Bank, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The Palestinian Authority and
Israel are not treated in this paper, which is devoted to the nine Mediterranean developing countries.
6 The central idea behind this initiative has been the notion that further integration with the EU provides considerable
potential to foster economic growth for the developing countries in the region and this partnership aims at establishing
a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010. To help this process the Union has promised financial contribution to
support the modernising efforts in the region. The Euro-Mediterranean free trade area is to be achieved mainly through
“Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements” between the EU and individual Mediterranean countries.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION’S MEDITERRANEAN NEIGHBOURS.
PAST TRENDS AND FUTURE POTENTIAL IN THE MEDA REGION
73
what are necessary preconditions for MNE externalities and FDI-led growth to emerge. Externalities are the mecha-
nisms through which productivity gains by locally based firms occur, leading to the generation of economic growth
in the host economy. Through these externalities, FDI inflows can potentially break the vicious circle of underdeve-
lopment (as evident in low savings, low investment and low growth poverty traps) by easing capital, technology,
knowledge constraints in the host economy. For example, MNEs are likely to bring in the host country, capital,
technology and knowledge and potentially lead to increased exports boosting international competitiveness (Blom-
strom, 1990). MNE externalities, spillovers and vertical are tackled first as the mechanisms through which the
generation of economic growth in the host country occurs. In passing, certain determinant factors for technology
spillovers and growth are highlighted. Here we stress the point that the impact of FDI on host country economic
growth revolves around the nature and extent of these externalities, whether occurring in the same industry of the
MNE or else in upstream industries (i.e. supplier firms)7. Irrespective of their nature and form, these externalities
have an impact on FDI-led host country economic growth prospects.
MNEs are among the most important actors in the generation and control of new technology and they utilize the
tangible and intangible resources in different host countries to the most productive use8. The fact that technologies used
by foreign affiliates are not always available at arm’s length for host economies, adds to the importance attached to FDI
as the most tenable form of technology acquisition for industrial upgrading.  FDI activity may involve the explicit
transfer of technology and in addition, the transfer of complementary resources such as management expertise and
processes to best utilize this technology. For example, Djankov and Hoekman (1999) show that firms receiving FDI or
involved in joint ventures tend to acquire new technologies more frequently than those without FDI and provide training
programmes. However, technology spillovers are hard to quantify. This is because the various learning and transfer
processes that underlay are hard to measure. Secondly, in the case of FDI spillovers it is difficult to determine the means
by which technology transfer through FDI affects the productivity growth of host country based firms. Most empirical
studies have dealt with these problems by taking the view that the technology gap which may exist between local firms
and MNE affiliates is reflected in the observed differences in the level of total factor productivity (TFP), i.e. how labour
and capital are utilized in host country firms. The effect of MNE technology spillovers can then be captured by changes
in the level of TFP observed at the firm level, after controlling the impact of other variables that may influence the firm’s
productivity performance. A considerable number of studies have focused on the MNE impact on intra-industry TFP,
stressing the possibility that MNEs have a positive impact on the productivity levels of local firms. These studies
examine the productivity externalities without trying to understand the mechanism through which these are realized.
Such studies have therefore focused on the indirect evidence of externalities by exploring whether increases in the
presence of MNEs in a country or sector are associated with increases in local firms’ productivity in that country or
sector or in upstream sectors. One robust finding is that MNEs tend to have higher productivity than domestic firms in
the same sector (for example Haddad and Harrison 1993; Blomstrom and Wolff, 1994; Kokko, Zejan and Tainsini,
2001)9. Utilizing this methodology, a number of studies indicate efficiency gains as a result of technological spillovers
from MNE affiliates to local firms in the same industry, as for example in Blomstrom and Persson (1983) for Mexico and
Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) for Indonesia. Using the same methodology, other studies indicate negative effects of
FDI on local firms as in Haddad and Harrison (1993) in the case of Morocco. This methodology has its pitfalls since
MNEs might be attracted by sectors that are more productive in the first place and thus the validity of TFP growth as
a measure of MNE spillover effects stands for some re-assessment (Aitken and Harrison 1999)10. As Aitken and
Harrison note, cross-sectional studies are subject to a critical identification problem. At the micro level, foreign firms may
be located in high productivity industries as opposed to causing productivity externalities. At the macro level, high
growth countries may attract more FDI as opposed to FDI causing this high growth. If this is the case, the coefficients
on cross-section estimates are likely to overstate the positive impact of foreign investment. As a result, one might find
evidence of positive externalities from foreign investment where no externalities occur11.
Empirical studies of FDI spillovers through panel data are used to deal with this endogeneity problem. For developing
countries, these studies find no indication of the existence of positive horizontal externalities. In fact, many studies find
7 In the case of vertical externalities, i.e. those externalities emerging from the links between an MNE in one sector with
upstream sectors, can take monetary form (as emerging from pure market transactions) as well as non-monetary, in the
form of knowledge and technology spillovers.
8 New technology generation is highly concentrated in a number of advanced industrial countries, taking place in large MNEs.
For a discussion on the role of MNEs in the globalisation of innovation, see for example, Narula (2003a).
9 When they adjust for firm size, Haddad and Harrison do not find differences in productivity between foreign and local firms.
10 This point is stressed by Hanson (2001) in his critique of the method
11 For amore detailed analysis of this method see for example, Rodriguez Clare (2003)
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evidence of negative horizontal externalities. In a recent review of the micro evidence on externalities from foreign owned to
domestically owned firms which pays particular attention to panel studies, Gorg and Greenaway (2002) conclude that the
effects are mostly negative. An explanation for this result might be that MNEs minimize technology leakages to competitors
while simultaneously tend to improve the productivity of suppliers by transferring knowledge to them (see for example,
Portelli and Narula 2004, Scott-Kennel 2000). More recent studies have examined the notion of positive externalities from FDI
towards local firms in upstream industries, Balock and Gertler (2003) find evidence of positive vertical externalities12. This
argument points to the notion that if FDI were to generate spillovers, they are more likely to be vertical rather than horizontal
in nature. Most empirical studies of FDI spillovers have regressed local firm productivity on FDI activity within the same
sector. Although such studies find no horizontal spillovers, the empirical work at the intra-industry level might not be suitable
to capture wider spillover effects on the host economy such as those created between MNEs and their suppliers. Indeed, from
the empirical literature is that it is difficult to find robust evidence of positive externalities from multinationals to local firms in
the same sector (horizontal externalities). In fact, many studies for developing countries that have paid particular attention to
causality problems have actually found evidence of negative horizontal externalities arising from multinational activity while
confirming the existence of positive externalities from multinationals to local firms in upstream industries (vertical externali-
ties). For a more detailed analysis refer to Portelli and Narula 2004)
The realization of MNE externalities potentially leads to the generation of economic growth at the macroeconomic level.
At the macroeconomic level, cross-section empirical work by Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998), Carkovic and Levine
(2000) and Alfaro, Chandra, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek (2003) finds little support that FDI has an exogenous positive effect
on economic growth. However, their evidence suggests that local conditions, such as the level of education and the development
of local financial markets play an important role in allowing the positive effects of FDI to materialize. In the widely cited paper
in the literature, Borensztein et al. (1998), using a dataset of FDI flows from industrialized countries to sixty-nine developing
countries find that FDI is an important vehicle for transferring technology and higher growth only when the host country has
a minimum threshold of human capital13 De Mello (1999) finds a positive and significant impact of FDI on output growth in
OECD and Asian non-OECD countries. However, FDI tends to increase output growth through higher productivity in
technological leader countries and through capital accumulation in technological laggards. Elsewhere, Reisen and Soto (2001)
find a positive correlation between FDI and portfolio equity flows on the one hand and GDP growth on the other.  Other
evidence in the literature confirms the positive impact of FDI on growth but highlight that developing countries need to have
reached a certain threshold level of development in their location factors, inter alia in the level of human capital and the physical
infrastructure prior to be able to internalize the associated benefits of FDI (Saggi, 2000). De Mello (1997) points to differences
in the growth impact of FDI across countries based on such capabilities. Since host country technological capabilities are likely
to determine the scope for spillovers from foreign to domestic firms, the growth impact of FDI tends to be limited in
technologically less advanced countries. The same authors go further to argue that FDI raises growth only in those countries
where the labour force has reached a minimum threshold of educational attainment. Xu (2000) finds strong evidence of the
positive effect of FDI on total factor productivity growth in host countries14, but reiterates that the absorption of MNE’s
technology may require a certain level of human capital accumulation on the recipient side.  In the same vein, Zhang (2001) finds
that the impact of FDI growth is country specific and tends to be positive where policies favouring free trade and education
are adopted to encourage export oriented FDI.
Therefore, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that a number of determinant factors need to be in place at the host
country level for MNE externalities to occur and FDI-led growth to be realized. There is consensus in the literature highlighting
these determinant factors, grouped under the concept of absorptive capacity. The realization of MNE technology spillovers as
well as FDI-led growth are determined by the absorptive capacity of host country economic agents, be they firms, individuals
or institutions. The concept of technological congruence or absorptive capacity15 is a function of the capability of the country
to benefit from technological spillovers from the more industrialized countries and the ability to accumulate and best utilize
technology and knowledge. Absorptive capacity includes the ability to search and select the most appropriate technology to
be assimilated from existing ones available, as well as the activities associated with creating new knowledge. Absorptive
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12 This new evidence, however, needs to be taken with caution. Methodological issues remain regarding estimation techniques
and measurement of variables, in particular productivity measures.
13 Likewise, Xu (2000) using data on U.S. MNEs finds that a country needs to reach a minimum human capital threshold in
order to benefit from the technology transfer from MNEs, and that most developing countries do not meet this threshold.
14 This result pertains to US survey data on manufacturing MNEs and the technology transfer effect is significant only for
developed countries.
15 Abramovitz (1990, 1995) distinguishes between two elements of social capability and technological congruence or
absorptive capacity. Dahlman and Nelson (1995) define national absorptive capacity as the “ability to learn and imple-
ment the technologies and associated practices of already developed countries”.
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capacity also reflects the ability of economic agents to integrate the existing and exploitable resources – technological oppor-
tunities – into the production chain, and the foresight to anticipate potential and relevant technological trajectories (Criscuolo
and Narula 2001). Laggard “economic units” (countries or firms) must possess inter alia) the ability to absorb, internalize and
utilize the knowledge potentially made available to them. Absorptive capacity in economic units corresponds to the appropria-
te supply of human capital and technological capability to be able to generate new technologies and consequently use
productive resources efficiently. The development and upgrading of capabilities is expected to translate into productivity
growth for firms as well as countries16. Absorptive capacity is significant for development because it allows domestic
economic actors to internalize knowledge that exists elsewhere (either within the domestic economy or externally) that is made
available directly or indirectly to them. There are several ways in which technology flows occur, either through arms-length
means, such as through licensing, or through trade in intermediate goods, plant and equipment or even products or services
(Narula 2003c). As in the focus of this article, technology flows may also be made available through the modality of FDI.
Although not the only means available, spillovers from FDI are regarded as one of the most practical and efficient means by
which industrial development and upgrading can be promoted (Narula and Dunning 2000). While the potential for MNE-
related spillovers are clear, as are the opportunities for industrial upgrading therefrom, it is increasingly acknowledged that the
nature, level and extent of the benefits vary considerably.
It should also be stressed that while human capital represents a core aspect of absorptive capacity (in that a host country
should possess a minimum threshold stock of knowledge that will allow it to absorb MNE externalities), its presence is not a
sufficient condition for knowledge accumulation (Criscuolo and Narula 2001). Knowledge accumulation requires the simulta-
neous presence of institutions and economic actors that determine the stock of knowledge in a given location and the efficient
use of markets and hierarchies – be they intra-firm, intra-industry or intra-country (Narula 2003c). This knowledge is not
costless and must be accumulated over time. Hence, while physical and human capital are necessary conditions for catching-
up, the lack of appropriate incentives for production and investment can compromise the success of the technological
upgrading (Lall 1992)17.
The contrasting empirical evidence on the impact of FDI at the host country level reinforces the claim that MNE
externalities and knowledge spillover effects are not automatic as one would tend to believe but are affected by several host-
industry and host country factors. An important characteristic for the emergence of technology spillovers is the technology gap
between MNE affiliates and local firms in the host country. Kokko (1994) and Kokko et al (1996) provide evidence for the
hypothesis that spillovers are easier to identify empirically when the technological attributes of local firms match those of the
MNE affiliates. Specifically, Kokko et al (1996) argue that a high technology gap combined with low competition prevents
spillovers to the host economy. The absorptive capability of host country firms to absorb foreign technology appears to be an
important determinant of the size of the FDI spillovers. Kokko et al. (2001) highlight the importance of past experience in
industrialisation as a precondition for international transfer of technology and the absence of this experience is concomitant to
lack of absorptive capacity by the local sector (Radosevic, 1999). For example, in the Sub Saharan African region, host to the
majority of LDCs, the conditions that stimulate technological assimilation (such as developed human capital, adequate
physical infrastructure and a dynamic business climate) are absent, leading to failure to master imported technology as well as
to compete in international markets (Mytelka, 1985, Lall and Pietrobelli, 2002). The development of capacities and capabilities
is key to both potentially attracting more FDI inflows as well as an increased the potential for MNE technological spillovers
tenable to industrial upgrading of the host economy. The improvement in location factors is an imperative path for host
countries to undertake since the competition for FDI among developing countries is heavily intensifying (see for example,
Mytelka (1996) and Mudambi (1998)). Indeed, a significant factor in influencing MNE location decisions is the presence of
sophisticated, created assets (in the form of developed human capital and domestic firms’ technological capabilities) in host
countries (Narula and Dunning, 2000., Noorbakhsh et al. 2001). Therefore, it is crucial, especially in the context of intense
competition for FDI, that developing countries formulate policies that improve local skills and build human resource capabi-
lities, in order to be able to benefit most from FDI and MNE activity. For instance, Borensztein et al. (1998) show that at
country level, a minimum threshold of absorptive capacity is necessary for FDI to contribute to higher productivity growth,
while Narula and Marin (2003) show that only firms with high absorptive capacity are likely to benefit from FDI spillovers.
Background and trends of FDI in the MEDA region
After dwelling on the main theoretical and analytical arguments about the role of FDI in host country economic
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16 Although one has to highlight that there are other intervening factors in play see e.g., Abramovitz 1986, 1995, Dahlman and
Nelson 1995).
17 For example, the availability of a large stock of suitably qualified workers does not in itself result in efficient absorption of
knowledge, although the definition of human capital shares some commonality with the concept of absorptive capacity.
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development, we turn our attention on the background and trends of FDI activity in the MEDA region. We start this section
by illustrating the context of global FDI flows and stock performance. At the outset, we put forward some definitions.
Flows of FDI comprise capital provided (either directly or through other related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to
an FDI enterprise, or capital received from an FDI enterprise by a foreign direct investor. FDI comprises three components
– equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. FDI stock is the value of the share of their capital and
reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent
enterprise.
Over the past two decades, world inward FDI flows into host countries have increased from around US$ 55 billion in
the late 1980s to reach US$651 billion in 2002. As illustrated in Table 1, in 2002 more than 70 per cent of total world FDI
have been directed to developed countries, with the remainder being shared by an increasing number of developing regions18.
FDI stock in developing countries has increased from US$ 307.5 billion in 1980, reaching US$ 2,340 billion in 2002. This
corresponds to around 33 per cent of total world FDI stock. The magnitude of inward FDI stock going to developed
economies accounted to 65 per cent of world total in 200 compared to 56 per cent in 1980.
As data in FDI seems to suggest, during the last two decades the globalization of the world economy has led to a dramatic
increase in international production, as the continuous growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) reaches all corners of the
globe. However, this phenomenon seemed to have bypassed the countries of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean basin,
since their respective share of global flows and stock of FDI seems to have deteriorated over the past two decades. The most
recent data shows that the Mediterranean countries share in total world FDI flows and stocks is at exceptionally low levels
18 It is noteworthy that an increasingly large proportion of aggregate FDI flows takes the form of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) which includes the acquisitions of public enterprises through various national privatisation programmes.
M&As accounted for around 80 per cent of total FDI inflows, corresponding to substantial high shares across developing
regions (UNCTAD 2000). The take-over of former parastatal companies represented an increasingly important FDI driver
in developing economies as these countries continue to liberalise their economies (Liberatori and Pigato, 2000).
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compared to levels registered by Sub Saharan Africa. As illustrated in Table 1, whereas in 1980 the eight MEDA countries
registered a 2.3 per cent share of total FDI flows and FDI stocks, in 2002, their respective share plummeted to less than and
around 1.0 per cent, respectively. The competitiveness of the MEDA region seems to have deteriorated vis-à-vis other
emerging developing regions in the world. For example, it is noteworthy that in 1980, the Central Eastern European (CEE)
countries registered lower FDI flows when compared to the MEDA countries. This relative position has been dramatically
altered two decades after with CEE countries recording a 4.4 per cent share of total world FDI flows in 2002. Over the same
period, the MEDA average share of total world FDI flows for the eight countries under focus decreased from 2.3 in 1980 to
reach 0.7 in 2002. Over the past two decades, the MEDA region has also registered declines in the extent of FDI stock. Within
the region, Algeria and Morocco rank as two of the most successful economies attracting FDI activity in the region, accounting
for around 27 and 24 per cent of MEDA FDI stock in 2002. It is noteworthy that MEDA countries seem to have consolidated
their improved their relative FDI stock position over the past two decades. However, in terms of their shares in global FDI
flows there have not been any dramatic changes over the period.
Nonetheless, the present levels of FDI activity in MEDA countries still represents an important potential contributor to
host country economic development. Indeed, the important role of FDI in host economies is highlighted in specific indicators,
such as the share of inward FDI flows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), as well as the share of inward
FDI stock as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The former measures the relative weight of FDI flows in relation
to the total investment occurring in the host economy (as measured by GFCF), whereas the latter provides a tentative measure
of the importance inward FDI stock in relation to total economic activity taking place in the host country (as measured by
GDP).  Table 2 illustrates the increased importance of FDI flows and stock as evidenced from increasing shares in both
indicators between 1980 and 2002. These indicators also highlight the increased important role FDI plays in the MEDA region,
particularly regarding FDI stock as a share of GDP. As far as the origin of the FDI is concerned, the EU is the most important
investor also in the MED region, even though the Mediterranean countries do not seem to be on top of the European firms’
preferences as a location for production plants. Indeed, in recent years, the MEDA region represented only around 2 per cent
of total EU FDI outflows. This share showed a decline since the late 1990s, when the region collected about 11 per cent of total
European FDI outflows. Within the EU, only five countries seem to be steadily involved as investors in the MED region, even
though with different paces and patterns. These countries are France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and United Kingdom.
Foreign Direct Investment in the European Union’s Mediterranean Neighbours. Past Trends and Future Potential
in the MEDA Region
78
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues
After looking at the trends in FDI performance, we turn our attention to he economic context in which FDI is being
attracted and sought. Specifically, we attempt to provide a brief analysis of the economic characteristics and econo-
mic performance of the respective Mediterranean countries. Some selected economic indicators are illustrated in
Table 3. At the outset, most MEDA economies are defined as middle- to low-income countries (World Bank 2004),
with GDP per capita ranging from around US$ 3,600 to US$ 6,000 per annum. For comparative purposes, this
compares to US$ 20,800 for the EU Member states. Aggregate growth in the Mediterranean region continues to be
characterised by erratic swings. Having contracted by 0.4% in 1999, the regional economy grew by 4.7% in 2000,
only to experience a decline in GDP of 1.8% in 2001. The fluctuations in growth can principally be attributed to the
varying performance of specific large economies within the region, notably Turkey and also the dependence of a
number of the economies, particularly Algeria and Syria on a fluctuating oil industry. Approximately, the region’s
GDP reaches just around 7.0 per cent of EU average. Economic growth should be analysed against the backdrop of
a rapidly growing population in the region. Indeed, while the Mediterranean countries have a population that is
equivalent to around 60 percent of the EU population, their aggregate economic size is considerably smaller and as a
result, their rate of economic growth has been insufficient to make a substantial improvement in the living standards
of a large proportion of the population. In other words, economic growth being registered is not keeping pace with the
increasing size of the labour force. Consequently, unemployment continues to grow, with recorded (official) unem-
ployment in excess of 20 per cent in a number of countries. While the poverty rates do not seem very high compared
to regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (regions which include developing countries having poverty
rates in excess of 70 per cent) when one considers the proximity and links between the countries of the Mediterranean
and the countries of Southern Europe, the regional contrast with the industrialized and prosperous North is remarka-
ble. Gross domestic investment (as measured by GCFC) in the region has not been exceptional and has been declining
in the majority of MEDA countries. Data related to the share of private fixed investment in total investment in part
reflecting the conditions of domestic investment activity in a number of economies in the region (with the notably
exception of Egypt, Morocco and Turkey). In addition, the inefficiency of investment appears to be associated with
the prominence of the role of the state in the respective economies. A further significant deterrent to investment has
been political instability, particularly in preventing the flow of goods, services and movement of labour and constrain-
ts giving rise to a lack of cooperation in matters such as the harmonization of customs procedures.
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Countries in the region still rank relatively low in the global rankings of human development indices (HDI),
reflecting to a large extent the nature and extent of human capital capacity in the respective economies. As illustrated
in Table 4, the lack of dynamic industrial activities, inter alia in the lack of investment in skills and technology may
also explain why agriculture still is important in regional economic activity. This importance is highlighted in the high
shares of agricultural sector in economic value added in the MEDA countries. Although these shares have been
declining when compared to a decade ago, they are still at relatively high levels compared to the international averages.
The importance of agriculture sector in these economies highlights the lack of industrial sector depth and dynamism.
As far as economic structure goes, most MEDA economies are characterized by striving manufacturing industrial
activity (as highlighted in terms of share of manufacturing exports in total merchandise exports), albeit concentrated
in low and medium technological industrial activities. Indeed, the share of high technology exports in manufactured
exports is at relatively low levels in the region.
Drivers of FDI in the MEDA region
After examining the past trends and economic context in which FDI is being attracted it is important to highlight
the drivers of FDI flows in the region. We summarise these location factors driving FDI activity in the region in the
context of market potential as well as in terms of improved investment climate in the region.
Market potential
The market of the MEDA countries is an important, dynamic location factors enticing FDI activity. The total
population of the Mediterranean shore countries was approximately 430 million inhabitants in the year 2002, with
a projection of 523.7 millions inhabitants in 2025. The region is not at all homogeneous in terms of population and
living standards, however, all countries share an important and privileged trade link with the with the European. For
example, Turkey, Israel and Algeria rank at the top of the list as trading partners of the EU in 2002. The European
Union remains the main outlet for exports from the MEDA countries. This highlights the great potential and
prospects for increased FDI activity to secure and serve these market prospects in the region. The market prospects
for FDI activity are evident in a number of economic sectors; notably consumer goods (food and non-durables, white
and brown goods), modernization in the agro-food sector, distributive trades, the health sector particularly pharma-
ceuticals, construction activity and information and communication technologies (ANIMA 2003).
As hinted earlier, the Euro Mediterranean Barcelona process envisages the establishment of an economic space
with the potential to represent one of the most dynamic markets in the global economy. It is envisaged that this
economic space will play host to deeper economic integration between the EU Member States and their Mediterra-
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nean partners, as well as providing the context for more integration between the Mediterranean countries themselves.
With the extension of the EU to 25 Member States, this market could in time group together no fewer than 40
countries and consists of a single market with nearly 800 million consumers. Nonetheless, the creation of such a free
trade area should not be an end in itself, but rather a means of improving relations between the shores of the
Mediterranean, of reducing social and economic disparities, of implementing sustainable development, of encouraging
regional co-operation and enabling a better integration of the partner countries within the world economy. Market
prospects are therefore expected to be a prime driver to FDI flows in the region in the medium and longer term. The
potential for FDI in the region emanates from the wider and successful implementation of the Barcelona process.
While it is likely that MNEs evaluate the local demand, measured at the country-level, in their investment decisions,
however they are also likely to consider the demand of neighbouring locations. As long as there is some trade, part of
the total demand addressed to MNEs will come from consumers located just outside the boundaries of the host
country chosen as their foreign production base (Head and Mayer, 2001).
Improving investment and business climate
More recently, the majority of MEDA countries have adopted stabilization policies and taken steps towards
establishing more open, market-oriented economies. By the mid 1990s, progress toward stabilization had been
achieved in a number of countries. However this process has been gradual and a number of MEDA countries may have
recorded the cost of a protracted slowdown in economic growth as a result of delay in the adoption of fundamental
economic reforms. In addition, the slowdown has tended to further exacerbate the economic fundamentals, fuelling
unemployment and creating transitional challenges for the respective economies. Typical economic reforms required
in countries of the region include amongst other measures; trade liberalization in the context of the Association
Agreements undertaken with the EU; the gradual programme of rationalisation of state budgets to prioritize invest-
ment in viable physical and social infrastructure with the emphasis on developing the right infrastructure and
promoting human capital; extensive privatization programmes to increase efficiency via competition, administrative
and legal reforms to reduce bureaucracy and improve the enforcement of contracts; financial sector liberalization and
the adoption of an appropriate regulatory framework to allow business intermediation to occur efficiently. Overall,
the MEDA countries have been introducing policies which, to differing degrees, contribute to the creation of a more
open and more dynamic economies. The majority of the MEDA countries are harnessing themselves to the moderni-
sation of their physical infrastructures and public services as well as those of their financial sectors. In particular, the
Association Agreements with the European Union play an important role in the development of a favourable
investment climate and improve the business environment in these economies. In addition, the Euro-Mediterranean
partnership adds dynamism to these reforms and favours the process of change of the economic, legal and political
institutions. Such changes are necessary to encourage investment in the region. Governments are responding by a
series of macro-economic reforms based on the reduction of the public deficits and expenses as well as a liberalization
of trade and investment. The disengagement of the state is illustrated by a number of events involving the privatiza-
tion of public enterprises (primarily in strategic sectors such as telecommunications and public utilities), the develop-
ment of the banking system and the development of the national financial markets. The legal institutions evolve just
as quickly, in particular as far as the competition, customs duties and private property are concerned, so as to attract
foreign investors.
Nevertheless, although positive steps have been undertaken in the right direction, institutional reform in MEDA
countries seems to be still insufficient and the region remains one of the most protected zones in the world. The
rhythm of privatization is still relatively low, for the governments have had a tendency to act with great caution so
as to avoid any risk of social confrontation. National financial markets are still relatively unattractive and the banking
systems, which continue to be heavily dependent on the public authorities, do not manage to support the private
sector correctly. Finally, the lack of efficiency and the questionable practices of the public administrations still often
constitute obstacles to the development of a healthy economic environment. Despite consequential efforts, the
MEDA countries know that they must in future accelerate the evolution of their institutions if they want to take full
advantage of the liberalization of their economies, in particular in terms of attracting foreign investments.
Conclusions
During the 1990s the globalization of the world economy has led to a dramatic increase in international produc-
tion, as the continuous growth of FDI reaches all corners of the globe. However, this phenomenon seemed to have
bypassed the countries of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean basin since their share of the global inflows of FDI
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues
81
has decreased. At the same time, recent growth performance in MEDA countries has been disappointing, particularly
when compared with the social and economic challenges they currently face. To the extent that FDI and growth are
positively correlated, it may be tempting to conclude that these economies should do everything they can to attract
FDI inflows if their objective is to raise their growth rate. Indeed, the contribution of FDI to development is less
controversial in theory than in practice since it is theoretically plausible that FDI provides a channel for capital
injection, technology and knowledge transfer. This belief has been reinforced by the successful industrial upgrading
experience of newly industrialized countries and has as a result fuelled the belief that FDI is a sine qua non for
development. However, notwithstanding the evidence that FDI can have a potential contribution to both income
growth and factor productivity in host countries, it is increasingly evident that it complements rather than substitutes
local factors tenable to economic development. It has been argued that absorptive capabilities, inter alia the level of
human capital and host country institutions, constitute determinant factors for a positive impact of FDI on host
country economic growth and realization of MNE spillovers. Host countries cannot capture the full benefits associa-
ted with FDI until a threshold level of capabilities is reached. The developmental impact of FDI rests on the dynamics
of the transfer of technology, but more importantly on the extent of integration of MNE affiliates in the host country
systems and how much upgrading of local capabilities takes place over time since it is vital that foreign agents of
dynamic comparative advantage must complement rather than substitute local agents.  Indeed, FDI represent a means
and a medium towards the end of sustainable economic development and not an end in itself. It has been argued that
in the MEDA region, overall economic performance of the region has been relatively poor when measured as growth
of income per capita. Investment in physical and human capital has both been lower and less efficient than in more
successful developing economies. It has been argued that increasing FDI flows to the region is a necessary but not
sufficient element in bringing the region onto a more promising path of economic development. Increased investment
needs to be accompanied by extensive and effective domestic economic reforms on a broad scale to facilitate needed
structural transformation and constantly improve the business environments. More importantly, MEDA countries
should not view FDI as a sine qua non for development but more as a vehicle to complement their comparative
economic advantages as emerging from local, indigenous investment and public sector economic strategic resolve.
References
Abramovitz, M. (1995) “The elements of social capability”, in D.H. Perkins, and B.H. Koo (eds.), Social
capability and long-term growth, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press.
Abramovitz, M. (1990) “ The catch-up factor in postwar economic growth”, Economic Inquiry, 28: 1-18.
Abramovitz, M. (1986). “Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind”, in Journal of Economic History, June,
Vol. 46(2), pp. 385-406.
Agosin M. R and R. Mayer (2000), “Foreign Investment in Developing Countries. Does it Crowd in Domestic
Investment?” UNCTAD Discussion Papers No. 146.
Aitken, B and A. E. Harrison, (1999), “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence
from Venezuela”, American Economic Review, Vol. 89.
Aitken, B and A. E. Harrison, (1991), “Are There Spill-overs From Foreign Direct Investment? Evidence from
Panel Data for Venezuela”, mimeo, MIT and the World Bank, November.
Aitken, B., A. Harrison and R. E. Lipsey (1996), “Wages and Foreign Ownership: A Comparative Study of
Mexico, Venezuela and the United States”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 40. No. 3 and 4. Pp. 345-371.
Asiedu, E. (2000) “On the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries: Is Africa Diffe-
rent?, World Development Vol. 30, No. 1, pp 107-119, 2002.
Blomstrom, M (1990) “Transnational Corporations and Manufacturing Exports from Developing Countries.
New York. United Nations.
Blomstrom, M. and F. Sjoholm (1988), “Technology Transfer and Spillovers: Does Local Participation with
Multinationals Matter?”. European Economic Review, Vol. 43, 1999.
Blomstrom, M. and H. Persson (1983), “Foreign Investment and Spillover Efficiency in an Underdeveloped
Economy: Evidence from the Mexican Manufacturing Industry”, World Development, Vol. 11.
Blomstrom, M and Kokko, A, (1998). “Multinational Corporations and Spillovers”, Journal of Economic Sur-
veys, 12 (3), 247-277.
Blomstrom, M and A. Kokko, (1997) “How Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries”, Policy Research
Foreign Direct Investment in the European Union’s Mediterranean Neighbours. Past Trends and Future Potential
in the MEDA Region
82
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues
Working Paper, The World Bank,
Borenzstein, E, De Gregorio. J & Lee, J.W (1998), “How does foreign direct investment affect economic growth?”,
Journal of International Economics, 45, pp. 115-35.
Caves, R.E. (1982), Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dahlman, C and C, Nelson, (1995), “Social Absorption Capability, National Innovation Systems and Economic
Development”, in Perkins, D and Koo, B. (eds.), Social Capability and Long-term Growth, Basingstoke: Macmillan
Press.
De Mello, L.R., Jr. (1999), “Foreign Direct Investment-Led Growth: Evidence from Time Series and Panel Data”,
Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 51. pp. 133-151.
De Mello, L.R., Jr. (1997), “Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries and Growth: A Selective Survey”,
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 34, pp 1-34.
Djankov, S and B- Hoekman (1999), “Foreign Investment and Productivity Growth n Czech Enterprises”, World
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 14. pp. 49-64.
Driffield, N and Mohd Noor, A, H (1999) “Foreign direct investment and local input linkages in Malaysia”,
Transnational Corporations, 8,3, pp 1-24.
Dunning, J (1993). Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Reading; Addison-Wesley.
Fosfuri, A., Motta, M., and Roende, T., 2001, “Foreign direct investment and spillovers through workers’
mobility”, Journal of International Economics 53, 205-222.
Gershenberg, I. (1987), “The Training and Spread of Managerial Know-How, A Comparative Analysis of Multi-
national and Other Firms in Kenya”. World Development, Vol. 15. No. 7 pp. 931-939, 1987.
Gorg, H and Ruane F (1998), “Linkages between Multinationals and Indigenous Firms: Evidence for the Electro-
nics Sector in Ireland”, Trinity Economic Paper Series, Technical Paper  No. 98/13
Haddad, M and Harrison, A. (1993) “Are there positive spillovers from direct foreign investment? Evidence from
panel data for Morocco, Journal of Economic Development, 42 (51-74).
Hanson, G., (2001), “Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment”, Research Paper No. 9, Research
Papers for the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs, UNCTAD, United
Nations New York and Geneva.
Hiemenz, U. et al. (1991), The International Competitiveness of Developing Countries for Risk Capital  (Chapter
8), The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, J. C. B. Moh, Tubingen.
Katz, J. (1987), Technology Generation in Latin American Manufacturing Industries, St. Martins Press, New
York.
Kokko, A (1994), “Technology, market characteristics and spillovers”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol 43
(1994), pp 279-293.
Kokko, A, Tansini, R and Zejan, M.C. (1996), “Local technology capability and productivity spillovers from FDI
in the Uruguayan manufacturing sector. Journal of Development Studies, 32(4), 602-612.
Kokko, A., M Zejan and R. Tansini, (2001), “Trade Regimes and Spillover Effects of FDI: Evidence from
Uruguay”, Welwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 137, pp. 124-149.
Lall, S and C. Pietrobelli (2002), Failing to Compete. Technology Development and Technology Systems in Africa,
Edward Elgar.
Lall, S (1992), “Structural Problems of African Industry” in Stewart, F, Wangwe s, Lall, S (eds.) Alternative
Development Strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa, Macmillan, 1992.
Lall, S. (1992), “Technological capabilities and industrialization”, in World Development, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp.165-
86.
Lall, S. (2000), “FDI and Development: Policy and Research Issues in the Emerging Context”, Working Paper
Number 43, QEH Working Paper Series, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.
Lall, S. (1980). “Vertical Inter-firm Linkages in LDCs: An Empirical Study, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics” (August 1980) pp. 209-222.
Lall. S and P. Streeten., (1977), Foreign Investment, Transnationals and Developing Countries., London Macmil-
lan, 1977).  London Macmillan, 1977.
Liberatori, M and M. Pigato (2000), FDI Through Privatisation in sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
Lim, Ewe-Ghee (2000), “Determinants of, and the Relation Between, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: A
Summary of the Recent Literature. IMF Working Paper. Middle Eastern Department. November 2001. IMF. Washin-
83
Foreign Direct Investment in the European Union’s Mediterranean Neighbours. Past Trends and Future Potential
in the MEDA Region
gton DC.
Lim, L and Pang, E.F (1982), “Vertical Linkages and Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries”, World
Development, Vol. 10 No.7 pp.585-595
McAleese, D and McDonald, D, (1978) “Employment growth and the development of linkages in foreign-owned
and domestic manufacturing enterprises”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics (1978).
Mudambi, R (1998), “The Role of Duration in MNE investment attraction strategies, Journal of International
Business Studies, 29 (2): 239-262.
Mytelka, L (1996), Locational Tournaments, Strategic Partnerships and the State, mimeo, Carleton University,
Ottawa.
Mytelka, Lynn K. (1985), “Stimulating Effective Technology Transfer: The Case of Textiles in Africa”, in
Rosenberg, N and Frischtak, C. (eds.) International Technology Transfer, Praeger, New York. 1985
Narula, R (2003a), book
—. (2003b), “Multinational firms, regional integration and globalizing markets: Implications for developing
countries”, in R. Devlin and A. Estevadeordal, (eds.),Trade and regional integration in the development agenda,
Washington DC., Inter-American Development Bank.
(2003c) Innovation
—. Marin, A. (2003d), “FDI spillovers, absorptive capacities and human capital development: Evidence from
Argentina”, MERIT Research Memorandum 2003-16.
Narula, R (1996) Multinational Investment and Economic Structure, London., Routledge.
Narula, R and Dunning, J. (2000), “Industrial Development, Globalisation and Multinational Enterprises: New
Realities for Developing Countries”, Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2000.
Noorbaksh, F, Paloni, A and Youssef, A (2001), “Human Capital and FDI Inflows to Developing Countries: New
Empirical Evidence”, World Development, Vol. 29, No. 9, pp. 153-1610, 2001.
Ozawa, T (1992), “Foreign Direct Investment and economic development”. Transnational Corporations, 1. 27-
54.
Radosevic, S. (1999), International Technology Transfer and Catch-up in Economic Development, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK.
Reisen, H and M. Soto (2001), “Which Types of Capital Inflows Foster Developing-Country Growth”, Interna-
tional Finance, Vol. 4. No. 1
Reuber, L. G., Emerson, M. and Gallais-Hamonno, G. (1973), Private Foreign Investment in Development,
Oxford Clarendon Press.
Rodriguez Clare, A (1996) “Multinationals, Linkages and Economic Development” ,The American Economic
Review, Volume, 86, Issue 4 September 1996, 852-873.
Scott-Kennel, J and Enderwick, P. (2001), Economic Upgrading and Foreign Direct Investment: Exploring the
Black Box of the IDP, University of Waikato, New Zealand.
Stewart, J. C. (1976), “Linkages and Foreign Direct Investment”, Regional Studies, May 10(2), pp. 245-58.
Xu, B. (2000), “Multinational Enterprises, Technological Diffusion, and Host Country Productivity Growth”,
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 62, pp. 477- 493.
Zang, K (2001), “Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Economic Growth? Evidence from East Asia and




History appears to indicate that deepening globalization in the second half of the 20th century and especially in the
past two decades has contributed a great deal to unprecedented political and economic changes in the global context.
Globalization is usually associated with more openness of the countries involved in this process.  It is a well-known fact
that apart from closer cultural contacts between nations, globalization is connected with declining barriers to trade,
migration, capital flows, foreign direct investment, and technological transfers.
Deepening economic integration between countries has entailed a more efficient allocation of resources in the world
and reduction of transport costs, communication costs, and barriers to trade and investment. Fortunately, today the
present political leaders of Russia have expressed an idea that Russia should participate more actively in the internatio-
nal economy. The process of further integration into the world economy is indispensable for Russia because it prepares
the basis for the adoption of tested “rules of the game” and therefore contributes to enhanced stability in the country.
It is evident that increasing the role of Russia in the international arena and improving the standard of living if its
citizens require a strong, dynamically developing economy, based on greater production efficiency, the creation of a new
economic structure, and the modernization of the economy. Unfortunately, while imports cover a wide spectrum of
manufactured goods, the trouble with exports is that they remain heavily biased towards energy and raw materials.
Russia’s endowment with energy sources and raw materials is regarded as a mixed blessing because it is said to have
turned the country into a “raw material appendix of the West” and, more specifically, to have damaged the manufacturing
industry (“Dutch disease”).
The main purpose of this paper is to consider some aspects and spheres of economic ties between Russia and the
European Union. It is a well-known fact that the enlargement of the EU will influence Russia-EU bilateral relations;
therefore this paper represents an attempt to evaluate the effects of this event.
Economic co-operation: aspects and spheres
Economic co-operation between Russia and the European Union represents a very interesting and riveting but at the
same time knotty question. We should take into consideration that EU-Russia economic relations are based on the
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, which provides for trade liberalization and closer interaction. One of the titles
(the title ¹ 7) of the PCA is dedicated to economic issues of bilateral relations
According to the article 56 of the PCA “The Community and Russia shall foster economic cooperation of wide scope
in order to contribute to the expansion of their respective economies, to the creation of a supportive international
economic environment and to the integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe”. Moreover the
article provides for that the economic co-operation shall also imply the development of respective industries and
transport; the exploration of new sources of supply and of new markets; the encouragement of technological and
scientific progress; the encouragement of a stable human and social resources development and of local employment
development; the promotion of the regional co-operation with the purpose of its harmonious and sustainable develop-
ment.
A lot of scientists and experts consider that the Partnership and Co-operation agreement has an insignificant practical
impact on the development of economic ties between Russia and the European Union, and that about half of the PCA
provisions are, in fact, no longer in force. Nevertheless, I am strongly convinced that the PCA plays an enormous role
as a legal base, to which Russia and the European Union should adhere.
On 27 December 2001 the Commission adopted the second EU’s Common Strategy on Russia, which offers the
strategic framework within which EU assistance will be provided for the period 2002-2006. The CSP constitutes the
Indicative Programme and sets forth co-operation objectives and goals, policy responses and priority field co-operation
based on a thorough and meticulous assessment of policy agenda and political and socio-economic situation of Russia.
The Chapter 6 of the CSP is dedicated to National Indicative Programme, specifying programme objectives, expected
results and conditionality for Tacis. This document states that the EU expresses a significant economic and strategic
interest in Russia’s development and stability. It is a well-known fact that Russia and The European Union have
launched thematic dialogues on energy, space and science and technology co-operation as well as established a High-
Level Group in an attempt to develop the concept of a common European economic space between Russia and the
European Union. Russia should be able to develop its position as a prosperous market for EU exports and investments
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and a reliable source of EU energy supplies, as well as stable, predictable and co-operative partner for security in Europe.
The European Union presumes that the main challenges facing Russia over the medium term are the effective implemen-
tation of the new legislation and to improve the investment climate in order to current economic growth sustainable. The
EU should provide its full support to the Government’s socio-economic reform programme and should concentrate on
establishing the legal, institutional and administrative framework to achieve economic development through private
initiative and market forces.
For its part, Russia attaches great significance to the bilateral relations in the context of the Russian further integration
into the world economy. In 2000 the Russian Federation adopted the Strategy of the development of the relations
between Russia and the European Union over the medium term (2000-2010), which defines the objectives of mutual
relations. Russian “Mid-Term Strategy” towards the EU underlines the importance of “strategic partnership of equals,
which does not limit sovereign rights of the Russian Federation as a world power”. Many experts consider that such a
stance contradicts the position of the European Union. While the EU expects Russia to become a politically stable
partner, who will stick to the same standards as Europe, Russia needs the EU as an inexhaustible source of foreign direct
investments and technologies, which does not interfere in home political problems of the Russian state.
The enlargement of the European Union exerted great influence on relations between Russia and the EU. Shortly
before the enlargement on April 27 the first meeting of the Russia-European Union Permanent Partnership Council was
held in Luxembourg at Foreign Ministers’ level. A Joint Statement on the EU Enlargement and Russia-EU Relations was
adopted setting forth the political obligations of the European Union to minimize the trade-and-economic consequences
of the EU enlargement for the interests of Russia and to preserve Russian exporters’ traditional flows of goods and outlet
markets to the ten entrant countries. The Statement provides for that “the interdependence of the EU and Russia,
stemming from the proximity and increasing political, economic and cultural ties, will reach new levels with the EU
enlargement”. In April 2004 the EU and Russia signed the Protocol to the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement,
which extended the PCA to new Member states of the EU.
The effects of the EU enlargement for Russia’s economy are considered to be equivocal. They may be classified into
three groups: positive, contradictory and negative. The positive effects of the enlargement are connected with the
emergence of opportunities for Russian economic agents to interact with a more spacious and unified market of the
expanded EU. The level of tariffs for imports of goods of Russian origin to the new Member States is expected to
decrease from an average of 9% to around 4% due to the application by the enlarged EU of the Common Customs Tariff
to imports from Russia. The EU confirmed that compensatory tariff adjustments accorded in the context of the EU
enlargement through modifications of the EU tariff schedule would be applied on a MFN (most favoured nation) basis
to the advantage of Russian exporters.
The Russian Federation will somewhat benefit from Central-East European countries adopting trade tariff preferen-
ces granted to Russia by the EU. Since preferences for Russia are mainly applied to final industrial goods the benefit will
be not high.
The consequences of the enlargement will have an ambiguous effect on Russian external economic activities. The
transition to the European Union’s trade regime, mainly free from quantitative limitations for Russian import, will
induce the CEE countries to abolish the existing quotas and other non-tariff protection measures in force for Russian
import. It will expand export of some Russian goods (coal and calcium carbide to Poland, textile to Hungary, welded
pipes to the Czech Republic, ammonium nitrate to several countries, etc.). However at the same time the new EU
Member States will have to introduce some limitations, very harmful for Russian deliveries, stipulated by EU trade
legislation, id est. import of rolled steel and nuclear fuel for nuclear power stations traditionally delivered to the CEE
countries without trade limitations will be subject to quotas now.
Some experts believe that the enlargement will entail deplorable consequences for Russia since the EU accession of
the CEE countries may further reduce Russia’s CEE market share. The opening-up of the EU market for the CEE
countries has led to a rapid growth of exports from Eastern to Western Europe: from 1990 to 2002 they grew by 4.5
times. As far as economic interaction with Russia is concerned, Russia’s trade with individual CEE countries decreased
from 1990 to 2002 by 3 to 5 times, while our partners’ deliveries to Russia dropped by 8 to 10 times. Moreover the
enlargement may lower Russian firms’ competitiveness since free movement of goods, services and capital within the
borders of the integration group will foster Western companies’ advantages on the Central-East European markets1.
The participation of the new members in the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will cause negative effect on
Russian economy. Anticipated modernization of agro-industrial complexes in these countries may augment the flow of
1 Study of the Effect of the EU Enlargement on Russia’s Economy prepared by the National Investment Council (resume).
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cheap foodstuffs to Russia, which will deteriorate the position of Russian producers. On the other hand, evident EU
CAP protectionism will narrow the chances of the Russian agricultural export to CEE countries and make Russian
produce uncompetitive on their markets.
We should take into consideration the fact that many problems can be settled and solved in the framework of
Common European Economic Space of the EU and Russia, which idea was suggested by the European Union and laid
down in the final communiqué of the Moscow summit held by Russia’s and EU’s leaders in May 2001. It was agreed to
establish a High-Level Group to elaborate this project, which envisages the creation of four common Russia-EU spaces
(in the fields of economy; freedom, justice and the supremacy of law; external security; science, education and culture).
The main purposes and objectives of this initiative are to promote conditions to boost trade and investment and to create
an open and integrated market between Russia and the EU. In spite of the fact that the politicians intend to establish
CEES already by 2007 the practical application of the adopted concept is viable only in the far future.
Among all the EU’s trading partners Russia occupies the fifth place (after the United States of America, Switzerland,
China and Japan), while the EU is Russia’s main trading partner accounting for above 50% of its total trade. Total EU
trade with Russia in 2003 amounted to 85 billion euros and the EU had a trade deficit of around 20 billion euros. The
structure of EU imports is the following: energy (57%), agriculture (4%) and chemicals (4%). Main EU exports are
machinery (34%), chemicals (13%), agriculture (11%), transport material (11%) and textiles (6%). EU-Russia trade has
increased significantly between 1995 and 2003: for example, in 1995 EU trade with Russia amounted to 38 billion euros
(the EU had a deficit of 6 billion euros). A lot of Russian goods entering the EU market benefit from the EU’s General
System of Preferences. Unfortunately, EU-Russia trade in services is still rather limited in value terms: around 10 billion
euros in 2002 in total, i.e. below 2% of total EU trade in services2.
In 2002 the Russian Federation acquired the status of the country with market economy, and this fact will result in
a lot of favourable consequences for Russian producers, will rule out discrimination and restrict some anti-dumping
proceedings against Russian imports.
As far as Foreign Direct Investment is concerned, according to Russian estimates, the volume of FDI will augment
from 5 billion euros in 2002 to 7-8 billion euros in 2005. Russia is acutely aware that it is essential to improve the
investment climate, notably through a more effective protection of property rights, in order to attract more investment
and know-how from abroad and to reverse the capital flight trends3.
Now I would like to draw Your attention to some discrepancies between Russia and the European Union within the
scope of European Neighbourhood policy. As known, in March 2003 the European Commission published the report
“Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A new Framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” on which
basis on 1 July 2003 the EC adopted the document “Paving the Way for a new Neighbourhood Instrument” and
established a Wider Europe Task Force and a Wider Europe Inter-Service Group. This initiative foresees a more active
EU interaction and special relations with all the countries mentioned in these documents based on the unity of values and
common interests as well as the creation of a common economic and social space and the formation of a “ ring of friends”.
Since Russia is trying to maintain and strengthen its presence in the Commonwealth of Independent States, a more
energetic EU policy in this region may lead to a certain tension. A striking corroboration is a negative reaction of the west
to the framework Agreement about the creation of a Common Economic Space signed in 2003 by Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan, if it takes the form of a customs union. Moreover, some scientists are sceptic about this
initiative because it is orientated towards the countries with different political systems and economic development.
Another topical issue is Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization. Russia’s WTO integration is a prere-
quisite of for CEES formation. It is expected that advantages stemming from Russia’s joining the WTO will be reciprocal.
Russian economy will be more predictable and stable and will establish better terms and conditions of access for EU
businesses willing to co-operate with Russia. On 21 May 2004 the European Union and Russia achieved a breakthrough
in their negotiations and signed on the margins of the EU-Russia Summit the agreement concluding the bilateral talks for
the accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO. During these negotiations the EU raised the question about
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases by Russia. The Russian President underscored that Russia
supported the Kyoto process, but at the same time it had some concerns over the obligations that it would have to
assume. He promised that Russia would accelerate its movement towards ratifying the Protocol.
One of the most interesting spheres of co-operation between Russia and the European Union is the energy dialogue.
The article 65 of the PCA defines the framework of energy co-operation. The energy dialogue was launched on the
2 www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/russia/index_en.htm
3 Borco Y.A. From European Idea to United Europe. M., 2003, p.355
4 www.eur.ru/en/p_217.htm
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initiative of the European Union in 2000 in order to improve partnership in energy sphere. Nowadays Russia remains
a traditional, reliable, stable and significant supplier of energy products to the EU. 53% of Russia’s oil exports go to the
European Union, representing 16% of total EU oil consumption. 62% of Russia’s natural gas exports arrive in the EU,
representing 20% of total EU natural gas consumption4. For Russia it is indispensable to attract investments from the
EU in order to expand oil and gas exports to improve energy infrastructure and to enhance bilateral co-operation. Within
the framework of the dialogue the exploratory phase suggested the establishment of the High-Level Task Force and four
thematic groups were established (groups of energy strategies and balances; investments; technology transfer and energy
infrastructure; energy efficiency and the environment). An agreement has been reached to implement some infrastructure
projects identified as being of common interests (for example, Shtokman natural gas field development, Northern
European trans-Baltic natural gas pipeline and others). It is important to mention the European Energy Charter, which
was adopted in 1991. In December 1994 the Energy Charter Treaty was signed and it entered into force in April 1998.
This document is considered to be a legally binding multilateral instrument, which deals with intergovernmental co-
operation in the energy sector, based on market economy, mutual assistance and non-discrimination. Russia signed this
Treaty, but has not ratified it yet.
Russia attaches great importance to the prospects of implementation of the EU energy policy by the new members
implying a diversification of energy sources. Russian nuclear fuel deliveries for nuclear power station in East European
countries in danger. EU official documents envisage for its members a limit of a 25% import share of nuclear goods
proceeding from the same source.
Among other matters of concern I would like to single out the problem of Kaliningrad. Today according to EU experts
Kaliningrad approaching the borders of a unified Europe with its new economic order and liberal trade principles in force
will bring tangible trade and economic consequences for the region including a broader access to the European sales
markets. Russia and the European Union strive to solve this problem, taking into consideration the interests of people
who live in Kaliningrad. Both sides have reached agreement to implement the principle of freedom of transit of goods,
including energy between Kaliningrad region and the rest of Russia on the basis of Article 12 of the PCA and article V
GATT.
I have already mentioned the Tacis programme, which was created in 1991. It is one of European Union’s main
instruments for cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova,
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan Ukraine and Uzbekistan. This programme pursues the objectives of
promoting the transition to a market economy and reinforcing democracy and the rule of law in partner states. The
present Tacis regulation is due to expire at the end of 2006 and the EU will spend 3.1 billion euros on this new
programme5.
One of the most important directions of Russia–EU mutual relations is the “Northern Dimension”. This initiative,
advocated by Finland, arouses a lot of interest and envisages a joint utilization of “northern regions’” potential and
resources and the improvement of environmental situation in the North of Europe.
Conclusions
Russia is sure to enhance and promote economic co-operation with Europe. Today psychological rejection of Russia,
which dominated in 1990s in the countries of the former Soviet bloc, is replaced by a pragmatic approach towards co-
operation since Russia represents a huge market. For its part, Russia should develop ties with the European Union,
because it pursues the goal to integrate into the world economy. According to some macro-economic studies, Russia will
benefit from the EU enlargement. For example, recent scientific researches by the independent institute Brussels-based
CEPS and Moscow-based RECEP have estimated that Russian welfare will increase as a result of the enlargement by
just under 2%6. Moreover, Russia is supposed to benefit from the substantial reduction in tariffs. Ultimately, the long-
term economic effects of the EU enlargement are, to a significant extent, determined by the way co-operation priorities
between Russia and the EU will be formulated and by the choice of the legal and organizational co-operation model for
the nearest future. Furthermore, Russian authorities realize that instead of resorting to a complete reliance on exports of
energy products, it is indispensable to restructure Russian economy paying more attention to the domestic manufactu-
ring industry. One of the main results of Russia-EU relations is the transition from the initial, mainly declaratory stage
to the stage of business co-operation.
5 Butorina O.V., Borco Y.A. European Union, M., 2003, p.206
6 www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/russia/index_en.htm
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There is no need to prove that in a good policy-making concept changes anticipate operational transforma-
tion. In the case of the European Union enlargement, it has been clearly realized that before completing the
decisive step of accepting ten new member something should be done to make the strategy continuous. The task
was not that easy, taking into consideration the fact that the countries staying along the new EU borders do not
have or ask for candidate status.
The solution proposed was simple and original: to create a “ring of friends – with whom the EU enjoys close,
peaceful and cooperative relations”1. It looked quite attractive and promising as a political declaration, but could
not go as a stable basis for relations building. In fact, the first Communication from the Commission was only
a “framework”, and should have been completed by subsequent work of the EU institutions.
The response of the Parliament was much more detailed and realistic, and it put some important emphases
that missed in the Commission document. It clearly distinguished Eastern and Mediterranean dimensions in the
new policy underlying the necessity of “clearly differentiating between the regions and countries covered, in
particular on the basis of the types of challenges involved, their level of respect for democracy, human rights and
individual freedoms, and their interest and capacity to engage in closer cooperation”2.  Parliament stressed
“geopolitical differences between Eastern and Southern neighbours”, and expressed the belief that while there
should be significant scope for developing sub-regional and regional cooperation in the South, a bilateral appro-
ach is more promising in the East as regional cooperation scarcely seems possible in view of these differences”3.
As a matter of fact the same idea was present in the Commission’s communication, but it was not so sharply
delineated: “while the EU should aim to ensure a more coherent approach, offering the same opportunities
across the wider neighbourhood, and asking in return the same standards of behaviour from each of our nei-
ghbours, differentiation between the countries would remain the basis for the new neighbourhood policy”4.  In
such a context, the elaboration of a “New Neighbourhood instrument focussing on ensuring the smooth functio-
ning and secure management of the future Eastern and Mediterranean borders, promoting sustainable economic
and social development of the bordering regions and pursuing regional and transborder cooperation”5 appears to
be quite a difficult task.
The above cited objective is not a pretty new one in the EU political language. The issue of the development
of border areas has been introduced in the mid 1970s, when the objective of bridging the gap between different
regions of the EU came about. With the development of the European integration this goal has been extended in
the subsequent treaties and finally took the form of policy of economic and social cohesion, which was rather
successfully realized within the Union.
In the beginning of the 1990s when, on the one hand, the European Community transformed into the Union
and, on the other, it had to face the challenge of enlargement, the nature of external relations and the concept of
border started to change. There have been introduced financial instruments that provided for cooperation across
the border with the countries that were not eligible for the EU Structural funds subsidies. As it was mentioned
in the introduction to the publication of the  EU Commission on External Interregional Cooperation6 - interre-
gional cooperation acts as a preparation to the candidate countries accession to the European Union and it was
at the forefront of encouraging institutional reform and the decentralisation of power. Empowering local and
regional authorities has been a significant characteristic in the democratisation of Central Europe, and has
highlighted the need for closer cooperation between authorities in Central Europe and their counterparts in the
1 Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. COM
(2003) 104. Brussels, 11.03.2003.
2 European Parliament. Report on “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern
and Southern Neighbours” (COM(2003)104-2003/2018(INI)):8.
3 Ibid: 9.
4 Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. COM
(2003) 104. Brussels, 11.03.2003:16.
5 Ibid:18.
6 ECOS-Ouverture Success Stories. External Interregional Cooperation 1991-1999. Paris-Glasgow-Brussels, 1999: 3.
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European Union.
So, the topic of external regional cooperation is not that new either. It has slowly evolved form exclusively
EU-managed programmes to the projects that were coordinated from the external side of the border. The
partners in those projects were countries not only from Central Europe but also form the Mediterranean part,
and, thus, the experience of such a cooperation could be of a great use  in the context of the new policy.
 The novelty of the Neighbourhood is that it is not a one-time programme, it is a political framework
concept, that will further have a substantial impact on all single policies. The objective of sustainable develop-
ment of the bordering areas coming from the past INTEREG is put again on the agenda, but now it is accompa-
nied by the goal of border security guarantees, and this element is going to be quite important in interregional
cooperation programmes. The are several issues that should be still solved: how to find a universal instrument,
if it is possible at all, how to deal with the whole diversity of the bordering regions and countries, what is going
to be the outcome of the process and whether the changes introduced by the Wider Europe are enough to
develop a consistent policy line.
The goal of the present contribution is to analyse the changes envisaged by the Neighbourhood policy for the
cooperation at regional level, the way they have been carried out and the implications that these transformations
could bring about. We will start with the presentation of both variables: independent - Neighbourhood policy,
and dependent - regional cooperation, followed by the analysis of their interaction and some reflections on
possible outcomes of the process.
Independent variable.
On March 11, 2003 the EU Commission came out with the Communication “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood:
A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”7 where it has stated new objecti-
ves and has drawn up a new strategy of the EU after the enlargement. The main message of the paper was the
intention to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe, to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond
the new borders and to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – “a ring of friends” around
the Union. The task of the Commission was to find a way for building a framework for the Union’s relations
with the countries that do not currently have a prospective of becoming EU members. That group is far to be
homogeneous and the difficulty in elaboration of a common or balanced strategy along the whole new border is
quite obvious.
We will not discuss here to what extent the Commission has reached the objective of finding a plausible
solution to the new challenge, it has already been criticized for not having been able to do that. No doubt,
however, that the document dated by March, 11 had a significant impact on all the following developments of
the EU politics and policies.
Regional dimension of cooperation has been particularly emphasised in the Communication. And the goal to
promote regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration as preconditions for political stability, economic
development reduction of poverty and social division has been clearly stated8. We will further reveal the
elements regarding regional level of cooperation in the new policy proposed by Commission and  then explain
how they are going to change the past framework of cooperation.
The dilemma for the EU can be quite easily picked up form the document itself. The Commission recognizes
the differences in starting positions for different counries and states that the new EU approach can not be a one-
size-fit-all policy9. At the same time, it confirms the necessity to build up a cohesive system of relations along
Eastern and Southern borders. The common challenges for all of them were defined as “three P”: Proximity,
Prosperity and Poverty, what reflects the attempt to find common grounds for the strategy regardless the
differences between the countries- neighbours.
The first P - proximity challenge is about geographical location, it contains the challenge of assuring secure
and efficient borders of the Union. Cross-border cultural links, not least between people of the same ethnic/
cultural affinities as well as threats to mutual security, whether from the trans-border dimension of environmen-
tal and nuclear hazards, illegal immigration, trafficking, organized crime or terrorist networks are of additional
importance in the context of proximity and require joint approaches in order to be addressed comprehensively.
7 COM (2003) 104. Brussels, 11.03.2003.
8 Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. COM
(2003) 104. Brussels, 11.03.2003:3.
9 Ibid:6.
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The following two: prosperity and poverty regard not only borders but wider areas. Among the priorities in
this dimension are democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law and core labour
standards as essential prerequisites for political stability, as well as for peaceful and sustained social and
economic development. Trade and investment are vital to improving economic growth and employment. So, the
overall objective is to work with partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values
based on deeper economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border coope-
ration and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbours.  But bordering areas
are still considered to be the first step before going in depth. To achieve the stated objectives Neighbourhood
Instrument was to be elaborated.
Following the agenda put forward in the Wider Europe Communication, Commission presented another
Communication “Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument” which clarifies the concept of the
Neighbourhood Instrument and presents the analysis of measures to improve interoperability between diffe-
rent instruments. As a starting point it defined the coordination work that had been taken forward between
different cooperation instruments INTERREG, PHARE and TACIS. According to the presented approach the
NNI was to cover all the borders between the EU and partner countries10.
So, while the Wider Europe Communication placed the NNI in the context of the European Neighbourhood
Policy, the following Communication broadened the geographical scope of it, saying that “in order to ensure a
comprehensive approach, the Instrument should also cover those neighbouring countries which benefit from
CARDS and Euro-med partnership, even though the Western Balkans fall outside the political scope of the
Wider Europe communication”11. The NNI Communication proposed a two step approach: first phase 2004-
2006 – significant improvement of the instruments concerned within existing legislative and financial fra-
mework12. In the second period, after 2006, a new legal instrument should be elaborated.
For both the transitional phase and the NNI operation the Commission clearly identifies four main objecti-
ves:
• promoting sustainable economic and social development in the border areas;
• working together to address common challenges in fields such as environment, public health, and the
prevention of and fight against organised crime;
• ensuring efficient and secure borders;
• promoting people-to-people type actions.
It can be easily noted they are congruent with challenges identified as “three P” in the fist Communication.
During the first step period, the Commission proposed to introduce Neighbourhood Programmes covering the
external borders of the enlarged Union. They were supposed to develop a broad range of actions following the
above mentioned objectives. These programmes would permit a single application process including a single call
for proposals covering both sides of the border, and would have a joint selection process for projects. The
funding for these programmes should come from the allocations already earmarked for existing programmes.
The rules governing the programmes’ committee structures would ensure a balanced membership from both
sides of the border. As for concrete numbers of financial allocations to existing instruments for 2004-2006, they
will be distributed as it follows: •700m from INTERREG, •90m from PHARE, •75m from TACIS, •45m from
CARDS and •45m from MEDA13. Since Structural Funds can not be used outside the border, and external
instruments cannot be used internally, a new concept should have been built in a way to meet the challenge of
combining both external policy objectives and social and economic cohesion.
This challenge has been approached again in the Strategy paper issued in mid May, 2004. In this document
10 Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument. Communication from the Commission.COM(2003)393 final: 3
11 ibid.
12 These instruments are:
INTERREG Community Initiative – a financial instrument within the framework of the EU Structural Funds, supports
cross-border and interregional cooperation among member states and neighbouring countries; PHARE CBC support
cross-border cooperation between member states and candidate countries; TACIS CBC- supports cross-border coopera-
tion in Western NIS; CARDS – aimed at fostering regional, transnational, cross-border and interregional cooperation
among the countries of Western Balkans, between them and EU, and them and other countries of the region (no
programme exists); MEDA provides support for regional cooperation in the broader sense between countries on the
southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean.
13 Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument. Communication from the Commission.COM(2003)393 fi-
nal:11.
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the Commission is more concrete in terms of substance and procedures regarding both the Neighbourhood
Policy and the Instrument. The document has been produced after the consultations with partner countries
were completed. The method proposed was, together with partner countries, to define a set of priorities, whose
fulfilment would bring them closer to the EU. These priorities were to be incorporated in jointly agreed action
plans, covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform, trade and measures
preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU Internal Market, justice and home affairs, energy,
transport, information society, environment and research and innovation, and social policy and people-to-
people action.
Action plans, and this approach has been initiated in the first Communication, would draw up a common set
of principles but will be differentiated, reflecting the existing state of relations with each country, its needs and
capacities. The level of ambition of the EU’s relationships with its neighbours will take into account  the extent
to which these values are effectively shared14. The Strategy Paper has defined more precisely the framework for
relations with neighbouring countries that will be involved in the ENP but do not have neither association nor
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the EU15. The two step approach of introduction of NP in the
first phase (2004-2006)and NNI in the second (after 2006) proposed in the previous Communication has been
confirmed.
Among the suggested ways of the development of such an Instrument16 the option of “creating a single new
Regulation to govern a Neighbourhood instrument to fund activities on both inside and outside the Union” has
been chosen. Since there are no relevant legal precedents for an instrument with a dual nature covering external
policy and economic and social cohesion within the EU and with the ambition of operating on an equal footing
on the two sides of the EU’s external border, the instrument will build on the principles of existing cross-border
programmes such as partnership, multiannual programming and co-financing. The ENI will cover all the borders
between EU Member States on one side, and countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy on the
other side. It will support trans-national cooperation involving beneficiaries in at least one member State and
one partner country, and replace existing internal and external cross-border programmes in member states and
partner country regions adjacent to the future EU external borders.
Strategy paper has confirmed the objectives identified in the NNI Communication and has identified two
windows of the ENI operation. The ENI will finance joint projects proposed by and for the benefit of partners
from both the EU Member States and partner countries and will operate through two separate funding win-
dows: cross-border cooperation and trans-national cooperation. The first window will support cross-border
cooperation, and will cover the objective of creation of an area of shared prosperity and cooperation across the
EU borders with partner countries. While the second window will provide more flexible support for wider
trans-national co-operation involving actors and beneficiaries from both EU member states and partner coun-
tries. It is mainly to address the objective of common challenges in fields such as environment, integration,
energy, telecommunication and transport networks, public health and prevention of and fight against organised
crime.
That is the framework, which has been laid down for further implementation through regional cooperation
mechanisms. It is quite obvious that the cooperation at regional level is going to be one of the main issues of the
new policy approach of the enlarged Union. In the following  paragraph will analyse how the new regulative
scheme has been introduced  into the past framework of the regional cooperation policy and in what kind of
transformation of the latter has taken place.
Dependent Variable.
Cooperation at regional level in the “old” European Union grew up with the development of the regional
policy, or if we want to be more precise, with the assistance of INTERREG initiative. INTERREG has been the
14 European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper. COM (2004) 373 final. Brussels, 12.05.2004
15 Southern Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; Belarus and Libya.
16 1- expanding the content and geographical scope of an existing co-operation instrument to allow these funds to be used
on both sides of the border (e.g. permitting to use INTERREG outside the border);
2- creating a single new Regulation to govern Neighbourhood Instrument to fund activities both inside and outside the
Union, based on a single or on two separate budget lines;
3- focusing further on coordination between already existing instruments on the basis of the Neighbourhood Program-
mes proposed for 2004-2006
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initiative of the EU with the overall aim that “national borders should not be a barrier to the balanced develop-
ment and integration of the European territory”17.   In contrast to the majority of the initiatives of regional
policy which had as a scope bridging the gap in the level of economic development of regions of the Union with
huge disparities not only across but also within the countries, INTERREG has been aimed at a different
objective. It was to bring regions closer promoting the building of cross-border cooperation net-works and
creating in that way a united Europe without clear cut national frontiers.
INTERREG reads borders as dividing lines between communities, which are cut off economically, socially
and culturally, that also hinder the coherent management of eco-systems18. In past programming periods IN-
TERREG19 worked to help overcome the above mentioned negative implications of the borders. Its funding was
devoted principally to the promotion of common responses to SME development, education, training and
cultural exchange, health problems in border regions, environmental protection and improvement, RID, energy
networks, transport and telecommunications.
In 2000 it was decided to establish Community Initiative concerning trans-European cooperation (INTER-
REG III). Its main objective was to strengthen economic and social cohesion in the Community by promoting
cross-border, trans-national and interregional cooperation and balanced development of the Community terri-
tory.  While the main focus was still on the internal borders of the EU, the new phase of INTERREG had to face
a serious challenge of enlargement on the one hand, and growing cooperation with third countries on the
Southern border on the other. This new phase of the Initiative INTERREG III has been implemented under
three strands:
INTERREG III A Cross-border cooperation - the most important part of the initiative, it focuses on
promoting integrated regional development between neighbouring border regions, including external borders and
certain maritime borders. It takes the bulk of financial recourses. INTERREG III A is supporting 53 program-
mes for the 2000-2006, including 14 along the borders of applicant countries with the budget of 3,300 million,
or 67% of the funding available.
INTERREG III B Transnational co-operation covers actions involving the national, regional and local
authorities and other socio-economic players. These programmes should normally entail a strategic approach to
the development of the area, be it in terms of environmental or economic development or in terms of spatial
planning. So, their preparation in rather complex. The objective was to promote territorial integration within a
large group of European regions, including those outside 15, before May 1, 2004, and  outside 25 after, and
between the Member states and the applicant countries or other neighbouring countries. Since the structures
needed for the work of these programmes - many of which have not existed before - are quite complex, it is not
surprising that out of the 13 programmes expected in total number only one programme (that of the Baltic Sea
Region) has been decided so far. The total budget foreseen is around 1,300 million Euro - i.e. some 27% of the
total.
INTERREG IIIC Interregional cooperation supports cooperation between players all over Europe and
not necessarily just those in neighbouring regions. This strand helps to make regional development policies and
tools more efficient by enabling a vast exchange of information, the sharing of experiences and the creation of
structures of cooperation between the regions.
Players from all the regions of the Union can benefit from this aid. The actions are implemented through four
programmes: North, East, West and South. The regions of the applicant countries and other non-EU states may
also participate in these programmes. And the funding for these programmes is of 6% of the total. The whole
financial resources envisaged for the INTERREG III Imitative amount for •5,700 millions.
Here above we regarded INTERREG key strands as they were established before the Wider Europe initiati-
ve. Neighbourhood elements are already envisaged in all of them. It is worth mentioning that the updated
version of the INTERREG Guidelines issued by the Commission yearly this year does not contain substantial
changes, it has only introduced some necessary elements of Wider Europe and Neighbourhood Instrument
Communications and defined the eligible areas for the new programmes20. Next we are going to overview the
17 OJ No C 2000/143/08. Communication from the Commission to the member states laying down guidelines for
Community initiative concerning trans-European cooperation intended to encourage harmonious and balanced deve-
lopment of the European territory.
18 Ibid.
19 First launched in 1990.
20 Communication No 448/2004 of 10 March 2004: www.interreg3c.net/web/detail.php?id=28
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principles that regulated cooperation to understand better the rules and nature of the process.
The principles that were laid down in the basis of the INTERREG III programmes have, to a considerable
extent, “paved the way” to the following newest approach of Neighbourhood, the concept of which is being
developed now drawing the framework for cooperation of regions on the external borders of the enlarged EU.
Among these principles are the following:
 - Joint cross-border strategy and development programme, means that all the measures and operations
must be based on the joint programming for the regions or territories concerned and demonstrate the value which
it adds.
- Partnership and a bottom-up approach - a wide partnership must be developed, including not only
“institutional” partners from national, regional and local authorities, but also economic and social partners and
other relevant competent bodies (non governmental organizations etc.), operations must allow the widest
possible degree of participation by public and private actors.
- Complementarity to the mainstream of the Structural Funds provides that Programming must be
complementary to the measures promoted under objectives of Structural Funds, and operations must comply
with the scope of the Structural Funds and the rules on the eligibility of expenditure.
- A more integrated approach to the implementation of the Community Initiatives means that in
accordance with Article 3(2) of Regulation (EC) N 1783/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 July 1999 on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the latter is allowed to implement the
INTERREG III initiative by financing measures for rural development eligible under EAGGF, for the develop-
ment of human resources eligible under the ESF  and for the adjustment of fisheries structures eligible under the
FIFG. That was a new opportunity which could improve the coordination and integration of measures and
operations which benefit from the Community assistance.
- Effective coordination between INTERREG and external Community policy instruments, especially
with a view of enlargement took into account that the implementation of INTERREG III had to ensure coheren-
ce and synchronisation with other financial instruments concerned. The operations undertaken within the
Community are funded by ERDF whereas operations undertaken outside the community are funded by other
Community financial instruments such as PHARE21, TACIS22, MEDA23 and CARDS24 or other Community
programmes with an external policy dimension, as appropriate.
In the past the coordination between INTERREG and these instruments was rather poor because of weak
administrative structures in third countries and different operational rules of the instruments. It became clear
that for further development cross-border cooperation the approach of separate treatment could not suit, and
s joint approach is needed.
The implementation of cooperation on the basis of the principles listed above requires much effort from
both sides. Truly joint structures to prepare the programmes that involve the parties concerned should be
created. Previous experience is going to be useful, but  the challenge is all grater when the enlargement of the
Community is concerned, as it increases the number of internal borders, and changes drastically the surrounding
environment.
With the introduction of the NNP and further elaboration of the NNI the operation of cross-border coope-
ration programmes will change, taking into account provisions of the new policy concept. Going through the
main incentives of the New Neighbourhood Policy and regional cooperation regulation we can draw up the list
21 PHARE CBC (Cross-Border Cooperation) programme was introduced in 1994 to support action in the field of infra-
structure and economic development in bordering regions of CECs countries with EU members. In the Commission
regulation 2760/98 it is stated that its aim was to promote cooperation of the border regions in the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe with adjacent regions in neighbouring EU and accession countries and help them to overcome
specific development problems
22 TACIS Cross-Border Cooperation Programme was launched in 1996 to fund cross-border activities on the western
border regions of WNI and CECs. The main focus was cross-border facilities, environment and cross-border coopera-
tion at local level.
23 MEDA(financial and technical assistance for Mediterranean non-member countries). There is a scope for cross-border
actions, but no programmed institutional or other arrangements equivalent to those of INTERREG or PHARE.
24 Assistance for Western Balkan countries (Council Regulation 2666/2000) covering Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, federal Republic of Yugoslavia and FY Republic of Macedonia. To support the development of close relations
among recipient countries, between them and the EU, and between them and the countries which are candidates for
accession, in coordination with other instruments for cross-border, transnational and regional  cooperation with non-
member states.
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of transformations of the latter and discuss the consequences and challenges of the process.
Output
Before going directly to these characteristics we can not avoid mentioning that the very first change of the
cooperation at regional level is that from being an issue of “technical policy” it has become a strategic branch in
the political initiative of the EU. Now it combines two priorities of the Union: sustainable development of the
all parts of the Union and bordering regions and building friendly relations with the nearest neighbourhood. The
concept of Neighbourhood could not, thus, avoid borrowing the experience of the policy which has already been
dealing with the matters of cross-border cooperation, and on the other hand, could not prevent it from change.
For the scope of analysis we will define the following key characteristics of the programmes: objectives,
funding, management and implementation.
We have mentioned the four objectives identified by the Neighbourhood Communication for cooperation
programme:
• promoting sustainable economic and social development in the border areas;
• working together to address common challenges, in fields such as environment, public health , and the
prevention of and fight against organised crime;
• ensuring efficient and secure borders;
• promoting local, “people-to-people” actions.
We will not recall the objectives of the classic INTERREG programmes, which are reported on the pp. 10-
11, but only underline that three of the new, except the third one, have been present in the programmes of
regional cooperation programmes before introduction of the Neighbourhood initiative. The second objective
gains broader strategic context than it had in the previous period. While the first, and the substance of the last
have not undergone any substantial change.
Neighbourhood Programmes are not going to be exclusively of interest for third countries that are covered by
TACIS, MEDA and CARDS, and which are going to be involved in the Wider Europe initiative aimed at
preventing new dividing lines on the continent, but also for the EU member states and countries that became
members on May, 4 2004 who were preparing INTERREG programmes on the external borders of the Union,
and the countries that already had INTERRREG cross-border programmes on their external borders, but were
not affected by the enlargement. That is why there is going to be a serious work of elaboration of new
programmes, on the one hand, and adjustment of those having relevant geographical location on the map of the
Union, on the other.
The question of funding has been decisive in changing the nature of cross-border cooperation.  Before,
unless many efforts of INTERREG programmes to involve their neighbouring countries in programmes, it was
hardly successful.  Since the ERDF money could be used only inside the Union, it was little direct benefit for
neighbouring countries to participate. In the Neighbourhood programmes, it has been envisaged, that on the
external part of the border funding will be allocated from the appropriate external instrument (TACIS, CARDS
or MEDA), while the internal part will be financed according to normal Structural Funds procedures. A specific
amount for each year will be formally decided by the Commission in the first half of each year in the appropriate
annual action programmes (s) for each external instrument25.
As for the management of the programmes, a big step has been made forward the implementation of the
principle of partnership. Neighbouring countries will have an equal role in the Neighbourhood Programmes. A
responsible authority will be nominated at national level, and a wide partnership at regional., local and non-
governmental level will be involved, as it is done on the Member state side at present. It is clear enough that full
and efficient cooperation between the internal and external partners can be realised only once the official
nomination by the external partners has been confirmed. Therefore, it is important to ensure that national,
regional and local levels are fully involved in programme preparation and expand the role of the neighbouring
countries in programme Committees.
In the implementation we will identify two elements:
25 Guidance note concerning the preparation of Neighbourhood Programmes at the external borders of member States and
Accession Countries: europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/ interreg3/doc/docu_en.htm.
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a) structures
Each Neighbourhood programme will have two Committees: a Monitoring Committee, which will ensure a
policy and financial overview of the operation of the programme, and a Selection (Steering) Committee, which
will be responsible for the selection of projects. It can be decided to operate only with one Committee.
The Committees of each NP will include a balanced membership from all participating countries and an
appropriate representation of the Commission. Each country is responsible for nominating proper representa-
tives.
Each programme will also have a Managing authority (the responsible body for Structural funds) and a Joint
Technical Secretariat, which will provide advice to potential project partners and will deal with day-to-day
management tasks related to the programme.
b) procedures
Neighbourhood Programmes will operate on the basis of a single application process and a single selection
process covering both sides of the border. A single application form for each project will be issued, with a clear
separation of work to be done inside and outside the Union.
Applications will be submitted directly to a Neighbourhood Programme Secretariat, which will carry out the
initial assessment of each project, and will prepare recommendations to the Selection Committee. Applications
will include partners from both inside and outside the Union.
Outcome
Why it is not enough to speak about output? The reason is quite simple – beyond obvious results of the
process of interaction of variables there is a more complex group of effects that a  process involves. We can
hardly foresee all the elements of it. Still, thinking about outcome is important for understanding of what could
or should be changed in a process, if it is manageable, and, thus, is essentially to be considered.
We have discussed above the output elements of regional cooperation transformation as a result of introduc-
tion of the Neighbourhood policy initiative. Now we will try to reconstruct each of them in a broader context
of outcomes they might bring.
The first necessary point to focus our attention on is the list of Neighbourhood Programmes, since they
constitute the ground for the whole policy process. Some of them are new and some should be amended.
26 According to the Communication “Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument”, •75m will be taken form
TACIS, and •45m.
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That is the map of the Neighbourhood policy first application.  Just a very superficial approach permits to
evidence a number of important features. The countries surrounding the EU vary enormously in the level of
economic development (with GDP per capita minimum in Moldova of 417 and maximum in Israel 19 578 Euro),
political and administrative structure, cultural and social traditions, and the resources that can be involved from
the outside of the border will be different.
As for the programmes distribution, there are 10 programmes covering “land” border and 6 maritime. Among
the first group 7 programmes are new and 3 are going to be amended, while in the second there are no new
programmes at all. The first group will use TACIS funding, and, thus, the balk of financial resources, while the
second group will get money from MEDA with more modest budget26. The majority of land programmes are of
strand A, that means that they are cross-border, and include a limited number of partners. The second group is
B programmes, which are transnational and, consequently, have elevated number of participating countries. So,
even if TASIC funds are distributed among more programmes, they are more specifically focused (Russia is
present in 5 programmes, Belarus and Ukraine in 2 each), while for example Algeria or Middle East countries are
only covered by multilateral programmes and their involvement in neighbourhood initiative is going to be lower.
Is that what the Commission call differential approach to countries? But what is the criteria of this differentia-
tion? The population, geographical distance, any other? It should be cleared up to avoid miscomprehension and
delusion in bordering countries and provide for realization of principles.
As for principles and objectives of the new policy, we will find some more points that do not seem
unequivocal. The objectives stated in the Communication embody, in fact, a very sensitive balance of what
should be done. The main task here is to manage combining the objective of promoting sustainable economic and
social development and people-to-people actions and the goal of ensuring efficient and secure borders. The
substance of the first is to accelerate economic and social development by increasing trade and investment
flows, enhancing cross-border cooperation in the fields of transport and energy, and integrating the neighbouring
countries more deeply into wider European Cooperation27. While the second one is closely related to what
Schengen agreement requirements from the countries that stay on external borders of the Union.
What does it mean practical terms? From the list of the countries we will easily pick up new members and
see that their neighbours are the countries with whom the new member states have had deep economic and
cultural links, while introduction of the border with strict passing regime inevitably puts division lines. We
could site the example of Hungary: its accession to the EU requires full adoption of the Schengen acquis. Until
2002, Romania was on the common EU visa list. Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro seem likely to stay on it for
several years, and Hungary has to fall in line with that28. What would such a situation mean for Hungarian
minorities dispersed in the bordering countries and how efficient borders and people-to-people objectives are
going to be realized?
Another example is Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Belarusian border. As experience showed, the introduction
of visa regime on these borders early in this year caused serious problems for border services and damaged
economic activity of small entrepreneurs in bordering areas. It was estimated that about 30-40 % of small and
medium size enterprise in the Polish eastern city of Lublin survive by commerce with Ukraine219 .
The same could be said about the principles: their application will for sure require rather a careful treatment
on the part of policy makers. The ENI is going to be built on the principles of existing cross-border programmes:
partnership, multiannual programming and co-financing? In general we could access as very positive for coope-
ration the “spirit” of such principles: partnership between EU and third countries  would stimulate involvement
27 Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument. Communication from the Commission.COM(2003)393 final.
28 Batt, J. The enlarged EU’s external borders – the regional dimension, in Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a wider
Europe, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper n.64, Paris, September 2003: 102-118.
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and help to overcome the possible challenge of “exclusion” beyond the EU borders, multiannual programming
would provide for more stability for cooperation, while co-financing could give more flexibility to the program-
mes. At the same time, there might appear a number of problems in the wider Europe context. Since the level of
decentralisation in neighbouring countries is low or zero, it will be quite difficult to find partners except central
authorities.  For multiannual programmes a good quality of projects would be desirable, and it is quite hard to
reach, considering that on the other side of the borders there is no experience in writing or handling such
programmes, and that infrastructure is underdeveloped.  At last, co-financing:  first of all, the neighbouring
countries have very limited resources to invest into the cross-border cooperation. Secondly they used to get
“technical” assistance and to be more “reactors” than actors. Moreover, centralized models of statehood do not
permit for co-financing from different levels. Thus, it is going to be quite difficult to use the advantage of this
principle.
In what regards funding, there are the following issues for further study and consideration. First, the
question of distribution of money, especially between land and maritime borders. What is going to be the criteria
for admissibility of maritime bordering regions: distance, population, existing communication lines or coopera-
tion experience? Without clear criteria the number of possible bilateral maritime border programmes can be
extended to nearly 50. There is a serious problem of corruption in absolute majority of the neighbouring
countries and the question of spending money beyond the border is quite sensitive issue for both bordering
parties.
Management and implementation of the programmes may also prove to be problematic.  In Strategy
paper it is stated that “management will be delegated by the Commission to a management body operating
through shared management or other suitable arrangements”29. No model of management structures has been
elaborated so far. In INTERREG they used decentralised model, but in reality of the neighbouring countries this
seems hardly possible for a number of reasons. First, the needed structures are still rather weak on the internal
part of the border, since regionalization process in ex-candidate countries is hardly comparable with that of old
EU members – let along highly centralized neighbouring countries; second, there are substantial differences in
state and market order between internal and external parts of the border. The question where to place joint
structures most probably will get the answer  - in a member-state. It means more responsibility for hosting
country and still the need for supporting structures on the other side of the border. Since there is no experience
in the bordering countries of handling programmes, one of the first tasks for member states and Commission is
“capacity building” – promoting the creation of a network of institutions that could further work autonomously
in cooperation structures and beyond.
The basic thing that would facilitate cooperation is legal approximation, but it is far not a technical detail -
political decisions are required. For the moment the basis for cooperation with third countries varies a lot, and
therefore the elaboration of unique European Neighbourhood Instrument is going to be rather cumbersome. For
instance, Association agreements that regular the relations with Mediterranean countries provide for approxi-
mation of legislation of the involved countries to that of Internal Market. While Partnership and Cooperation
agreements in force with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova grant neither preferential treatment for trade, nor a
timetable for regulatory approximation30. So, if we speak about legal instrument what could be the basis for it?
Concluding remarks.
Wider Europe initiative was aimed at meeting the challenge of enlargement and adopting New Union to New
Europe. The objectives announced in the Communication of March 11, 2003 as well as those of subsequent
documents related to the Neighbourhood Policy and the Neighbourhood Instrument reflected the understanding
of imperative to build up relations with bordering countries on the basis of partnership and mutual respect of
interest, without definitive prospective of closer institutional relations.
We have evidence on the example of a single branch of policy what it would mean in practical terms.
Cooperation at regional level proves to be one of the priorities of the new policy, and at the same time is not a
completely new element in the EU policies. As it comes from the above analysis, many details of external cross-
border cooperation will be borrowed from former INTERREG Initiative of the European Union, which was
29 ibid
30 European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper. COM (2004) 373 final. Brussels, 12.05.2004
31 Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. COM
(2003) 104. Brussels, 11.03.2003: 5.
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aimed at reducing negative effects of the borders within the former EU. It seems that majority of principles and
rules could be applicable to the new environment, but almost all of them need detailed adjustment. In this
context bilateral consultations, expertise and multilateral discussion with partner countries would be a good
tool.
The first step has been done with Action plans negociations. They have many features and priorities in
common, and their geographical origin can be quite easily distinguished. It also seems that there is a lack of
knowledge and understanding of the substance of new EU initiative, including cross-border cooperation Nei-
ghbourhood programmes. Therefore, a real challenge for the EU in the nearest future is to promote “learning”
and “capacity building” in the neighbouing countries.
The diversity of state and economy systems, cultural and social traditions are the main characteristic of the
surrounding EU neighbourhood. The EU had different external instruments to deal with this diversity in the
past, and the new ambitious project of elaboration of unique tool will use the experience of them. Former
regional cooperation models prove to be useful from the point of view of practical knowladge necessary to deal
with the diversity of the bordering areas. Much will depend on political will of third countries, as well as on the
work of the EU experts and politicians. The first steps proved that there are strong incentives from both sides.
The future will show whether past lessons have been leant.
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Moldova is a former URSS republic, that’s why its internal and external policy has had a very specifically
development. From political point of view, Moldova is hardly a periphery of Europe, though, from the geographical
point of view, it is located on the median line of the European continent. Along with Belorussia and Ukraine,
Moldova, as its sphere of influence is a part of the “grey zone” between Russia and European Union. Due to this fact,
it runs rather serious political and economic risks. Russia influences Moldova economically and through direct
support of “transnistrean” criminal authority.1 In Transnistria is situated the 14-th Russian army, which is conside-
red one of the biggest in Europe, to determine RM still stay in Russian zones of influence. Moldova will not be able
to take full advantage of its direct participation to the Stability Pact and to integrate in the European Union, until it
withdraws Russian troops from the territory of the Republic of Moldova and settles the Transnistrian dispute.
Fortunately, the perspective of the Russian troops withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, as well
as the settlement of the Transnistrian dispute, is gloomy. The Istanbul OSCE Summit has set the year of 2002 (See:
Final documents of the Istanbul OSCE Summit) as the deadline for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from
Moldova, but it didn’t happened. That is why the progress of the Republic of Moldova on the way of European
integration will depend mostly on the way in which Moldova’s authorities will be able to take full advantages in
diplomatic negotiations, and how international organizations will have a prompt attitude toward it.
Besides historical interest of Russia in this region and territorial discords, Moldova confronts with a lot of social
and political problems, which create strong barriers to integrate in the European Union. One of them is that Moldova
is extremely poor in raw materials. That is why the geo-economic pattern of foreign relations has to have as its core
the attraction of foreign investments and creation, development of technologically advanced industries and services,
especially those of international transportation and finance. The spectrum of possibilities is very large – free
economic zones, techno-parks, off-shore zones, trans-boundary cooperation.
Present and anterior governmental structures have elaborated a strategy of gradual integration of Moldova in
European Union, but it’s membership in the Community of Independent states (CIS) creates strong impediments,
that’s why many analysts consider that the first part of the way to Europe should be living CIS, while maintaining
bilateral relation with its member states. The situation, though confused, is characterized by an evolution. The
governments of 1994-1998 did not recognize or neglect these problems, but at present it is impossible to ignore the
situation. Evolution on the international scene overwhelms the political life in the Republic of Moldova and forces the
political class to react promptly. The position of balancing between CIS (Tratate internaþionale, Vol. 16, 1999, 4) and
the European Union, which in fact signifies the absence of any clear political, “materially tangible” conception in
promoting relations both in the frame of CIS and in the European Union, is becoming more inefficient and less
convincing. Slowly the electorate is requesting stability. The pro-CIS revolution in the context of a weakly developed
political culture and with more economic problems forecast, may prove consequentially painful for the population of
the republic. (Igor Munteanu, 1997, 25).
An optimal way to accede to European Union is through the Stability Pact for the South-Eastern Europe
(Cologne, 1999), but not only. This fact is explained by the complexity of the processes and international juncture,
as well as by their accelerated dynamic in the last years. Many important events for our country took place. Thus,
at the parliamentarian elections from February 2001, the Party of Communists won2 . Though they achieve remarka-
ble successes in the process of European integration. In this period of time Moldova became a member of the World
Trade Organization, was included with full rights to the Stability Pact for the South-Eastern Europe, Ilie Ilascu
(I.Ilasco was prisoner of criminal authority in Transnistria since 1992) was freed and the new leadership of Moldova
took a more severe position towards the Transnistrian separatists. An efficient participation of the Republic of
Moldova to the Pact is expected to facilitate in the future the access to the Stabilization and Association Agreements.
The firm and unbeatable position of PCRM in the top of the preferences of our electorate is very telling. But, in
our opinion it would be erroneous to attribute the high scare achieved by PCRM as an expression of anti-Europea-
nism by the population. Even a few poles on the problem denote a vast acceptance by the population of the idea of
European integration by the Republic of Moldova. But, we can’t overlook the fact that as the options in favor of
1 Since 1992 a region of Moldova, called Transnistria, auto-proclamated itself as an autonomy republic.
2 It’s for first time in South-East Europe area when communist party return at the power.
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PCRM are not anti-European, likewise the pro-European options are not completely pro-European. In other words
these contradictions in the results of the poles can be explained on one side by the lack of information that Molda-
vian’s have about the European Union and on the other side by nostalgia for a “satiated” stability (This fact explains
the high score of the Communists). Hence, we have superior economic motivation. Unfortunately, the support of the
population offered to the pro-European parties the Republic of Moldova and the European Union have to reach a
level of maturity, evolving from down to up.
At the same time, Moldavian authorities have to make strenuous efforts with a view to removing all obstacles and
difficulties on the way of its direct participation to the Stability Pact and its integration in the EU. It is necessary to
be undertaken, at least, measures called to diminish the effects of some problems faced by the Republic of Moldova
if these cannot be completely solved.
The impact of the Russian financial crisis from 1998 had the effect of a cold shower for  Moldavian authorities,
because more than 63% of economic transactions we have had with Russia.( South-Eastern Europe, 2002, 293-307).
It reflected negative on Moldavian economy. In this context the idea of a European integration becomes more and
more perceptible by the society as an essential element for the assurance of the security, stability and prosperity of
the young Moldavian state. In consequence, for the first time, the Government of the Republic of Moldova’s working
program, for 1999-2002, entitled “The supremacy of law, economic revitalization and European integration” declared
that European integration was the main strategic objective of foreign policy for the Republic of Moldova. The stress
of a pro-European direction gave a plus of credibility and coherence to the political speech of the Moldavian
authorities in Chisinau at the very moment the German presidency launched the idea of the Stability Pact for the
Southern and Eastern Europe. With this Pact, the European Union assumed the obligation to offer the states from the
region the perspective of complete integration into the structures of the community. The perspective met our
strategic objective of gradual adherence to the European Union and it made the new regional initiative an essential
element of the European integration policy of the Republic of Moldova. In the context of this evolution, we’ve
watched activation of the political dialogue with the European Union. This has been materialized by the initiation of
diplomatic discussions in the most important European capitals, sensitizing them to the view of including the
Republic of Moldova as a full right participant in the Stability Pact for the South-Eastern Europe.
At the Regional Table in Salonic, on June 8, 2000, Moldova achieved, for the first time, a position comparable with
other observer states, which also had requested their inclusion into the Pact. In the final report of the Regional Table
in Salonic, the participants consented to greeted the fact that Moldova, due to its geographical proximity and to its
strong connection with the South-Eastern European states, is more deeply involved in the activities, initiatives and
projects of the Stability Pact and encouraged Moldova to intensify its presence in the Pact and in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe activities. An obvious proof of Salonic’s success is the fact that Moldova was the
only observer state of the Stability Pact invited to participate at the meeting of the National Coordinators to the
Stability Pact for the Eastern Europe in July 17-18, 2000.
The formalization of our state as a full right participant to the Pact could have to occur through the fusion of the
South-Eastern Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI of which Moldova is a member, with the Working Table for
economic reconstruction, cooperation and development of the Stability Pact. Transnistrian problem wasn’t oppor-
tune to mention it as an argument for our inclusion into the Stability Pact, because it couldn’t take responsibilities
belonging to other institutions, in this case to OSCE. In its sensitizing efforts, Moldova had to stress its advantages
and its practical contribution for stability in the region and namely (Valeriu Gheorghiu, 2000, 8)
• Geographically and politically Moldova belongs to the South-Eastern European area;
• Moldova supported the efforts of the international Community in the process of settlement the crisis in
Kosovo and in launching the European Union initiative concerning the creation of the Stability Pact;
• Moldova is member of SECI and of Action Plan of the USA for the South-Eastern Europe;
• Its small dimension is an advantage when compared to other states that requested the same statute in the Pact;
• The European Commission, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament,
CEI and the Council of the Foreign Ministers of the BSEC Organization declared to be favorable to the
inclusion of Moldova as a full right participant to the Stability Pact;
• Moldova’s achievements in the democratization of the society, in the affirmation of the democratic institu-
tions and in solving the problem of national minorities are acknowledged by the international organizations,
especially by the Council of Europe. According to this, Moldova can offer to the South-Eastern European
States its positive experience in these domains;
• The government of the Republic of Moldova adopted the Charter for Freedom of Mass-Media of the
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Stability Pact;
• Moldova develops good-neighboring and cooperation relations with the neighboring states;
• Moldova is still engaged to make reforms a which the priorities correspond to the basic projects of the Pact
and these are: the improvement of the investment frame; the struggle with corruption and with organized
crime; the affirmation of the state of right, of human rights etc;
• Moldova has already been invited to participate in initiatives, activities and projects of the Pact, such as
Good Governance, the campaign that promotes a multiethnic society (both elaborated under the patronage of
the Council of Europe), the initiative concerning the fight with organized crime, the initiative concerning the
struggle with corruption, the investment Charter and the Parliamentary dimension for Cooperation. Canada
also included the Republic of Moldova in its project concerning the electric energy in South-Eastern Europe.
European integration, even in the context of an ideal economic and political evolution, will be open to Moldova
depending on the degree of compatibility of the development of the Republic of Moldova with the standards of the
European Union. There is another problem that cannot be overlooked, possibly the most important problem facing
the European Union. In spite of the success that was achieved, the process of European integration has an uncertain
and contradictory character, oscillating between the idea of a Europe of states (advanced by general De Gaule) and
that of a supernational Europe (promoted by Jean Monnet and Robert Shuman). The process of finalizing that which
is called the European Union, what its boundaries are, who can become part of the European Union and when it can
happen continue to be topics of discussion and have impact upon the challenges in Moldova. The absence of clear
messages from the European Union and its member countries not only dishearten the pro-European forces within the
Republic of Moldova that are in their political beginning, but also encourages the antidemocratic forces within the
society. That’s why many pro-european statements reflect only momentary interests and are not free of useless
ideological burden. In the text of the National Strategy for European Integration, this concern is formulated in a
diplomatic, but rather transparent form: “The Republic of Moldova can not stay outside the process in South Eastern
Europe and on the whole European continent. Moldova being a South-Eastern European state, does not request
special treatment but the same treatment the other countries from South-Eastern Europe enjoy. However, getting a
response from the European Union to this question is a main preoccupation in the activity of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Moldova”.
By some western analysts, Moldova don’t motivate clearly its pro-European politics. Also, low political culture,
serious economic problems and the carelessness of the European Union concerning Moldova, let them to affirm that
the problem of European integration is a premature one. The main argument supporting this thesis is that Moldova,
in spite of the international juncture, has to independently demonstrate the wish and the capacity to integrate into the
European Union. This could be a problem beyond the abilities of Moldova. In other words a solution to the political
and economic problems of the Republic of Moldova will be in our opinion strongly influenced by the existence of
external support.
Another argument is the accepted statement, that the progress of the Republic of Moldova in the direction of
integration into the European Union until recently was minor. This may be the reason why failure in the promotion
of a national strategy towards European integration until recently has had no consequences either for the government
or for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also, European integration does not politically engage any political force and
the failure in this domain is not decisive for the political fate of the political forces. A symbol of the paradoxes
happening in the Republic of Moldova on the plan of the integration of the Republic of Moldova into the European
Union is the fact that one person was the Minister of Foreign Affairs for several years promoting foreign policy that
differed from government to government, during which time the policy was sometimes diametrically opposed.
The European high official Mr. Burghardt (2002, The Republic of Moldova and European integration, 110)
declared that only a gradual evolution of events would allow to passage from the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements to a European agreement. In his opinion the application of the PCA contribute to the process of
“unification of Moldova” and every premature decision concerning the association of Moldova would be inappro-
priate and it would complicate relations with Transnistria. At the end, Mr. Burghardt mentioned that the European
Union had major problems such as extension towards the East, institutional reforms, reform of common agricultural
policy, and that solving these problems requires major efforts, a fact that would create the illusion that there was
insufficient attention paid to Moldova.
On March 4, 1998 the meeting between Anatol Arapu, Moldova’s Ambassador to Brussels, and Guenter Burghar-
dt, Director General in the European Commission, is highly revealing when one tries to understand the factors that
motivated such a “reaction” towards Moldova’s wishes at that time. Burghardt described the meeting as an attempt
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues
105
of the European Commission to identify the means of helping the Republic of Moldova to find “the right approach”
in its relations with the EU. In Burghardt’s opinion, before forwarding a request for establishing relations which
would exceed the PCA, Moldova should consider the following two aspects that make that request less realistic: the
geo-political situation of Moldova and the insufficient preparation of internal prerequisites that would allow acces-
sion. Believing that the EU’s relations with the Republic of Moldova should reach maturity and evolve upward, the
European official announced that the gradual development of the events would permit the substitution of the PCA
with a European Agreement. In his opinion, applying the PCA could contribute to the “unification of the Republic of
Moldova”, and any premature decision on the accession to the EU would be inappropriate and could complicate the
situation with Tiraspol.
The implication made by the European Commission and by the members of the European Union towards
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements implementation by Moldova, has been and is still determined by the
indecision of the European Union to treat the new independent states differently, on the basis of their own merits. An
eventual satisfaction of our request would have as an effect the implementation of the PCA and of the whole strategy
of the community towards the former soviet republics documents, according to which the European Union intend to
confer equal treatment. It is less probable that the answer was different in the moment when PCA was in the process
of ratification by the members of the European Union. Still we notice that neither the European Commission nor the
members of the European Union have excluded the perspective of a progressive evolution of their contractual
relations with the Republic of Moldova, but not before getting over the PCA round. Thus, during his meeting with
Mr. Petru Lucinschi, President of Republic of Moldova, in January 26, 1998, Mr. Jacques Santer, President of the
European Commission, mentioned that only after having the experience of a functioning PCA would we be able to see
how to develop our relations further. At the same time Mr. Santer reiterated the importance of rein forming the state
members of the European Union concerning our request, as in the last moment, the association negotiations could be
initiated according to a decision of the Ministerial Council of the European Union. Mr. Piere Moscovici, the French
minister for European relations, declared during his meeting with Mr. Ion Sturza, (the former prime minister of the
Republic of Moldova) on September 15, 1999, that France understood our aspirations to integrate into Europe and
encouraged and supported them. But, he also said that this integration had to pass through the implementation and
through an integral and complete utilization of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
The dismissal of the Sturza Government, which was known as the most pro-European Government in the recent
period of the Republic of Moldova’s history had the effect of a short circuit in the evolution of the partnership with
the European Union. Being confronted with confused message and in midst of politically instable conditions in
Chisinau, associated with the difficulties of foreseeing the possible configuration of the political orientation of the
future government, the European Union had to decide on its expectations in its relation with the Republic of
Moldova. Under the impact of a new political situation in Chisinau, the European Union took the decision to
postpone the granting of a 15 million Euro loan for the assurance of a payment balance of the Republic of Moldova.
Over this fact, the political dialogue with the Moldovan authorities and the Cooperation Council planned for
November 16, 1999 was postponed for an undetermined period. The lack of an active dialogue with the European
Union before preparation of the historical conference of the Council of Europe in Helsinki, was a big disadvantage for
the European Integration policy promoted by the Republic of Moldova. Our country was omitted from the conclu-
sions of the Council of Europe in Helsinki regarding the extension to the East of the European Union. The continua-
tion of the European integration policy by the Braghis government managed to put an end to this small period of
“intermezzo” in our relations with the European Union.
TACIS program as a step closer to UE
Another important element of cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and the EU is the TACIS program.
This is one of the main tools created by Brussels for developing strong economic and political relations with the
Newly Independent States. Initially intended as a program for materializing the EU’s support to the transition
process of former Soviet states, TACIS’ decennial activity revealed its original nature and objectives. Thus, assistance
provided by TACIS cannot be reduced only to its technical content. Currently, TACIS assistance is focused on
developing viable market economies in former Soviet countries, as well as consolidating democratic and legal funda-
mentals.
Therefore, the TACIS Program (Technical Assistance to the New Independent States) is one of the main instru-
ments created for the development of a tight economic and political relation with the New Independent States.
Initially conceived as a program to materialize the European Union support for the development of the transitional
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processes in the New Independent States (NIS), its evolution during a decade has marked its original character and
objectives. At present the assistance that TACIS offers can’t be reduced to only a technical context, because currently
it is concentrated on the development in the NIS of a viable free market economy and on the consolidation of their
democratic and juridical basis. On the effective date of PCA in certain states of CIS, TACIS became an instrument in
the implementation process. And the Republic of Moldova is no exception in this regard. Being interested in
contributing to an exemplary and integral implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements’s objecti-
ves, the European Union engaged, according to art. 87 from PCA, to offer Moldova temporary financial and technical
assistance in form of donations through the TACIS program. The effective date of the PCA, July 1,1998, allowed the
execution of TACIS actions Moldova in all domains present in the PCA: the legislative harmonization; standards and
certificates; transport, the development of the private sector, small enterprises development; human resources
development; promotion of customs, social and industrial cooperation and also the promotion of cooperation in the
sphere of education and professional training, institutional consolidation and adherence of Moldova to the World
Trade Organization. At the same time, being convinced that the economy can positively influence the direction of
politics, the European Union took the decision to give a new aspect to the TACIS program in Moldova: promoter of
a cooperation and trust dialogue between the two parties of the Nistru banks through the identification and accom-
plishment of certain common economic projects. Among them was a project concerning the reconstruction of the
bridge at Gura Bacului, destroyed during the military operation in 1992. The European Union planned an allocation
of 2 million of EURO for this project.
After July 1,1998 TACIS becomes an essential instrument in the implementation of the Partnership and Coope-
ration Agreements signed between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union. Initiating an ample assistance
program called “The Implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements”, TACIS managed to bring its
contribution to the consolidation of institutional capacities and the perfection of communication and decision making
systems between the institutions which are involved in a consequent evolution of a materialization process of PCA
objectives. Under its authority, a series of instruments that would facilitate the efforts of Moldavian legislation to
obtain the standards of the European Union legislation was also elaborated.
The first round of the TACIS program “The Implementation of the PCA” started on September 23, 1997 and
ended in September 1998. During this period the priority had been given to the elaboration of certain working
instruments that would assist Moldavian officials in their efforts to interpret and implement and the PCA. There
have also been a series of remarks and analysis of some laws made which are in force or of projects of law that were
intended to be presented to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova for approval.
The second round was initiated in February 1999 and lasted 10 months. Establishing structural capacities and
informing the public of Moldova about its role and importance in implementing the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements were its major objectives. Among its achievements are the creation of a data base concerning the
legislation of Moldova and of the European Union, the creation of a computerized documentation center, the
publication of the “Buletinul Informativ”, destined to inform the society about the process of implementation of the
PCA and assistance in preparing reunion of the subcommittees European Union-Moldova. In the sphere of the
legislative harmonization there have been elaborated comparative studies which focused on six sectors: entrepreneu-
rial right, competition, the service sector, the banking sector, taxation and accountancy. These studies explain the
stipulations of the PCA, analyzing at the same time the situation in Moldova and in the European Union in all these
six spheres.
At the beginning of April 2000 the third round of the TACIS program “The implementation of the PCA” started
and lasted 2,5 years, with a total budget of 2,5 million EURO. It has to be mentioned that its priorities are the general
objectives of the previous rounds, assuring the continuity and the coherence of the program.
In the context of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements provisions, Moldova advanced a lot in the liberaliza-
tion of trade, investments and current capital payments. But nevertheless, the harmonization of Moldavian legisla-
tion to the legislation of the European Union is still at the incipient stage. The creation of an institutional national
mechanism, which would coordinate and officialize the process of obtaining the standards of the community should
be a primordial objective in this sphere.
Another aspect of TACIS that should be pointed out is its use as an instrument of promotion of “know-how” in
the key sectors of the economy of the Republic of Moldova. In order to give content to this characteristic we will
analyze briefly only three of the sectors which are the prior directions of the TACIS program in Moldova: agriculture,
the reorganization of enterprises and the development of human resources. The TACIS assistance in the sphere of
agriculture is oriented to the implementation of projects destined to support the process of privatization and land
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distribution. The improvement of the formulation and administration mechanism of the agricultural policies at central
and local level, the development of the rural economy, the reform of the agricultural support systems, the reorgani-
zation of big agricultural branches and agricultural —industrial enterprises, the promotion of the export of domestic
agricultural products and the attraction of investments are prior directions of the TACIS projects in the agricultural
sphere. The pilot project implemented in the Orhei district in 1995-1997 is a revealing example.( The Republic of
Moldova and European integration, 2002, 59) During the application of this project, farmers-owners of small land
parcels, benefited in the identification or opening of credit lines, used for the establishment of a federation of farmers
associations with the purpose to of offering a number of key services coming from agricultural equipment suppliers,
stoking and transport companies and import and export agencies. According to the TACIS program of action for
1999, the Moldavian Export Promotion Organization (MEPO) was created and in the development of human
resources, a supporting project for the farmers that are at the post privatization stage has been launched.
Regarding the privatization and the reorganization of enterprises, beginning in 1998, TACIS attention was orien-
ted predominantly to the reorganization and privatization of big enterprises, to the encouragement of the develop-
ment of small enterprises and to the promotion of exports and investments. Following the achievements of the
priorities in this sphere, TACIS continues to offer support to the Agency for the Reorganization of Enterprises and
Assistance (AREA), which coordinates the efforts of individual reorganization of enterprises by strengthening the
financial discipline and increasing their competition. At the same time TACIS supports businessmen in their familia-
rization with the techniques of the market management, supports the establishment of informational centers in small
and middle enterprises, the elaboration of business plans, feasibility studies, market studies for Moldavian enterpri-
ses and encourages the establishment of links between small and middle enterprises of Moldova and of the European
Union.
The projects started under TACIS, in the sector of human resources, has the support of Moldova’s efforts in
edification of a modern social infrastructure and the development of its human resources potential as its major
objectives. The support offered by TACIS in this sphere is predominantly materialized by the assistance that has
been offered to relevant agencies and ministries involved in the reforms and development of a new system of social
protection, by training official persons responsible for the PCA implementation, by supporting managerial training
and by encouraging enterprising in Moldova, by financial support of the TEMPUS program, which promotes
cooperation between universities and also by the establishment of professional training in the educational system, in
order to enhance the chances for the employment of the working force.
TACIS is also the promoter of transfrontier cooperation and integration of Moldova into the trans-European
network of transport. With the European Union extension towards the East, the promotion of security within the
common frontiers: the European Union/ Commonwealth of Independent States and within the common frontiers of
the associated of the trade, the inclusion of the agricultural products in the FTA will have tiny effects on the market
of the agricultural products in the European Union.. Adherence to WTO would allow Moldova to participate together
with the European Union in the process of multilateral liberalization simultaneously with the preferential liberaliza-
tion of the trade between them.( Ten benefits of the WTO trading System, 1999, 54)
Under the auspices of TACIS, a series of tools were developed to facilitate harmonization of Moldovan and EU
legislation.
Also, TACIS is an initiator of cross-border cooperation and Moldova’s integration in the European transport
network. If the EU were to expand Eastward, there are concerns ensuring the regarding the integrity of common
borders between associated countries from Central and South Eastern Europe and for CIS countries. Therefore, the
EU engaged in the encouragement of cross-border cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and neighboring
states (Romania, Ukraine) by promoting common activities. This is intended to increase customs control efficiency,
facilitate cross-border traffic, and to solve ecological problems within border territories. Toward this end, in 1996, the
TACIS program “Cross-Border Cooperation” established a special budget in the total amount of 30 million Euros
annually.
General context of solutions for integration of Moldova in the UE
In the context of extension towards the East, the European Union is positive to engage itself more and more in
specifying its relations with future neighbors. Thus in the case of Russia and Ukraine, this relationship was already
materialized during 1999 through an approval of the “General Strategy “ of the fifteen states members of the
European Union towards these two countries. The Republic of Moldova is no exception in this regard. The order in
which PCA’s with the former soviet states have been signed seems also to be respected by the European Union in this
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case too. Many signals received from the European Union, including a visit to Chisinau of the “Troika”, prove that
the elaboration of such a strategy concerning our state is in the European Union’s attention. In this context, the fact
that on December 4, 2000, before the visit of the “Troika”, the Council of General Affairs adopted the “common
approach” of the state members of the European Union towards the Republic of Moldova is revealing. This “com-
mon approach” is the outlining of the essence of the future Common Strategy towards our Republic.
According to this Common position, the objective followed by the European Union regarding the Republic of
Moldova is to contribute to the maintenance of stability, the consolidation of democracy and the development of a
healthy and prosperous free market economy, but without offering us a clear perspective concerning the association
to the European Union. It seems that the European Union will continue to stress upon the integral implementation
of the PCA. Regarding the implementation of PCA, Moldova’s achievements in adopting a legislation necessary for
the affirmation of the free market  economy are qualified as being important.(Vennon Th., 1999, 96-141) In the same
time engaging itself to intensify the political dialogue with the Republic of Moldova, to vary its diplomatic presence
in Moldova by working through a Permanent Delegation of the European Commission in Chisinau, broaching
constantly the withdrawal of Russian troops and the transnistrean problem in OSCE and also in its political dialogue
at a bilateral level with Russia and Ukraine, contributing to the post-conflict rehabilitation through promoting
projects destined to reestablish economic relations and to create a climate of trust between the two parties of the
Nistru.
In this context it’s obvious that Moldova has to structure its own vision of understanding its understands in the
development of perspective relations with the European Union. This could be materialized by adopting a state
document, which would be ratified by the three branches of power, a fact that would offer it the necessary political
weight and credibility.
This strategic document clearly state the idea of gradual integration into the European Union, at the same time
offering details regarding the ways through which Moldova has to pass in order to eventually reach this objective. The
exploration of the potential offered by the PCA is in our opinion one of these ways. We state this idea on the basis
of the following realities:
• The PCA objectives subscribe to the criteria of adhering to the European Union declared by the Council of
Europe in Copenhagen in June 1993. In this way the implementation is able to facilitate the preparation of Moldova
for a gradual promotion of its relations with the European Union and here we refer to the statute of associate and full
member of the European Union;
• In the messages received from the European Union the promotion of the actual frame of our relations with the
European Community depends on the integral exploration of the potential offered by the PCA. The inflexibility of
the European Union may be explained by the fact that an eventual satisfaction of our request regarding the signing of
an association agreement would have as an effect the tackling of a whole strategy of the community towards the
former soviet states, which have as a basis the actual PCA’s. Or according to the mentioned strategy the European
Union understands to treat these states equally;
• Also art. 5 from the PCA stipulates the modification clause of this agreement in case the circumstances
change, especially in the context of Moldova’s adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the same time
the article stipulates that the parties will proceed to an examination of the PCA 3 years after its effective date or on
July 1, 2001. In the conditions when the European Union persists to put accent on the integral implementation of the
PCA, the mentioned article offers the chance to propose some clauses which would offer the possibility of the
progressive evolution of our contractual relations with the European Union.
This kind of clause can be found in the Cooperation agreement signed between Macedonia and the European
Union on April 26,1997 and its effective date is January 1,1998. In art. 45 of the mentioned agreement it is stipulated
“The parties of the contract will examine, according to the fulfilled conditions, the possibility to strengthen their
contractual relations, taking into consideration the FYROM aspirations to an advanced type of relation in order to
associate with the European Community”. A similar stipulation exists in the Agreement concerning the trade and
economic cooperation signed between the European Union and Albania in 1992, in the preamble of which there is
mentioned the perspective of the development of the relations in order to sign an Association Agreement. As soon as
adherence to WTO is made, the Republic of Moldova can propose that the revised PCA should stipulate a transitio-
nal period necessary for the gradual creation of the Free Trade Zone with the European Union and should establish
an exact calendar regarding the abolition of customs taxes on import and export, as it is stipulated in the European
Agreements.
Another barrier on the way of full integration of the Republic of Moldova in the Stability Pact is the lack on its
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territory of a single customs area. Transnistrian separatist authorities have created their own customs system.
Besides, the Republic of Moldova is not able to ensure a rigid customs zone on the territory controlled by Chisinau
as well, first of all due to the permeability of its Eastern border.
As it is known, on the one hand, the Stability Pact pursues the objective of removing all the barriers on the way
of the development of trade, and on the other hand, that of the establishment of one or more free trade areas between
the countries of South-Eastern Europe and the European Union. Yet without a consolidation of its customs area,
participation of the Republic of Moldova in the trade integration foreseen in this process will be in fact impossible.
Therefore in the present conditions, even if the door of the Pact will be open for Moldova, it will hardly be able
anyway to benefit from opportunities offered by the Pact.
The European Union will certainly have other objections to the Republic of Moldova: those of a political nature
— instability of democratic institutions, lack of cooperation between the branches of government; of the economic
origin — absence of a functional market economy, a hostile environment for foreign investors and businessmen, as
well as other serious difficulties in the process of transition to the market economy; of the legal nature — considerable
deficiencies in the field of legislation; of a social nature — a very low living standard of the population.
We may make note of the fact that neither the European Commission nor the European Union members dismissed
the possibility of the evolution of their contractual relations with the Republic of Moldova, but not before going
through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement stage.
Not all image elements are negative and not all elements during the previous period were positive. For instance, the
protection of the rights of minorities in the Republic of Moldova fully meets European standards, but corruption has
been a characteristic of independence in the Republic of Moldova and has affected its image significantly.
As internal factors are more important in the building the image of a capable state for integration in UE, Moldova
must undertake the following measures:
General Short-Term:
• Full, excellent, timely implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement;
• Establish a free exchange area with the EU;
Medium-term:
• Sign the Association Agreement with the EU;
• Identification of tension sources and impediments of a political, economic, financial, technical nature that
obstruct building a security space in our region ;
• Elaboration of certain practical recommendations, specifically regarding the borders by reinforcing border
control and developing closer cooperative relations among the respective structures of the Republic of
Moldova., Romania and Ukraine.
• Implement the European Agreement based on the example of the candidate countries from the “first and two
wave” group.
Long-term:
• Make efforts to open accession negotiations;
• Adopt and apply the “acquis communautaire”;
• Fully comply with the criteria adopted at Copenhagen in 1993.
Special Internal:
• Prove the will to promote a firm policy of integration within Europe;
• Adopt and implement democratic reforms;
• Ensure the cooperation of State institutions, eradicate corruption;
• Abandon the strategy of solving problems as they occur;
• Settle the Transnistria dispute and secure the Eastern border;
• Develop public administration;
• Open a resident office of the European Commission in Chisinau.
External:
• Collaborate with the European Union;
• Leave the Commonwealth of Independent States, by having bilateral relationship with the member-states.
Conclusions
The current international relations on the European continent is strongly influenced by many process toward
European integration. For this reason, the Republic of Moldova makes strenuous efforts to participate in all Europe-
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an cooperation structures.
Of great importance for Moldova is bringing the national legislation into line with the European community
legislation and establishing proper institutions, which would have national administrative functions and ensure
practical applications. The implementation of these requirements is an indispensable element for attaining the final
objective of joining the EU.
Creation of necessary conditions for a gradual development of the relations with the EU and for speeding up the
realization of the final goal-accession to the EU – is an absolute priority of national and foreign policy of the Republic
of Moldova.
A key element of relations between the EU and the Republic of Moldova is the setting up of a political dialog. The
new form of political cooperation is expressing Europe’s political interest to drive Moldova to firmly assume its
responsibilities, in exchange for support for the consolidation of the country’s political independence and its reinte-
gration in the community of democratic states.
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L’étude des migrations internationales prend de plus en plus de l’importance depuis quelques années. Tous les pays
se trouvent concernés, qu’ils soient d’origine, de transit ou de destination. Selon les estimations des Nations Unies, il y’a
aujourd’hui environ 175 millions de personnes qui vivent en dehors de leur pays d’origine, soit 3% de la population
mondiale. Le nombre a plus que doublé depuis 25 ans dont 60%  se concentrent dans les pays développés. La raison
principale de ces migrations reste toujours économique. Elles sont liées directement aux inégalités de développement
économique et à l’écart croissant entre niveaux de vie des pays riches et des pays pauvres. Elles sont appelées à
augmenter encore au cours de ce 21ème siècle à 203 millions de migrants internationaux en 2050 selon les estimations des
Nations Unies. Face à cette tendance certains pays développés ferment de plus en plus leurs frontières. L’immigration
illégale prend de l’ampleur en conséquence. On assiste également au développement d’une importante migration forcée.
Plus de 20 millions de réfugiés fuient leur pays à cause de la guerre et de la violence. L’évolution du capitalisme et de la
mondialisation s’est accompagnée d’une augmentation des flux migratoires à travers le monde. Mis en cause toujours le
développent inégal avec un Nord de plus en plus riche et un Sud qui s’appauvrit davantage.
Il ressort également que la nouvelle migration n’est plus celle des affamées qui affluent massivement vers les pays
riches. Elle concerne plutôt des jeunes dynamiques, instruits, d’autres hautement qualifiées qui émigrent tout simple-
ment à la recherche de meilleures conditions de vie et de travail qui font défaut dans leur pays d’origine.
L’émigration vers l’Europe n’est pas nouvelle mais les flux migratoires ne sont plus massifs aujourd’hui. Malgré le
vieillissement de la population européenne et le besoin de main d’œuvre, les Etats membres de l’union européenne
durcissent leur politique de contrôle migratoire qui ne règle en rien l’immigration illégale et son ampleur.
Très préoccupée certainement par l’évolution de la situation économique générale ainsi que les conséquences  des
migrations se pose ainsi pour l’Europe la gestion quantitative et qualitative des flux migratoires notamment en provenan-
ce  des 10 nouveaux pays devenus membres de l’Union  et pour lesquels on admet un flux migratoire assez limité. Les
frontières externes restent, cependant, fermées pour les autres pays voisins qui voient que l’élargissement européen se
fait en leur détriment et suggèrent, entre autres, la libre circulation des personnes. Les négociations sont cours entre les
différentes parties pour trouver une solution juste au problème.
Quelques remarques doivent être apportées en ce qui concerne ce phénomène des migrations qui devient un sujet
passionnel, sensible surtout politiquement, tabou lorsqu il s’agit de l’étude de certaine caractéristiques de la population
immigrée, des minorités ou lorsqu’il est question d’ouverture des frontières à plus d’immigration contrôlée . Les
statistiques ne sont pas toujours disponibles, difficile d’accès; souvent incomplètes et diffèrent énormément d’une
source à l’autre. De sorte qu’elles peuvent servir à des fins politiques et ne permettent guère une analyse scientifique
rigoureuse. Nombreux sont les auteurs qui font remarquer l’inexactitude des statistiques sur les migrations et parfois
même leur surestimation. Sans parler de la définition des concepts (étrangers, immigrés, population issue de l’immigra-
tion). Il reste vrai que la migration, moins stable que les autres phénomènes démographiques (mortalité, fécondité), se
prête mal ou difficilement à la mesure. C’est du reste ces que les modèles migratoires ont du mal à rendre compte si bien
qu’ils montrent la complexité du phénomène notamment dans la détermination du volume, des formes et la direction des
flux migratoires. Les publications sur les migrations sont abondantes. Dans cette étude nous nous sommes limité
essentiellement aux publications et rapports de certaines organisations internationales (Nations Unies, OIM, OIT,
OCDE, Banque Mondiale) ainsi que certaines études plus récentes et plus objectives sans pouvoir, en si peu de temps,
consulter la vaste documentation sur le sujet.
Démographie et migration en Europe
L’Union Européenne compte aujourd’hui 380 millions d’habitants. Si on ajoute la population des 10 nouveaux pays
membres, le chiffre s’élève à 455 millions de personnes. D’une manière générale, l’Union Européenne se caractérise par
un faible accroissement démographique et une accentuation du vieillissement de la population. Cette augmentation du
vieillissement résulte à la fois de la  baisse de la fécondité et de l’augmentation de l’espérance de vie. Le taux de
reproduction qui est de 1,4 enfants/par femme en moyenne est loin d’assurer le remplacement des générations (2,1
enfants/femme).L’augmentation de la population résulte pour les 3/4 du solde migratoire.
Les perspectives établies jusqu’en 2050 par de multiples organismes, européens et internationaux, montrent que la
population de l’Union Européenne continuera à diminuer avec accélération du processus de vieillissement. La tranche
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d’âge 15-64 ans devrait décroître de 259,4 millions en 2000 à 237,3 millions en 2025 et à 162,8 millions en 2050 soit une
baisse de 37,2%.Ce qui aggraverait le rapport de dépendance (personnes âgées de15-64 ans/65 ans et plus) c’est-à-dire le
coefficient de charge des inactifs par rapport à la population active.
Toutes les études et rapports montrent également le rôle important que jouent les migrations dans l’évolution démo-
graphique de l’Europe, bien que le recours à l’immigration voire même le relèvement de la fécondité ne contribuerait que très
faiblement à freiner le vieillissement. Néanmoins cela permet de combler le déficit en rajeunissant la population, de
renouveler la population active, d’améliorer le rapport de dépendance et d’assurer un certain équilibre du système de
retraite. Pour cela, il est estimé qu’un apport annuel d’environ 0,5millions travailleurs étrangers sont nécessaires
jusqu’en 2010,1.6 millions entre 2010 et2050 soit au total 68,0 millions de personnes entre 2003 et 2050 .N’insistons
pas, la démographie européenne est bien connue.
Malgré la situation décrite ainsi les frontières restent toujours presque fermées. La crainte est de voir affluer des
cohortes de chômeurs de l’Asie, de l’Afrique et même des nouveaux pays devenus membres de l’Union Européenne. Si
cette crainte fait partie de la nature humaine elle parait relativement exagérée. En ce qui concerne les flux migratoires en
provenance des pays nouvellement adhérents à l’Union Européenne ils devraient être limités pour plusieurs raisons. Il
est observé que les pays, une fois membres de l’Union, les flux migratoires diminuent considérablement. Les gens
préfèrent rester chez eux. C’était justement le cas au moment de l’adhésion de l’Espagne, l’Italie et le Portugal par
exemple où l’on craignait une migration massive en provenance de ces pays traditionnellement d’émigration. Or, il n’en
était rien. Il faudrait dire aussi que la stabilisation de la population était, en partie, grâce à l’aide au développement
économique de l’Europe de l’Ouest. L’exemple de Berlin est aussi illustrant. Après l’effondrement du mur, on craignait
des flux migratoires massifs vers l’Europe de l’Ouest. Rien de tout cela. D’autres part, ces pays comme ceux, nouvelle-
ment membres de l’Union se caractérisent, eux-mêmes, par la même dynamique démographique que les autres pays de
l’Union, à savoir une faible fécondité et un vieillissement accentué de la population. Anciens et nouveaux membres de
l’Union deviennent même des pays d’immigration. En somme, il est estimé qu’au plus 1% de la population des 10
nouveaux pays qui devrait émigrer vers les autres Etats membres actuels de l’Union Européenne. Même l’intention
d’émigrer chez les jeunes chômeurs âgés de 15à 24 ans est très faible soit 2 % seulement selon les résultats d’enquête
(Krieger H. 2004 p.1). Comme si l’envie d’émigrer disparaît avec la  suppression des frontières et quand  la circulation
des personnes devient normale. De tout ce qu’en vient de dire la question est de savoir s’il en serait de même pour les
autres pays tiers notamment ceux du Sud méditerranéen. Vraisemblablement, pour des raisons multiples. Tout d’abord
et démographiquement parlant, presque tous les pays tendent vers une certaine convergence de l’équilibre démographi-
que entre natalité et mortalité et un vieillissement plus ou moins accéléré de leur population. Pour s’en tenir au pays
maghrébins d’où vient essentiellement la crainte de la pression démographique, il faut dire que le remplacement des
générations n’est plus assuré aujourd’hui ou tout juste. Le vieillissement de la population se poursuit progressivement
avec la chute rapide de la fécondité et l’accroissement de l’espérance de vie. Le déclin démographique s’observe partout
dans le monde. Les pays à»réservoir» de main-d’œuvre pourraient cesser de l’être. En conséquence tous les pays
peuvent devenir à la fois zone d’émigration et d’immigration. Démographie»avancée» et marché de travail mondialisé
obligent.
Le problème de ces pays reste, pour l’instant, essentiellement économique. Les flux migratoires proviennent directe-
ment des inégalités de développement. L’écart ne cesse de se creuser entre niveaux de vie des pays riches et des pays
pauvres. Ainsi, 20% de la population mondiale détient 80% du revenu mondial alors que 80% de la population mondiale
ne détient que 20% seulement du revenu. Logiquement, la part du pauvre se trouve chez le riche. Faute de l’avoir, il part
à sa récupération là où elle se trouve. Aussi les réformes économiques engagées ces dernières années ainsi que l’applica-
tion du programme d’ajustement structurel ont entraîné une augmentation de la pauvreté dans ces pays. La restructura-
tion des entreprises publiques et les compressions des effectifs qui s’en suivent ont fait augmenter le nombre de
chômeurs qui viennent gonfler les rangs de ceux déjà existant. L’aide au développement est insuffisante et non utilisée
rationnellement. Cela ne signifie, pas pour autant, qu’avec le développement économique de ces pays les flux migratoires
s’arrêteront automatiquement. Tout se passe comme si les personnes sont en possession d’un droit de circulation dans
leur espace qu’est la planète –village tout simplement cherchant à devenir membres d’une société ou d’un système
politique auquel ils se sentent appartenir.
Politique migratoire européenne
Il n’est pas vraiment nécessaire de revenir en détails sur tous les aspects de la politique migratoire  et son évolution
depuis les accords de Schengen jusqu’à présent. On peut relever cependant les points essentiels suivants. Premièrement,
la politique migratoire est contradictoire. Le besoin de migrants est exprimé ainsi que l’intention d’ouverture des
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frontières. Dans la pratique, c’est l’inverse qui se produit. Ainsi l’Europe hésite entre ouverture et repli. Deuxièmement,
la politique migratoire n’est pas homogène. Chaque Etat de l’Union mène à sa manière une certaine politique en fonction
de la conjoncture et du besoin du marché de travail. Troisièment, la mise en œuvre d’une politique d’immigration sélective
réservée pour les personnes hautement qualifiées dont a besoin l’Europe pour son économie. Une politique de retour
encourageant les départs volontaires sans trop de succès. Les migrants illégaux sont éloignés ou transférés avec l’accord
des autorités des pays d’origine. Il est aussi question même de sanctions. L’aide financière accordée aux pays tiers  pour
le développement économique pourrait être, purement et simplement, supprimée si ces pays ne coopèrent pas à
maîtriser les flux migratoires en provenance de chez eux. En plus des nouveaux gardiens de la Forteresse Europe par les
nouveaux pays membres, des pressions sont exercées aussi sur certains pays tiers pour combattre, à la place de l’Europe,
les migrations illégales en provenance d’autres pays.
Plus globalement, la politique migratoire européenne reste très restrictive. Les mesures prises pour contrôler les
migrations sont très sévères. On peut les voir à travers le nombre très réduit de visas octroyés. Les rejets sont
systématiques. Encore faudrait-t-il souligner les conditions inhumaines d’accueil et de délivrances de visas de certaines
ambassades dans certains pays tiers dont le but est de dissuader les personnes, qui ont l’intention d’émigrer ou non, de
rester chez eux. Dés lors se pose la question de savoir quelles sont les raisons qui ont poussé les autorités européennes
à adopter une telle politique à la fois contradictoire et hétérogène, sévère d’un coté, sélective de l’autre. Et quelle pourrait
être une nouvelle politique en matière de migration en concordance avec la nouvelle politique de voisinage?
L’Europe reste certainement préoccupée par l’évolution générale de la situation économique et sociale. La crainte est
de voir affluer des cohortes de chômeurs vers l’Europe prospère qui attire de plus en plus de migrants. L’on pense
également que la population européenne a atteint son volume optimal et que les capacités d’accueil ne sont plus en
mesure de recevoir plus de migrants, bien que le besoin de main-d’œuvre se fait sentir davantage. L’on pense peut-être
que le déficit démographique déjà existant pourrait être comblé, et tant mieux, par des flux migratoires en provenance des
10 pays nouveaux membres de l’Union. Par conséquent, les frontières devraient rester fermées pour les autres pays
extérieurs. D’autres part, on s’en tient uniquement aux entrées et on oublie souvent les sorties non comptabilisés. Une
proportion non négligeable de migrants retourne dans leur pays d’origine après avoir passé quelques années en Europe.
Ces migrations de courte durée tendent à se développer de plus en plus.
Cela dit, l’Europe reste une puissance économique et industrielle. Sa faible croissance démographique et le manque de
main-d’œuvre pourraient être comblé par un apport démographique des pays tiers notamment ceux de la rive Sud
méditerranéen dont la pression démographique demeure importante. L’équilibre est ainsi réalisé à travers le rajeunisse-
ment relatif de la population européenne en même temps réduit la pression démographique et constitue une aide
économique substantielle pour les tiers concernés. La nouvelle politique de voisinage pourrait y contribuer efficacement
dans ce sens. En gardant un certain optimisme, la machine économique européenne est, loin de s’arrêter, soit au ralenti
ou en vitesse. Les flux migratoires suivent le rythme en conséquence. De même pour les tensions sociales qui suivent, à
leur tour, l’évolution économique. Elles apparaissent avec la crise et disparaissent en période de prospérité.
Politique migratoire et politique de voisinage
Voyons maintenant comment les pays voisins de l’Europe analyse la politique migratoire en relation avec  la nouvelle
politique de voisinage. Tout d’abord, ils pensent que le dernier élargissement à 25 s’est fait au détriment des autres pays
tiers notamment ceux de la rive Sud méditerranéen. Ils ont compris dans la réorganisation de la famille européenne que le
«gâteau» se partage, désormais et uniquement, entre membres de la famille. La politique très restrictive de l’immigration
qui reste appliquée pour les pays tiers voisins constitue de toute évidence une entrave à la libre circulation des personnes.
Ces pays voisins de l’Europe n’admettent pas un partenariat euro- méditerranéen  avec la création des zones de libre
échange ou circulent capitaux et marchandises sans libre circulation des personnes. Que l’Europe se préoccupe seule-
ment de sa sécurité, cherche uniquement son intérêt en considérant ses pays voisins seulement comme un vaste marché
pour l’écoulement de son excédent de production. Que les mesures très sévères de contrôle des migrations sont souvent
liées à la sécurité publique et sous prétexte du terrorisme alors que ce dernier n’a aucune couleur et ne connaît pas de
frontières. Nombreux sont aussi, au Nord comme au Sud qui pensent que la pratique de l’immigration sélective réservée
aux personnes hautement qualifiées et/ou sous couvert de la sécurité publique n’est pas dénuée d’arrières pensées
idéologiques et racistes. Elle répond tout de même aux préoccupations d’une partie de la population européenne qui voit
en l’immigration une invasion et une menace pour leur identité culturelle. La nature humaine est ainsi. Néanmoins, la
moitié de la population européenne reste favorable à l’immigration pour des raisons humanitaires du moins.
Ainsi comme on peut le constater pour le seul point des migrations apparaît des conflits d’intérêt qui ne sont pas sans
conséquence sur les relations entre l’Europe et ses voisins. La politique migratoire ne fonctionne pas bien avec la nouvelle
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politique de voisinage. Cette dernière dont les modalités de mise en œuvre restent encore à définir plus clairement est-t-
elle en mesure d’y remédier en cas de mésentente? Dans tous les cas, elle constitue  un instrument à utiliser de bon sens
pour la préservation des bonnes relations de voisinage.
Immigration et intégration
Le sujet de l’intégration des immigrés est trop médiatisé et utilisé par les politiciens à des fins politiques parfois sans en
mesurer les conséquences. L’intégration des émigrés dans la société d’accueil n’est pas chose facile. Elle exige beaucoup de
temps et d’efforts. L’histoire nous enseigne que l’Europe était  une terre d’émigration et que 50 à 60 millions d’Européens
ont émigré vers les Etats-Unis d’Amérique entre 1800 et 1920. A cette époque, la crainte des Américains était de voir dans
cet afflux massif des Européens un danger pour l’unité nationale et le mode de vie des Américains. Or, il n’en était rien.
L’intégration dans la société américaine de ces millions d’Européens s’est faite, il est vrai, difficilement. Mais elle est faite
avec le temps et ces millions d’Européens ont contribué à la construction de l’Amérique d’aujourd’hui sans constituer un
danger pour l’unité nationale américaine et sans que l’Amérique redevienne européenne. Le besoin de main d’œuvre aux
USA a trouvé sa solution dans la pression démographique de l’Europe à l’époque. Europe et Amérique étaient tous les deux
gagnants. Le problème se pose, aujourd’hui pour l’Europe, presque dans les mêmes termes.  L’Europe craint l’immigration
et se voit menacé dans son identité culturelle surtout par la pression démographique du Sud méditerranéen. Si l’on revient
à l’histoire de l’immigration en Amérique, on peut dire que la crainte des Européens est exagérée. On peut multiplier les
exemples de ces craintes et ces mêmes idées reçues. Il n’y a pas si longtemps, l’intégration des Italiens dans la société
française était dure et difficile, mais elle s’est faite tout de même après l’accomplissement du cycle migratoire, sans danger
pour la société française qui  félicite, aujourd’hui, les émigrés Italiens pour leur intégration réussie. C’était le cas des Polonais,
des Portugais, des pays de l’Est devenus membres de l’Union et qu’on craignait par le passé. Aujourd’hui et demain, ce sera
la même chose pour les nouveaux venus. En ce qui concerne les Maghrébins, la majorité d’entre eux sont parfaitement intégré
et pour les  jeunes issus de l’immigration l’intégration est réussie. Peu sont en retard dans l’accomplissement de leur cycle
migratoire. C’est tout à fait normal qu’une hirondelle ne fait pas le printemps. Et l’on ne voit que le seul train qui est en
retard. Les autres, arrivés à l’heure, quel que soit le point de départ, sont sans aucune importance. Le problème c’est que l’on
ne cherche pas à et l’on ne veut pas comprendre à quoi est dû le retard. On cherchait, à l’époque, une main-d’œuvre docile
et bon marché sans se soucier des problèmes d’éducation et d’intégration. De plus, l’émigré en retard fait partie d’un
ensemble qu’est la société où il vit. S’il est là c’est qu’il a fait le premier pas non suivi, cependant, de celui de la société. Aussi
certaines lois (le vote par exemple) ainsi que d’autres obstacles (discrimination sur le marché de travail) ne favorisent pas à
créer un climat propice à l’intégration; ce qui explique en partie leur retard. Elle se fera de toute manière, cette intégration des
retardataires, plus ou moins  lentement mais certainement. Mis à part ces retardataires, beaucoup ont perdu leur identité si
l’on peut dire ainsi. Par conséquent, l’on ne voit pas la menace sur l’identité culturelle européenne alors que l’Europe est et
restera multiculturelle et l’on se demande aussi pourquoi le problème se pose aujourd’hui alors que l’immigration maghré-
bine date du siècle dernier sans que le problème de culture soit posé ainsi. Hier c’était la menace du communisme.
Aujourd’hui, l’islamisme. Demain qui sait?...
La solution idéale est de laisser travailler le temps en misant beaucoup plus sur l’éducation, favorisant ainsi la tolérance,
l’acceptation et l’ouverture sur l’autre, dans le respect mutuel pour une vie commune riche et harmonieuse.
Eléments pour une stratégie globale
Quelques propositions pouvant aider à atténuer l’intensité du phénomène.
Encourager la fécondité avec tous les moyens possibles bien que l’on doute d’un relèvement significatif. Cette idée reste
cependant celle de ceux qui craignent l’immigration et ses conséquences sociales et culturelles.
L’adéquation formation- emploi pour satisfaire les besoins du marché en spécialistes notamment  dans les technologies
de pointes. Se pose alors le problème de la durée et du coût de la formation. Utiliser les réserves existantes notamment
l’emploi féminin qui est difficile à concilier avec la politique d’encouragement des naissances.
Recours à l’immigration sachant qu’elle ne constitue pas une solution au vieillissement de la population mais permet
néanmoins de contribuer au renouvellement de la population active nécessaire au fonctionnement de la machine économique.
Aide économique accrue et véritable des pays pauvres pour s’attaquer aux causes profondes des migrations sans
s’attendre à des miracles mais permet du moins une certaine stabilisation de la population des pays concernés par les flux
migratoires. L’investissement direct le permettrait encore mieux à travers la création des postes d’emploi fixant la popula-
tion sur place.
Combattre l’immigration illégale par l’immigration légale. En tout état de cause le maintien des frontières fermées
encouragerait toujours les migrants illégaux pour venir gonfler le nombre de ceux déjà sur place.
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Poursuite des négociations avec les pays tiers pour trouver une solution juste et équitable dans l’intérêt de tous.
Les éléments de cette stratégie globale n’auraient vraisemblablement qu’un effet limité. A moins d’une révision de la
politique migratoire  devenue incompatible avec la nouvelle politique de voisinage.
Le meilleur combat reste l’ouverture comme principal régulateur de toutes les conséquences liées à l’évolution actuelle
et future de la population et comme le meilleur instrument de la réalisation des objectifs fixés notamment par la nouvelle
politique de voisinage.
La nouvelle politique migratoire devrait objectivement tenir compte des tendances d’évolution de la population eu-
ropéenne et de voir en le recours à l’immigration comme une nécessité démographique et économique et comme un plus et
non une charge.
Au niveau interne, l’égalité des droits et la citoyenneté pour tous sans discrimination favoriserait considérablement la
cohésion sociale.
Dans cette nouvelle politique de voisinage, préparer les jeunes et les générations futures à construire ensemble leur
monde de demain à travers le développement des échanges avec les pays voisins et sur la base de l’interculturel et le bon
voisinage.
Conclusion
Malgré la faible croissance et le vieillissement accentué de la population, l’Europe juge nécessaire de maintenir fermées
les frontières. La politique migratoire reste très restrictive. L’immigration devient sélective et est réservée uniquement pour
les personnes hautement qualifiées. L’on pense que la population de l’Europe a atteint son volume optimal. Cette politique
très restrictive répond aussi à la crainte des populations européennes qui voient en l’immigration une menace pour leur
identité culturelle. D’ailleurs la sélection des migrants qui s’opère n’est pas neutre. L’aide au développement est conçue
justement pour limiter les flux migratoires en provenance des pays tiers pauvres sans résultats significatifs. L’immigration
clandestine continue toujours même combattue sans trop de succès.
Les négociations se poursuivent entre les différentes parties pour trouver une solution juste et équitable dans l’intérêt
de tout le monde. Les pays tiers n’arrivent pas à concevoir, cependant, un partenariat avec l’Europe ainsi que la création des
zones de libre échange ou circulent capitaux et marchandises sauf les personnes. La nouvelle politique de bon voisinage peut
venir au secours pour une nouvelle approche de la politique migratoire européenne et le recours à l’immigration qu’il faut
voir son rôle comme un complément et non comme un envahissement. Les déséquilibres économiques et démographiques
existants pourraient être ainsi  atténué par la complémentarité entre le Nord et le Sud. Il faudrait voir avec optimisme les
perspectives de l’économie européenne et que les migrations internationales s’inscrivent désormais dans les mouvements
engendrés par la mondialisation.
L’avenir des peuples est dans l’ouverture les uns sur les autres. Leur richesse se trouve justement dans leur différence et
diversité culturelle. Une nouvelle Europe prospère, des droits de l’Homme, de bon voisinage est à ce prix.
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Liudmila KUDRINA
Over the past 15 years, the number of people crossing borders in search of a better life has been rising steadily. The
current global estimate of international migrants is 175 million, some 3% of the world population, and the number is
increasing. “At the start of the 21st Century, one in every 35 people is an international migrant. If they all lived in the
same place, it would be the world’s fifth-largest country”.1
As the global debate surrounding migration issues grows, it ought to be reminded that from the Stone Age onwards,
people have migrated all over the world. Mobility of persons occurs through choice or necessity. People migrate,
temporarily or permanently, to receive education and training, to perform services, to find employment, to flee life-
threatening situations or to provide themselves and their children with hope and opportunity. People have always fled
from hunger, war and persecution. They have also been driven away, captured and shipped against their will. Many
more, however, have moved simply because they thought and hoped that life would be a little bit better elsewhere.
Whether in search of land, peace, prosperity, easier farming or just to see what is over the next hill, movement of
people is a simple fact of human history. Global migration nowadays affects every country – they are all either places
of origin, transit or destination for migrants. The movement of people across borders is essential in today’s globalised
world. International business depends heavily on an international labour force, and the ability of people to move around
the world with ease. Most developed countries face declining birth rates and ageing populations, which can be mitigated
by migration. Remittances earned abroad are the principal support to the economies of many developing countries.
But much of migration today is unregulated. There are not enough legal channels open for those who want to migrate
and whose labour may be needed. Criminal smuggling and trafficking networks are matching up the supply of labour
with the demand, mostly in the informal economy. As a result, border controls are evaded, with exploitation and security
risks for the individuals and societies involved.
Xenophobia and racism flourish to the detriment of host communities and migrants, particularly when governments
are perceived to have lost control of the migration situation. Case in point here is Mr Le Pen’s success two years ago that
showed that “if the mainstream political parties fail to deal with domestic issues, there are other plenty of extreme
groups ready to pick them up.”2
There is no easy solution to these sensitive problems. The issue of migration is high on the political agenda for
European governments and has already become the issue of various political speculations. Many European countries
find themselves under pressure to restrict the entry of migrants. “But now migration experts are warning that Europe is
missing the point - with the reality of the continent’s migrant needs clouded by misinformation and fear.”3
Yet, it has been historically proved that when managed effectively migration holds great potential for migrants and for
host communities. The ultimate goal is not to obstruct or prevent mobility but to better manage it for the benefit of all.
Immigration is a hotly debated issue in Europe. It is a well-known fact that when a hot debate is underway some
essential facts could be lost under a wave of misinformation. Mass media often distracts us from the key points of certain
issues. Catchy headlines and figures that turn out to be so elusive and misleading shape our opinion. In order not to be
easily manipulated into someone’s political game one should try to separate myth from reality. That is no easy task.
Each and every day common Europeans are showered with tones of additional information that so far has little or
sometimes no relevance to the matter at all. The purpose of this paper is to see whether illegal immigration from the
Muslim countries presents a real threat to the European societies? Whether the alarmist tendency that tend to prevail in
public mind as far as this issue is concerned is adequate to the challenge Europe faces nowadays? Whether unregulated
movement of people presents a challenge at all?
There are no easy answers to these questions as well as no hasty decisions could be taken to handle the situation.
The South-West migration flows had become overwhelming by the last decade of the twentieth century. At least half
a million people are believed to enter the EU illegally every year. There are no clear figures. Illegal immigration can be
hardly controlled because of the EU’s extensive borders and coastline.
It was Tony Blair who pointed out that Europe is to tackle at present what is considered to be “one of the most
pressing issues of our time, which is the issue of immigration and asylum”.4 More than ever before, people are
1 Special edition, As part of BBC series on global migration, www.bbc.com
2 Mason B., The rise of the European right, 2002/04/22, www.bbc.com
3 Mulvey S., EU values - united in diversity? 2004/03/05, www.bbc.com
4 Tony Blair, EU signals asylum action, 2002/05/21, www.bbc.com
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crossing borders and embarking on what are sometimes long and dangerous journeys in search of a better life. Asia, Africa
and finally Europe - these are stepping stones to a better life, landmarks along the journey of any migrant family. On their
way to Europe each of them has there own share of perils and joys that go on with economic migration.
 According to the UN official terminology “economic migrants are those who leave behind their country of origin in
order to improve their quality of life. The term is often used to refer to those attempting to enter a country without legal
permission and/or those who asylum procedures without bona fide cause.5 These people are not refugees. Migrants,
especially economic migrants, choose to move in order to improve the future prospects of themselves and their families,
while refugees have to move if they are to save their lives or preserve their freedom. There is no such thing as an
“environmental refugee” or an “economic refugee” perhaps that’s what makes the situation for an economic migrant even
worse. They are not protected by the international law (as refugees or asylum seekers are) yet many of them claim a
sanctuary to which they are not entitled. Usually they are not welcomed in the countries of their destination, as they are
largely ill-educated workers, often they have no means or desire to return home and restart the miserable life once left
behind.
The EU countries have been trying to curb the demographic wave coming to Europe from the South Mediterranean
and other regions with the use of traditional methods: restrictive immigration policies and providing for strengthening of
economic and political reforms in the South Mediterranean countries to improve living standards, to decrease unemploy-
ment and thus lessen the push factors. First turn out to be inefficient from the very beginning. The results of the second
one (at least in a short-time perspective) are no more encouraging.
 Speaking about economic migration one has to keep in mind that this process is unstoppable. “The movement of
people from poor and failing states to rich and stable ones is as inevitable as water running downhill.”6 The sad truth
about illegal immigration is whatever EU actions are taken to stop the process, however sophisticated are the border
controls or coast guard systems nothing can hamper the desire of people to fled from hunger, misery and dispair.
Moreover the more barriers are put on the way of illegal immigration the more illegal gaps are found in the “fortress”
Europe. As practice proves it a ban alone can turn out to be counterproductive.
In this respect the situation in the Mediterranean region provides a kind of a graphic example. This region is
responsible for a considerable proportion of the European Community’s immigrants. The differences between the north
and the south banks of the Mediterranean are increasing, creating potential serious regional instabilities. “With a high
population growth (more than 2% per annum, which implies a doubling over around 30 years) it was calculated that the
countries of the region may have a population over 400 million by 2035, and that the wealth gap would undoubtedly
grow, meaning that migratory flows are not about to dry up.”7
“I wanted to have my own house and give my children the good start in life I never had. Going to Europe seemed to
be the best way to achieve these goals. Many of my friends had emigrated - I felt I was being left behind.”8
These words prove a simple fact that you may ban whatever you wish still you can not prevent certain things from
happening - Europe will always be for immigrants a land of hope that is open and confident.
When European governments tackle the problem of illegal immigration they have to resolve a number of other issues
that go hand in hand with illegal immigration. There is a growing belief that illegal immigration is accompanied by
terrorism, drug-trafficking and organised crime. One reason the EU is so concerned is the involvement of organised crime.
Here we are about to look into the ugliest side to the landscape. Taking advantage of persons seeking a better life,
smuggling and trafficking networks have taken hold across the EU. This situation means that considerable resources are
to be mobilised to fight illegal migration especially to target traffickers and smugglers. These are the people that are
personally interested in the large-scale unregulated movement of people in the region. Actually illegal immigration is their
daily bred. Smuggling illegal immigrants into Europe has become a profitable but dangerous business. In fact, trafficking
in people is the world’s fastest growing criminal business and “preventing and combating trafficking in human beings -
a global challenge for the 21st century”.9
A high degree of organised-crime-involvement and a wide range of illegal operations in various states as countries of
5 Migration glossary, 2004/03/17, www.bbc.com
6 Alagiah G., Migration: ‘A force of history’ , 2004/03/24, www.bbc.com
7 Dubois G., The EU and the Mediterranean: Where are we today? Europe-The Mediterranean-Russia: perception of
strategies, Moscow, 1998, p. 15
8 Mamadou Saliou Diallo, immigrant, Billy’s journey: Crossing the Sahara, 2004/03/22, www.bbc.com
9 EU action against trafficking in human beings and the sexual exploitation of children, www.europa.eu.int
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origin, transit or destination of trafficked victims are characteristics of human trafficking. Falling frontiers between the
European Union Member States are bringing many benefits, but they are also making it easier for criminal organisations
to be active across Europe. “Whereas the scourge of organised crime is not new, criminals have been taking advantage
of fast moving technological advances such as the Internet, overall globalisation and, as far as the European Union is
concerned, the freedom of circulation and establishment the single market entails”.10 The effectiveness of classical
instruments and national level responses has diminished against the background of highly sophisticated criminal
groups acting strategically at international level. A variety of measures are required, including preventive measures,
adequate protection of and assistance to the victims, criminalisation of sexual violence in all its forms, as well as
measures to ensure law-enforcement and judicial cooperation. The challenge is therefore both local and global.
The EU leaders have already announced the state of alarm.
“It is astonishing that, while we teach our children in school about slavery in former times, these modern forms of
slavery are flourishing here in the European Union.”11
Tony Blair said human trafficking was often underpinned by organised crime, “by people operating in circumstan-
ces that are totally outside the boundaries of the law”.12 The similar concern was expressed by Jose Maria Aznar who
emphasised that the EU leaders must be unwavering in their battle to eliminate mafias that deal in human traffic.
“Europol says gangs are making as much from human trafficking as they are from drug smuggling.”13 One of the most
challenging issues is border controls. In spite of numerous projects both on the national and the European level the
question of how to patrol EU vast borders effectively remains as difficult as ever. “It is estimated that some 400,000
people a year enter the EU illegally.”14 Reliable figures on the scale of people smuggling are hard to come by. Yet
behind the official figures there is always a human tragedy. Frequently a journey to a distant European land turns into
drama full of lies and deception.
Before expanding on the issue one should trace a distinct line between a human trafficker and a smuggler. The UN
defines human trafficking as: “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”15 This exploitation can take different forms,
including: prostitution or other kinds of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, the removal of organs. Victims of trafficking have either never consented to the trafficking or their initial
consent has been rendered meaningless by the coercive, deceptive or abusive actions of the traffickers. The smuggling
of migrants is officially defined as “the procurement in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other
material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state of which the person is not a national or permanent
resident.”16 It differs from human trafficking in that it involves the consent of the migrants involved and ends with the
arrival of the migrants at their destination. Actually there is a world of difference between the two above-mentioned
groups, though in reality the line between them is rather vague.
Smugglers can collect thousands of dollars per person to bring would-be immigrants to Western Europe from Asia,
Eastern Europe and North Africa. Some pay smugglers up to $2,000 to make this illegal, always expensive and
perilous journey. Often immigrants spend thousands of dollars to be smuggled into the EU only to be conned and
dumped elsewhere. Usually immigrants know nothing about the hardships they are to endure. Only the journey itself
opens their eyes to the true dangers of the overland trip. Statistics show that for many of those started on the trip it
never ends successfully. As immigration controls in Western countries become stricter, illegal immigrants resort to
increasingly desperate methods to reach their “promised land”, and every year, an unknown number of people,
probably in the tens of thousands, die in the attempt.
With a good wind behind you, it only takes 18 minutes to cross the Straits of Gibraltar on a sailboard. With Europe
so close, perhaps it is not surprising that so many illegal immigrants from Morocco, other parts of Africa and beyond,
10 A common EU approach to the fight against organised transnational crime, www.europa.eu.int
11 Dan Eliasson, Swedish Justice Ministry, EU seeks common asylum policy, www.bbc.com
12 EU signals asylum action, 2002/05/21, www.bbc.com
13 Hagler T., Trafficking: A human tragedy, 2002/02/17, www.bbc.com
14 ibid, www.bbc.com
15 Migration glossary, 2004/03/17, www.bbc.com
16 ibid, www.bbc.com
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are tempted to try their luck with a night ride on the rickety boats known as pateras. The risks are high. The Straits are
notorious for their vicious currents and they are congested with shipping - the skipper of a big ferry or ocean liner can easily
run down a little boat without even noticing it. That is why this narrow stretch of water is rapidly becoming “a graveyard”
for thousands of immigrants. “Eric Shaw, a marine biologist based in Gibraltar, spends every day in the straits monitoring
the dolphin population. He has lost count of the number of bodies he has seen floating in the sea or washed up on the
coast.”17 Usually these bodies remain unidentified, as illegal immigrants often have no documents or identity papers with
them, so that if caught by police they won’t be immediately send back to the countries of their origin.
The absence of documents is an ordinary story. As the Spanish Civil Guard Captain Jose Manuel Rebollo explains this:
“By some miracle the papers always get lost on the journey so we are dealing with people who have no country and no
name. Where can we send them back to?”18That is a usual practice.
Speaking about immigration routes one can single out certain favourite ones - via boat from Albania, Tunisia or Morocco
into southern Europe; from Sarajevo airport via Croatia and Slovenia into Italy and Austria or overland starting from
Istanbul and often ending up in Germany.
With a 4,720-mile (7,600-kilometre) coastline Italy is a popular target for asylum seekers, many of whom use it as a
gateway to Europe. Thousands of illegal immigrants try to enter Italy each month. Smugglers then help them make their
way to the Italian coast - which is difficult to police - and on through the rest of Europe in lorries or trains.
But the main issue of concern remains the Balkan states. The situation here is far more alarming. “The region is the
starting point of one of the main transit routes for illegal immigration to Western Europe and gangs operating along it are
believed responsible for smuggling up to 50,000 people a year.”19 According to the International Organisation for Migration
(IOM) the Balkans have turned into the main gateway for illegal migrants into Western Europe. Illegal immigrants from the
Middle East, Africa and Asia make their way to countries like Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina where immigration
controls are lax. The IOM estimates that more than 5,000 people pass through Bosnia Herzegovina every month.20
This was caused primarily by the series of wars in the Balkans that are responsible for the current unstable situation in
this part of Europe. Now that the former Yugoslavia is more or less at peace, the European Union is concerned to ensure
that the Western Balkans, so long prey to ethnic conflict, do not become captive to organised criminal structures.
EU foreign ministers agreed that urgent priority should be given to combating human trafficking, most of which appears
to be co-ordinated from the region. European leaders have already agreed on certain joint actions to stem the flow of illegal
immigrants from the former Yugoslavia. Such actions involve sending teams of immigration staff and police officers to the
Balkans (precisely deploying more police and immigration officers in Bosnia as a joint initiative to step up border checks),
offering some extra funds or introduction of a “voluntary repatriation” scheme, encouraging people who had made the
journey just to seek a better life to return home. The EU also expects more practical co-operation, both from countries in
the region that want to put bilateral relations on a new footing - such as Albania, Yugoslavia and Bosnia - and from regions
that rely on Western aid, such as Montenegro and Kosovo.
The issue of an even greater concern is Albanian Mafia that is said to be taking control of organised crime on both sides
of the Adriatic. Sporadic clashes between Italian policemen and Albanian gangsters are reported to take place in a chase and
collision in the Adriatic. One of Italy’s top prosecutors, Cataldo Motta, who has identified Albania’s most dangerous
mobsters, says they are a threat to Western society. “Albanian organised crime has become a point of reference for all
criminal activity today, everything passes via the Albanians. The road for drugs and arms and people, meaning illegal
immigrants destined for Europe, is in Albanian hands.”21
But there is another, less dangerous route for migrants. To be on the safe side and half way in Europe immigrants do not
have to be exposed to the threat to be drowned in the sea or suffocated in an abandoned lorry somewhere on a deserted
European road. Ceuta and Melilla are the unlocked doors into Fortress Europe. These two small Spanish enclaves on the
north coast of Morocco are the last fragments in Africa of a once-mighty empire ruled from Madrid. If the immigrants can
somehow get in here - it is the same as being in mainland Europe.
So many immigrants have arrived in Ceuta over the past few years that the Spanish government was forced to provide
a temporary shelter for them at a former campsite. Most of the inmates are young men from Sub-Saharan Africa, but there
are now people from 24 different countries at the camp including Algeria and Iraq. “At first there were just a few hundred,
17 Ash L., Europe’s front line, Marine biologist Eric Shaw and Julian Pettifer on the Straits of Gibraltar, 1999/10/21,
www.bbc.com
18 ibid, www.bbc.com
19 Crackdown on human traffickers, 2001/02/04, www.bbc.com
20 Doole C., Balkans main immigrant route, 2001/04/16, www.bbc.com
21 Barron B., Albanian mafia steps up people smuggling second special report from the southern Adriatic, www.bbc.com
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but now the camp houses more than 2,000 people”22 and more and more people arrive every week. Even children have
turned up here, some in their mothers’ arms and others completely alone, carrying only nametags around their necks. All of
them need food and shelter and the site is hopelessly overcrowded. Every day fights break out in the queues for water, there
are long queues for food but for many it’s worth it for the chance of EU citizenship.
Actually the potential rewards are great. Most of these migrants stay in Ceuta for two to five months. Then they are
given temporary work and residents’ permits and transferred to the mainland. After a year in Spain they can usually stay
on legally. Many end up with Spanish citizenship and they then have the right to move anywhere within the European
Union.
Under some pressure from other EU members, the Spanish authorities say they are doing their best to stop illegal
immigrants from getting into Ceuta. The eight and a half kilometre double security fence which separates the enclave from
Morocco, is now being fitted with razor wire, infra red cameras and heat sensors. But if the migrants do manage to get in,
it is virtually impossible to send them back.
Ceuta and Melilla have been European territories for 500 years and Madrid insists that they will forever remain so.
Colonial insignia still decorate the pavements of Ceuta. But at present Morocco is actively seeking the return of the enclaves
and Spain may have to hand them over - sooner rather than later - if the flood of migrants cannot be stopped.
Speaking about human trafficking and smuggling of people one should take a more detailed look on one more alarming
issue – child abuse.
The latest pawns of the people smugglers are children. The EU is overwhelmingly concerned with far greater numbers
of illegal immigrants in the years ahead. Local authorities will not order the enforced repatriation of anyone under 18 and the
gangsters are aware of this. This is one of the key factors (along with the fact that kids may be easily led astray and involved
in prostitution or forced labour) that makes children smuggling an extremely profitable business that provides the most
lucrative commodities to criminal gangs.
In search of better lives children leave their homes and their parents too. While some clearly move on willingly mostly
children are consigned to smugglers’ boats by their families who send them to Europe with orders to somehow find work
or make money to send home. Thus, the kids are under pressure from their parents not to mention the stress that comes
from the voyage itself, which is getting more and more dangerous. They travel hundreds of miles under horrific conditions.
Unfortunately the greater part of them stand no chance to find any normal job and start earning their living. These kids
often fell pray to human traffickers.  Belgium’s leading child protection agency has warned that hundreds of child migrants
and asylum seekers coming to the EU without their parents are going missing. Local child protection agencies have been
working to track down missing teenagers lured or abducted from reception centres by traffickers. An alarming number could
be falling into the hands of traffickers and prostitution rings. In some cases they have been forced to work off a debt by those
who brought them to the EU.
In the town of Alst, outside Brussels, a special centre has been set up to accommodate some of these children. “Appeals
for information have now been issued to trace nearly 400 young migrants and asylum seekers who came to Belgium without
their parents and are now missing.”23 But this is not just a Belgian problem, at the very least it will take a team effort across
the European Union to beat the criminals who prey on these young lives. Evidently there is an urgent need for more such
centres to be founded throughout Europe as a great number of children are disappearing every year, and they are in a very
vulnerable situation. They are in a country they don’t know - they don’t speak the language, they have no money, no friends
or families to turn to when they are in difficulties. So, to put it mildly, the prospects for their brighter future are rather
gloomy.
The EU ministers discuss ways of cracking down on human trafficking of women and children for sexual and other
exploitation.
“It is appalling that in the Europe of the 21st century such barbaric practices are still widespread - even increasing.
Because of their very nature these problems recognise no national boundaries. They infect the whole of Europe, and
only a European solution can effectively combat them”24.
22 Ash L., Europe’s front line, Marine biologist Eric Shaw and Julian Pettifer on the Straits of Gibraltar, 1999/10/21,
www.bbc.com
23 Blunt E., Europe under fire over immigrants: immigration is a controversial issue in Europe, 2001/01/30, www.bbc.com
24 Antonio Vitorino, Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner , Commission proposes action to combat trafficking in
human beings and sexual exploitation of children, Brussels, 2000/12/21, www.europa.eu.int
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However the highly complex network of criminal gangs operating across Europe has significally reduced the efficiency
of these initiatives as well as the work of special agencies. Head of the anti-trafficking unit of the Belgian Police Wim
Bontinck explained: “If you take out one ring there will be a few colleagues to replace them tomorrow. One member of a ring
today will be leader of another ring tomorrow. It is not as simple as the normal mafiosi structure where if you get the top
guy in the hierarchy the whole structure collapses.”25 The acuteness of this problem does not diminish and better protection
for these vulnerable youngsters is needed.
The main challenge is the lack of common EU policy towards people smugglers. The effectiveness of classical instru-
ments and national level responses has diminished against the background of highly sophisticated criminal groups acting
strategically at international level. A major issue is how to make sure that the external borders of Europe are made more
secure against the illegal trafficking of people. European politics have already named human trafficking a real disaster on the
European scale. Officials are reported to favour a Europe-wide sentence for traffickers. Sentences of up to 14 years for
criminals profiting from the world’s fastest growing illegal trade could be introduced as part of the crackdown.26 Yet
smuggling penalties vary in different European countries. For instance, in Britain which suffer heavily from organised
people smuggling they currently face a 10-year sentence, less in many other EU countries. Co-ordinated european actions
are mainly hampered by the fact that interests of many are involved in this dirty business. “Europe faces the biggest
problem because there’s so much money being made which was not the case before. It has become the main source of money
for organised crime.”27 The sheer numbers helped increase the backlogs, slow down the system, and thereby nourish the
smuggling business. So, it is hard to imagine how Europe can fight this kind of well-shaped international organisation.
However alarming the situation might be on the EU borders still more problems arise within the EU confines. Mass
influx of immigrants particularly from the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean region to the EU brought about the
problems of a different nature.
“I just wish someone would come down here and explain what’s going on, why they’re all here. I tried to speak in a
council meeting and I was told to sit down and shut up. They just keep saying there isn’t a problem, that the numbers have
been reduced – but there’s still a lot”.28
Up to now the Member States have primarily worried about the strengthening of the “European fortress” walls rather
than about the fate of those who had already penetrated inside. Meanwhile the appearance of “immigration nation” in the
EU countries has been influencing their life and has already led to the process of their transformation into “cultural
pluralistic” societies. “The unstoppable migration pressure and the way immigrants insert in the European environment
thus transforming it through changes in demographic composition into “culturally pluralistic” societies are the clear
evidence of a blending of civilisations”.29 The West is already quite ‘Islamic’, because there are millions of Muslims living
in so-called Western countries, and Muslim cultural and intellectual influences are found throughout European culture.
Though the vast majority of them live happily beside their neighbours, submit readily to the laws of the land, work hard,
hold strict family values and commit no crimes, their presence is becoming more and more frequently identified with a
“threat” and associated with the rise of organised crime, terrorism and drug trafficking. The growing belief that crime as a
virtual monopoly of the ethnic minorities, whether from North or West Africa or Eastern Europe breeds religious and ethnic
intolerance, racism and xenophobia, sometimes made even worse by racist politicians. Public concern about European
immigration has found unprecedented expression in the ballot box, propelling right and far-right parties to success in
country after country.
With the September 11th attacks executed if not planned by western-based Muslims the public debate concerning the
issue reached its climax. “That several of the perpetrators of the attacks on the twin towers had apparently lived for years
in western countries raised further worries about the enclosed societies that seem to exist within the West, societies in which
hate could be preached and treachery plotted while all around non-Muslims remained utterly unaware”.30 After 11th
25 Doole C., Balkans main immigrant route, www.bbc.com
26 Crackdown on human traffickers, 2001/02/04, www.bbc.com
27 Barron B., Albanian mafia steps up people smuggling Second special report from the southern Adriatic, 2001/ 05/17,
www.bbc.com
28 Marie Hart, 85, ex-councillor, Special edition, As part of BBC series on global migration, www.bbc.com
29 Olga Yu. Potemkina, From the Barcelona Declaration to the Amsterdam Treaty: changing of the EU Immigration
Policy, Europe-The Mediterranean-Russia: perception of strategies, Moscow, 1998, p. 165
30 Dim drums throbbing in the hills half heard, Special report, Muslims in the Western Europe, The Economist, August 10th
2002, p. 21
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September, living abroad has become quite unbearable for the Muslims. Most of the Westerners have equalised Islam with
terror, violence and disorder:
“Until 9/11, I was indifferent about Islam. After 9/11, I started looking into it more. As a result, I became opposed
to Islam”.31
 “Islam is a religion that is anti-progressive. It also preaches hatred against people of other beliefs. The Islamic
belief is anti-democratic and anti-establishment”.32
Unfortunately this tendency within the western societies is still on the rise.
Part of the problem lies with the slant of the western media. Deliberately or not the media constantly portray
Islam in a negative manner thus fuelling ignorance and hatred within Western society. “Islam’s image in the eyes of
mainstream Western media has been associated with turbans, veils, terrorism and violence. While not denying some
genuine evils of various kinds involving Islamism or in the name of Islam, they represent only part of the truth”.33 The
fact is that we never get to see the other side of the coin. As a result ignorance breeds misunderstandings and creates
unfounded fears and barriers, which lead to racism and xenophobia.
Whether Muslims like it or not, the face of Islam to the world at present is one of violence despite their
protestations to the contrary. Recently too many horrors have been committed in the name of Islam. Given this fact
it comes as no surprise that people came to associate Islam with terrorism and they easily confuse such words as
Islamism and Islam. It will take years now and would require the larger Muslim community efforts to eradicate this
pervasive violent image of Islam and “to wrest it back from the fanatical mullahs who have hijacked Islam for the past
several centuries”.34
Yet the spread of radical Islam is not a kind of a phantom that haunts the Europe through mass media channels.
Islamism has already become its everyday reality.
 “Religious re-awakening, often in the form of fundamental revivalism, is a major phenomenon in the world today,
especially in the Islamic regions.”35 The cultural image of Islamism has been seen as violent, backward, insular, anti-
secular and anti-modern. It is expanding dramatically and is portrayed as a new post-Cold War threat to the West. Yet
for many people in the Middle East and in other parts of the world Islamism is ideally suited not only as a spiritual
alternative against Western materialism and consumerism but also as an outlet for protest against corruption, repres-
sion and injustice. Moreover it provides disaffected and dispossessed people with a new identity and new meaning
in life. “Islamic fundamentalist movements are seen as the form of resistance, opposed to the global spread of Western
values, culture conspicuous consumption”.36 The 9.11 attacks are believed to be its most violent manifestation, a kind
of a fundamental clash between the democratic West and the Islamic cultural system.
 The European Community has always been gravely concerned with the surge of radical Islamic fundamentalism
and the threat it poses to the stability of the Mediterranean. “In fact, rightly or wrongly, Europe (as part of the West)
is seen, by opposition groups, especially Islamists, as an instrument of global power and oppression in the disguise
of universal values and is believed to support the regimes these same groups are strenuously fighting against”.37 That
is why the emergence of extremist and fundamental forces in a number of North African States seriously alarmed
Europe.
Yet the subject of even greater concern is the fact that nowadays “the threat of Islamism to the EU is felt even more
from within the European societies than from without”.38 The case in point here is a notorious story of Kamel Daudi,
who was brought to France from Algeria by his parents at the age of five and by all means represented the image of
31 Graeme Phillips, Berlin, Germany, BBC Forum Does the West understand Islam enough?
32 Efoe Livingstone, England, The second BBC Forum on ‘Islam and the West’ by Paul Reynolds
33 Xing Li, Dichotomies and Paradoxes: the West and Islam, Global Society, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2002, p. 413
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35 Xing Li, Dichotomies and Paradoxes: the West and Islam, Global Society, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2002, p. 417
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a successful integration. Finally, in 2001 he was granted French citizenship. Paradoxically enough this happened
right at the moment when Kamel was in one of the Islamist’s training camps somewhere in Afghanistan.39  This one and
many other similar stories made European and national authorities consider more carefully the issue of Muslim integra-
tion into the western societies.
Like the other migrants, Muslims tend to come from the poor, rural areas. Mostly they are ill-educated, they speak
the language of the wider society either poorly or not at all, so they find it difficult to get jobs, they huddle in poor
districts and have gloomy prospects for future. “For all these reasons they tend to withdraw into their own world, which
is relatively easy, since their numbers are great enough to enable them to form a fairly self-sufficient, self-contained
community”.40 Left to their own devices certain local ethnic and religious communes have been slowly turning into a kind
of “ghettos”, hardly controlled by the police and avoided by local citizens even in daylight. Strictly speaking it is no
wonder that in many so-called “ghettos” Sharia Law tends to prevail over the laws of a host country.
It is an open secret that Muslim minorities perpetuate strong links with their homeland and naturally try to introduce
Islamic values and way of life on the European land. Moreover, some brought their feudalism with them and also the
loyalty to the clan associated with it. This means that today an extended family of up to 500 people may vote as one.
Another factor is arranged and occasionally forced marriages that help to constitute the “parallel society”.
Though numerous efforts with respect to their integration have been made both on European and national level they
could not hamper the process of further “encapsulation” of Muslim community. Perhaps, this “state in the state”
structure is the most alarming tendency as many believe it threats to undermine the national sovereignty of the European
states. One more problem presents the demographic shift towards an unintegrated and increasingly vocal Muslim
minority.
Various special programmes and projects designed to facilitate successful minority’s integration have already been
launched by local authorities. The challenge is that they’ve got to compete now with a network of Muslim welfare
organisations and Islamic cultural centres that exist in Europe and the mosques in which Europe’s Muslims worship.
The only difference is that these organisations have other aims. Nothing perpetuates homeland links as worryingly as
they do. This does not necessarily means that they preach violence there but they are likely to teach that integration into
western societies is a treason under Islam.41
It ought to be pointed out that many Islamic organisations perform vital tasks neglected by the others.
“We do the grass-root job the government can’t…”42
Obviously if politicians fail to deal with domestic issues and provide viable solutions to acute problems, there are
plenty of other organisations and various extreme groups ready to pick them up. Perhaps, that is where Islamism
managed to elbow its way.
Surely the true key to success hardly lies within the radical dogmas of Islamism. Actually only a few are aware of
them, others are seduced by more down-to-earth things. The popularity of Islamists could be explained by their heavy
on grass roots organisation. Their parties are in close touch with the neighbourhood and are closely attuned to local
interests. Many Islamist parties run local social welfare programmes independently of governments and provide social
services such as clinics, especially for women, housing for students who have come from the village to the big city,
recreation facilities for the youth, legal advice, educational help and other forms of social assistance. “These activities –
often far more responsive than the state to social needs in the neighbourhood – are generally funded from religious
donations or from large Islamist-run banks and business. As a result Islamists prove to be closer to the needs of poorer
neighbourhoods than their political rivals”.43 The strength of Islamism is shaped not only by its Islamic discourses and
rhetoric, but also by its social components and political programmes.
Among the majority of European immigrants disaffected young European Muslims are believed to be most vulnera-
ble to Islamist certainties. “If ten years ago young people coming from Islamic countries hardly put any emphasis on
their Muslim origins, today their reference to Islam is omnipresent”.44 Islamist dogmas easily seduce them. Which is
39 Pelletier E., Pontaut J-M., Les islamistes indesirables, L’Express, 1/8/2002, p. 12
40 Europe’s Muslims, The Economist, August 10th 2002, p. 11
41 Dim drums throbbing in the hills half heard, Special report, Muslims in the Western Europe, The Economist, August
10th 2002, p. 22
42 An official of the Muslim Welfare House, Paris, The war of the headscarves, Special report, from the Economist print
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relatively easy due to their poor knowledge of Islam.
A fundamental problem with the teaching of Islam is that the Koran is written in ancient Arabic and is often learnt
parrot fashion in the same language, with no translation or historical context given. Practitioners as well non-practitio-
ners sometimes confuse ancestral culture with religion or unquestionably recite texts from the Koran without knowing
what it means.
Still one should clearly realise that to a larger extent Muslim cultural and welfare organisations do work properly.
Most do good work, organising programmes for women about health care or child welfare. They win prises for their anti-
drug activities. What’s more important they are much closer to the needs of the Muslim community as they are run by
those living in the community. What makes European authorities uneasy about them is the fact that what is taught by
their imams, both in the mosque and in the madrassa that is generally attached, is often unknown to outsiders.
In this respect national governments admit they should give priority to the financial part of the problem. Europe’s
imams are usually sent and paid for by the governments of Muslim countries. Secular Turkey sends imams and provides
Islamic lessons for children in Germany. Morocco and Algeria do the same in France.
Imams spring up spontaneously, sometimes out of nowhere, supported by some devotees and financed usually from
North Africa, the Middle East or Asia. Taking into consideration this fact it is not surprising that fundamentalist imams
are not rare in the Muslim religious quarters in Europe. Still a fear of extremism is not confined to non-Muslims only.
Muslim imams also express their fear of fundamentalists. Like many others they believe it essential that imams should
be trained in Europe, not in the Middle East, the Maghreb, Pakistan or Turkey.
“Muslims must become immunised against outside radicalisation”.45
The national government is expected to take certain actions to make sure the financial flows whether from inside
Europe or from abroad do not serve to nourish radicalism or harbour would-be terrorists in the Muslim religious centres
throughout Europe. More emphasis should be given to training of European imams, whose lack of knowledge frequently
stems from the lack of public and state control with regard to the issue. Otherwise how can it be possibly explained that
“70% of imams in France are self-proclaimed”? 46
Of course comprehensive Europe-wide measures might have proved to be far more beneficial. A partial communita-
rization of the third pillar (asylum and immigration policy, joint rules for checks at external borders and minorities’
integration) was proposed again and again as an instrument for improving the situation. But the differences in the
Member States positions over the issues which could be gradually communitarized were so significant and their fears of
losing the sovereignty in elaborating the immigration policy, for instance, were so strong that they have developed into
a serious obstacle in the way of cooperation.
 It seems incredible that the decisions regulating the rules of the new minorities’ insertion, very sensitive and tightly
linked to nationalism and nationalistic movements might be taken at the level of Community. Here are the words of a
senior Brussel-based diplomat, which explain why the debates concerning the issue are estimated as one of most
arduous. “Third pillar issues touch upon the core of statehood. If you fight for majority voting on this, you battle against
the whole weight of tradition and historical habit”.47
It highly doubtful that the Member States will harmonise the immigration policy with regard to the legal resident
immigrant’s integration or so-called “new ethnic groups” or new minorities” in the nearest future. Moreover Europe-
wide harmonisation of the integration process is frequently considered as rather utopian if not unnecessary. Historically
every European country has worked out its own national approach towards minorities’ insertion. Interfering within this
delicate sphere would hinder rather than facilitate the process.
“We do not intend to decide by directive the numbers of immigrants that our economies and societies are prepared to
absorb... Only member states, together with their civil societies and local authorities, know how much their societies are
capable of integrating.” 48
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So, rightly or wrongly, up to the present moment every European State choose its own way to deal with illegal
immigration or integration of immigrants into their society.
Concluding remarks
As is known a series of events - from the worldwide Islamic revival of the 1970s to the 11 September 2001 attacks
against America - has fuelled the fear that Islam and the West are on a collision course.
“There’s no getting away from it. Islam and the West view one another with mistrust and suspicion.”49
The outbreak of “islamophobia” led to debates whether Islam is compatible with modernity at all. Yet there are
millions of Muslims all over the world living in the most modern cities and working in technological fields. Obviously,
these Muslims have found a way to reconcile their faith with modernity. Clearly illegal immigration remains a
problem. Cultural differences cannot always be easily reconciled. But according to many experts the rise of the far
right rests upon a fundamental paradox: immigration, far from destroying European societies, could ultimately be
their saviour. 50
The main point here is that European populations are ageing. Birth rates in European countries are falling.
Substantial levels of immigration will be required in order to maintain the population levels of most developed
countries over the next 50 years, according to a new United Nations report. It finds that in Japan and virtually all
European countries populations will decline, whilst the average person will get older.
For instance, Italy is expected to register the largest decline, losing more than a quarter of its population, whilst
the average Italian will be 53 years old in 2050, compared to only 41 years of age now.51
The only way for such countries to maintain their populations, the report suggests, will be to take in substantial
numbers of immigrants. The prognosis made by the European Commission shows that the West European popula-
tion will have decreased from 320 million in 1990 to 270 by 2025 while that of the Northern Africa will grow
respectively from 200 million to 370.52
Not only will the overall level of the population in most rich countries fall but so will the ratio between those of
working age and those expecting to retire. The UN says that without immigration, richer countries might have to
consider increasing the upper working limit to 75 years of age in order to maintain their present levels of pension and
welfare support.53
“An ageing and shrinking population needs goods and services and somebody has to produce the goods and has
to provide the services”.54
Clearly immigrants form an important part of the labour force in many of the world’s most industrialised
countries. While many countries are trying to limit the number of asylum seekers permanently settled on their shores,
they are simultaneously trying to increase the number of people with specific skills and high levels of education
whom they want to encourage to move there.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) there is a renewed interest
in the recruitment of new immigrant workers in these countries, partly explained by their ageing populations. Many
industrialised countries are seeking to attract highly-skilled foreign workers.
Rich countries are increasingly competing to recruit highly skilled immigrants to meet labour shortages in key
industries like IT.
According to Professor John Salt of University College London’s Migration Research Unit, competition between
countries over attracting skilled migrants has become more intense.55 Shortage of key public sector professionals has
led to an explosion in the recruitment of doctors, nurses and teachers, and here Britain leads Europe and probably the
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world. Some countries have created special immigration schemes to attract them, competing with existing schemes
that have existed for some years in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. “In a new policy paper on immigration,
integration and employment, Employment and Social Affairs Commissioner, Anna Diamantopoulou, and Justice and
Home Affairs Commissioner, Antonio Vitorino, predict that unless more effective policies are developed to welcome
the migrants the EU needs, the immigrants will not be able to fulfil their potential nor make their full contribution to
economic development”.56 This means that the EU must not only do better to ensure their full participation into the
labour market, but also in social, cultural and civic life. At the same time the European Union is making new efforts
to stop the influx of illegal immigrants, and work out common immigration policies to satisfy the real economic need
for immigrant labour.
Leaving the economic factor aside one has to bear in mind a fact that immigration has always been a force of
history.
  “In today’s discussions about migration and its consequences many politicians and others seem to suffer from
severe amnesia. Migration is frequently labelled as a recent phenomenon. There are, however, few people in the world
who need to go back further than three generations in their family tree to stumble upon a migrating ancestor”.57
The first step is to see migration for what it is, rather than through the prejudiced eyes of some headline writers
that go with the flow of common opinion. People tend to be prejudiced against mass immigration in general and
immigrants in particular. But one should avoid thinking stereotypically. Historically, the net effect of migration has
been a benign one. “Where would America be without the unparalleled movement of Irish people in the mid-to-late
19th Century? Where would modern Australia be if it had continued to rely solely on the flow of people from the
“mother” country. Only the bigots there still believe that immigrants have contributed nothing”.58
They introduced new foods, which within one generation became staple foods of the receiving society. Migrants
brought techniques from one country to another, encouraged trade through their contacts and opened up new
markets. One need not search deep in the history to find some vivid examples.
For instance, with the German migrants of the 19th Century the Christmas tree - considered to be very German,
pagan and Catholic at the same time - became popular world-wide and entered into the households of people who can
claim no German ancestry. Migrating English engineers at the end of the 19th Century introduced football to the
European continent, and within one generation this sport stopped being typically British.
As for the rise of xenophobia and racism one has to bear in mind the fact that it has always accompanied
immigration waves. Actually all foreigners were officially discriminated against. Foreigners had to pay fees before
they were allowed to settle in a town, and had to pay another fee before they were allowed to join the guilds, and to
work in a certain profession. Furthermore, cities threw up barriers for people of a certain faith. Some regions
discriminated Catholics, others Protestants, almost all discriminated Jews. Moreover most migrants were looked
upon with fear. At the start of the 19th Century, when the French influence swept over Europe, it was feared that
French manners would weaken the spines of the young men of other nations. Later when the German unification
kicked off Europe was overwhelmed by widespread waves of Prusso-phobia. Pleas were made to restrict further
immigration of Germans to countries like Denmark, France and the Netherlands, and to evict those already present.
Each time new groups of migrants arrived, they were considered even more problematic and different then their
predecessors.
It seems the biggest motive is fear of the changes that usually comes with uncontrolled immigration.59First and
foremost fear of migrants rests upon the fear of change to culture. Culture is, however, not a fixed concept. Cultures
change continuously over time. Actually the cultures as we know them today are the result of centuries of migration.60
Even the fears of local authorities and local citizens that immigrants tend to be socially encapsulated are more or
less natural. Still this fear is exaggerated. Newcomers were always set apart in some sense.
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Of course the crucial mass of the Muslim immigrant communities, which makes it easier for individuals to survive
unintegrated, is a serious impediment. At present moment unintegrated ethnic communities are believed to be the
main push factor of social tensions. But conflict is natural and inevitable, and the only way to minimise it is to iron
out the extreme elements of all religions, and find the common ground where they can all thrive.
Yet some aspects of Islam do reinforce the isolation of Muslims in Western Europe.
The main obstacle western societies stumble over when dealing with the integration of Muslim immigrants is that
Islam is not a religion in the limited sense of the word, but it is rather a complete and comprehensive code of life and
a culture producing factor. The islamic world is basically different from the rest of the world and from the West in
particular. «Muslim culture profits from all available sources, local and international, but its unique characteristic is
that it has grown from the foundation of the Quran and Sunnah».61
What we see nowadays in the western countries is the marginalisation of the role of religion. Today in the West
religion is more associated with historical and cultural identity and has less to do with development and progress. It
is firmly belived that only scientific knowledge, economic developpment and technological progress are related to the
advancement of the society. Moreover, certain scholars believe that Westen Civilisation witnesses «the rise of a new
and fundamentally deformed religion – expressive individualism – the glorification neither of God nor of country but
of self».62
However many religions, including Islam, in other parts of the world do not share such approach. In their
understanding religion is far from being only a personal matter and that the actions are separate from beliefs. «Unlike
Christianity Islam has never limited itself to the realm of personal faith and private life. Rather, it was concerned with
politics and governance from the very beginning in seeking the just society and political order».63 Philosophically,
Islam considers religion integral to the state and society.
Given this fact it would be idle to pretend that Muslim religious visions do not present some problems in the
democratic West, yet one should avoid demonising the issue. «Islam does, of course, impose certain obligations and
zealots say they include outright hostility to the tenets of western society».64 But that is not the point, and the vast
majority of Muslims find they can follow their religion in the West without serious difficulty. Wnen speaking of Islam
one need to differentiate between political Islam, cultural Islam and true Islam. Their cultural and national back-
ground, which vary enormously, may play a bigger part in their ability to integrate than their religion.
So, in one respect, it is the strengh of Islam, as a religion, that brings several benefits. Muslims are generally good,
law-abiding citizens, they tend to have strong family values. But Islam is religion that is redily open to extremist
distortion, as all religions are in some extent. That is why when tackling the issue of Muslim integration and fulfilling
the demands of ethnic and religious minorities Western authorities should distinguish between religious radicalism –
Islamism (that has to do more with politics than religion itself) and Islam.
“It is not normal that islamistes eventually obtain so much in the host countries, while in the countries of their
origin they are rightly tracked down for similar activities”.65
In this respect European governments should build sensible and prompt politics in order to provide peace and
stability in the region and fight racism and xenophobia. Fearing and demonising other groups, a growing belief that
they want to set themselves aside, above and different from the others is the first step toward the intolerance and
closed minded idealism that leads to injustice, repression and finally violence. Of course in order to stop bigotry,
racism and planned segregation, this politics should begin at grass roots levels as mutual understanding – the
prerequisite of a successful ethnic or religious politics - can be hindered by the prejudices we harbour in out minds.
Then perhaps intolerance would evaporate and Islam would be seen a wonderful and truly peaceful religion with great
leaders and potential. But one needs to separate fact from fiction in order to understand the actual state of things.
Unfortunately as humans we seek to highlight the few differences rather than the many similarities. And in many
cases this thinking is promoted by politicians and clergy on all sides who prefer a “divide and rule” approach, in order
to keep their agendas alive. «Government itself sometimes encourages negative images of immigration and uses
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refugees or immigrants as a scapegoat for its failed policies”.66 If only we all had the resolve, desire and wisdom to
seek to understand our own and the others’ faith better.
Nowadays the local paper death announcements speak of “Pierre” and “Charle”; the birth are of “Moussa” and
“Fatih”.67 These simple indices of the changing face of Europe indicate that Islam has its place here now. Whether we
like it or not this evolution is irreversible. Of course the major difference of the present immigration wave from many
others that flooded Europe in the past is connected with its Islamic nature. Since the Pope Urban II’s sermon in
Clermont (1095) which blessed the Crusades the Christian and Muslim world have always been in a clash. Even in
today’s globalised world the memory of the past feud is slow to die. But this is a thing of the past.
Not cultural differences but trivial lack of mutual understanding generates cultural tension inside the host coun-
tries, which tend to translate even into international tensions. “Internationally, problems stemming from immigration
tend to give cultural factors in undesired weight and lend credibility to doctrines like “clash of civilisations”.68
Perhaps, that is where a thrilling myth of unprecedented threat to the European Civilisation stems from. History
needs time to unravel it. By now immigration presents European societies with thorny adjustments and cultural
dilemmas.
But as Antonio Vitorino put it immigration is neither a problem nor a solution of numerous european problems “it
is a reality that has to be properly managed”.69
The key to success in today’s time is creating a vibrant multicultural environment. Differences can only be
reconciled through mutual acceptance. Cooperation in the areas of culture and civilisation becomes an important
instrument bringing people closer to each other, one of the prerequisites for effective development of integration
process. “The final objective of those activities is the creation of a single European cultural space, a single European
communality, while preserving in full cultural identity of countries and regions – it is this kind of unification that is
regarded as the most durable and stable foundation of a “Big Europe”.70
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Ukraine’s development is analyzed in a general context of European integration that supports adoption of values
such as: human rights, minorities’ rights, liberalization, freedom of movement, freedom to receive education at every
level. They are all considered integral attributes of a civil democratic society.
Integration process consists in introducing European norms and standards in education, science and engineering,
in sharing scientific and technical achievements throughout the Union. Such steps will result in Ukraine’s increase of
European cultural identity with particular regard to education and science.
This goal requires mutual removal of any restrictions on contacts, exchanges and distribution of the information.
The basic purpose of Ukrainian’s reforms is the increase of population vital level, guaranteeing civil rights
protection and expansion of individual freedoms. Labour market and social policy are the most important componen-
ts, because they are necessary for maintaining modern economy efficiency.
In this context, reforming higher education and science in Ukraine means:
- Transition to a dynamic system of preparation of experts, that will satisfy citizens’ right to receive concrete
educational and qualifying skills, according to their abilities and to ensure their mobility in the labour market;
- Formation of a network of higher educational institutions, which under the forms, programmes, terms of
training and sources of financing would satisfy requirement of each man;
- Increase in educational and cultural level of society, creation of conditions for training during all life;
- Introduction of higher experience gained from the advanced countries, and its integration in the international
scientific and educational community.
1. History of development of European educational policy
Many inconsistent opinions have been express with regard to the kind of participation of Ukraine in Bologna
process. The main concern is an increasing dynamics of the process and cooperation between the European Union
(EU) and Ukraine.
First of all, it should be useful to provide a clear understanding of the variety of processes supported by the EU
since 1984, when the European Commission launched different tools to increase the mobility of human capital in the
European labour market.
The first tool, the Network of National Information Centres: the EU provides citizens and universities with the
competent information on opportunities and requirements on an academic recognition of the diplomas and separate
courses of training at foreign universities.
The second tool, European Credits Transfer System (ECTS), that aims at ensuring transparency, comparison of
volume of the investigated material and academic recognition of qualifications and competences. It has arisen original-
ly within the framework of the European programme ERASMUS in 1988, and now includes more than 1100
universities and network “lines of the help” (ECTS Helplines). Comparability of educational plans allows the
students to choose the programmes appropriate to qualification. Credits reflect volume of works required for ending
each course, in relation to total amount of work necessary for completing academic year at university (including
lectures, seminars, practical employment, independent work, examinations and tests). In ECTS 60 credits on volume
of loading represent one academic year, 30 - semester, 20 – trimester. For participation in ECTS universities are
prepared by annually updated information packages with the complete description of courses, their contents,
requirements for preparation, system of estimation, training techniques, structure, faculties conducting preparation.
Besides, information should include the complete educational plan on a given level of preparation, general information
on university, infrastructure, and administrative procedures for registration of the program and academic calendar.
The information package is distributed on all to universities - partners.
The third tool, Appendix to the Diploma, is prepared by universities on a model developed jointly by a working
group constituted by the experts of the European Commission, Council of Europe and UNESCO. The pattern exists
in 11 languages and gives the complete description of a subject, level, context, contents of the received preparation.
The appendix consists of eight sections: information on received qualification, skill level, contents of the programme
and results, information on functional purpose of qualification, additional information, information on national
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system of education. The Appendix to the Diploma raises a level of academic mobility and mobility of the graduates
in the market of employment. Simultaneously with it, protecting an autonomy of universities, it offers a general
framework of interaction, provides with the high-grade information on the university programmes partners - educa-
tional organizations and citizens, promotes progress of universities abroad.
Fourth tool, a supporting element of system, is the network EURYDICE, within which reliable and comparable
information on national systems of education in the countries of the EU are provided. EURYDICE has arisen in 1980
on the basis of Ministerial Council conclusion on Education accepted in 1976, about the first programme of coope-
ration in sphere of education. Now that network unites 30 countries (country - members of the EU and country of the
European zone of free trade). The divisions in Brussels and countries - participants of system carry out the
comparative analyses of policy and organization of national educational systems, reviews and statistical indicators
on special themes.
Resuming, the process of formation of an all-European educational space goes back twenty years ago. It evolved
on the basis of the political will of participants, on the legal basis of process (Article 149 and 150 Treaty on European
Union), on socio-economic provisions. Nevertheless, the process is far from being completed. In achieving the
creation of an all-European educational space, main concerns regard maintenance of quality, preservation of national
values, formation of trust, autonomy and role of universities.
In June 1999, 29 European Ministers of Education signed the so-called “Declaration on the European space for
higher education” (Bologna Declaration, 1999). The Conference and the Declaration are the key documents of a new
stage in the process of harmonizing different European educational systems. The long-term objective of the action
program is the “creation of the all-European educational space with the purpose of increase of mobility of the citizens
in the market of employment and amplification competitive of ability of the European higher education”. The basic
tasks, which should be executed till 2010, include:
• Introduction of a system ensuring comparability of the diplomas, including the introduction of the above
described tool “Appendix to the Diploma”;
• Introduction of a two-level system of preparation in all countries, first step of the bachelor not less than three
years, and second step master and - or of a doctor’s degree;
• Creation of a system of credits, ECTS, as a mean to increase students, teachers, researchers and administra-
tive personnel mobility.
• Creation of a complete system preserving educational quality (European Network of Quality Assurance in
Higher Education);
• Increase of students, teachers and researchers’ mobility;
• Development of cooperation in sphere of maintenance of quality of education with the purpose of creating
of comparable criteria and methodology;
• Amplification of  “European measurement” in higher education.
Bologna Process involves national Ministries of Education, Network of national information centres, the Europe-
an Commission, EU universities, Confederation of the Rectors and Associations of  European Universities.
In May 2001, in Prague, 32 ministers of Education accepted the final Communiqué, in which have been fixed the
goals for creating the all-European space within 2010. Working groups were created, that up to the Berlin conference,
lead researches and seminars in the field of cooperation concerning accreditation and maintenance of quality; creation
of joint diplomas; description of degrees and qualifications; social aspects of process; problems of barriers to
mobility: Even tasks regarding the expansion of Bologna process were discussed, in particular  an all-life training of
pupils. (Shestavin and Yepik, 2003)
2. The Essence of the Bologna process
6 key positions can be outlined in the framework of the Bologna Process:
1)Introduction of two-cycles training:
1-st - before reception of the first academic degree and 2 - after reception of the first academic degree. Thus, the
continuation of training on first cycle should be not less than 3 and no more than 4 years. Training during the second
cycle can conduct to reception of a degree master (in 1-2 years of training after reception of 1-st degree) and - or to
a doctor’s degree (at general duration of training 7-8 years).
2) Introduction of credit system:
It is the account of labour input of educational work. It is based on the ECTS (European Credit Transfer System
- test units of labour input), having made its memory system capable to work within the framework of the concept
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“training during all life”.
3) Quality surveillance of education
Establishment of Agencies for Accreditation, independent from national governments and international organiza-
tions. Estimation will be based not on training duration or contents, but on knowledge and skills, graduates got during
their career. Standards will be simultaneously established.
4) Expansion of mobility
First students’ mobility is stressed. Then mobility even regards teachers and other personnel. National acts are
supposed to change in the field of foreigner employment.
5) Maintenance of employment of the graduates
One of the most important assumption on which the Bologna process is based is the final goal higher education
must pursue: graduates should be able to use knowledge acquired all over Europe. The European market of work
should recognize academic degrees and other qualifications useful, and professional recognition of qualifications
should be facilitated. For assuring a mutual recognition of qualifications, use of the Appendix to the Diploma
recommended by UNESCO is planned.
6) Maintenance of appeal of the European system of education
One of the main tasks that should be solved in the frameworks of Bologna process is making Europe attractive for
those who study abroad. It is considered that the introduction of the all-European system of education will increase
the appeal of European higher education.
Up to the present 45 states referred to the European region, and Bologna Declaration was signed by more than 30
countries. Taking into account States having very small quantity of educational establishments, (Andorra, Vatican,
Monaco, etc.), the share of the European States that have joined in Bologna process is 81 %.
European experts will carry out intensive researches of systems of education, conditions of admission and
transfer, application of credit systems, structure of awarded degrees, organization of educational process in Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Russia and Yugoslavia. These 5 countries have joined Bologna Process in
October 2003 in Berlin. It means that more than 90 % of European states participate in the creation of an integrated
system of education.
Actually only Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine are out of the process. (MESU, 2004)
Ukraine did not determine yet concerning the participation in Bologna process. Ukrainian representatives were
present, as full participants, only at some meetings. Questions concerning the process basic rules are not discussed
in the Ukrainian press or at seminars and conferences. Ukraine’s position can be explained thanks to the following
considerations:
• It is difficult to begin a process of modernization of Ukrainin system of education yet is not already
completed;
• Ukraine economic situation, despite any efforts towards stabilization, does not allow to hope for increase in
financing of higher education, innovation and research;
• Ukrainian educational community is very conservative, because since the late 80s professor-teaching struc-
ture promptly grew old, and this process has not stopped yet;
• in Ukraine, many Bologna targets are already executed: the two-level system of academic degrees is entered;
there is a national system of accreditation of educational establishments, all qualifications received by the
graduates are claimed by the national market of work. Thus can create deceptive impression about an easy
achievement of other purposes highlighted in the Bologna process.
Essential to acceptance of the decision about inclusion in Bologna process is the ambiguous attitude to offered
innovations in Europe. Debate about feasibility of Bologna purposes is ongoing. However, it is necessary to note,
that in many countries (Austria, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden) intensive legislation
changes are going. Simultaneously, participants in ENIC and NARIC networks develop forms of simplification in the
process of mutual recognition of documents about education.
Purposes set out in Sorbonne and Bologna Declarations, will be hardly achieved by 2010. Probably we can
imagine a situation similar to EURO introduction: I mean some countries will take part to an integrated Zone of higher
education since its inception, others will join it later.
Harmonization and variety of higher education
Presence, and in some cases introduction (for example, in Austria) of a binary system, and also the introduction
in some countries of masters and bachelors in addition to the already existing courses, mean a considerable growth in
the number of higher education offers. This growth is supported by the development of additional education
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(education for the adult). This process, apparently, will enter contradiction on harmonization. Hence, the problem is
the simultaneous maintenance of various educational needs inside the-national level. The problem of compatibility
demonstrates importance of cooperation at national and European levels.
Socio-economic context and role of various subjects in educational process
It is important to realize that the basic purpose of the envisaged integrated educational system is the increase in
the opportunity of employment for European citizens. Nowadays in the European Union a 10-percentage of
unemployment is running, and the low level of mobility of the market of employment reduces competitiveness of
Europe within the framework of the global economy.
One of the basic obstacles in mobility stands in education. The potential employers, which are ready to accept a
work in another EU country seldom have an opportunity to carry out competent comparison of qualifications.
Existing conventions on recognition of academic degrees, national information centres and European network on
academic recognition and mobility (NARIC and ÅNIC) are completely inefficient. Therefore, Bologna goals can well
be considered of primary importance to measure how instruction becomes fundamental in developing a competitive
Europe. Thus will require EU countries, employers and professional organizations, and students’ active participa-
tion. Only such wide involving of experts can bring the initiative to success.
Increase of competitiveness in the global market
The second purpose of new system of reception of academic degrees is the increase of competitiveness of the
European system of higher education. The given task is dictated by two circumstances: 1) Europe lost its position as
a provider of education for foreigners; 2) European education is confronted with non conventional and not European
providers of higher education penetrated on the European market through branches campuses, virtual universities and
other organizations.
The simplified procedure of access to education would strengthen positions of Europe in the global market of
higher education. However for the present it is not clear up to what degree it really is a subject of anxiety for Europe.
The European Commission till now did not show steady interest to a problem of researches concerning parity of
number of the students decreasing from the countries of the European Union and arriving on training. The appropriate
statistics is absent. At the centre of attention till now remained in the basic questions of mobility of the students
aspiring to be trained in Europe. (COM-58, 2003)
The activity in the given question will also strongly depend on interest and initiatives of single European states.
Some of them have already shown interest in attracting non-EU students (Great Britain, Netherlands, Germany and
France, for example). Other countries, unfortunately, still collide with lack of places for the own students. These
countries (for example, Greece) are students “exporters”.
Anther important aspect concerning the attraction of foreign students is the language utilized to carry out
teaching.
The success of Bologna initiative as concerns the increase of competitiveness of European higher education, with
a major attraction of foreign students, will depend from the convergence of national educational programmes and
initiatives.
The warranties and accreditation of educational institutions
Bologna Declaration includes a phrase: “assistance to development of criteria and methodology for an estimation
of quality of education”. In the recent past, the European Commission intended to initiate cooperation in this area, as
it took place in a line of the countries of the EU. In some of them the systems of an estimation of quality were
developed, while in other countries the advanced systems were already used. At the same time State’s activity did not
become enough successful. Alongside with cultural and system distinctions national governments consider quality
estimation as a basic sphere of responsibility. The introduction of convergent academic degrees, however, would
immediately result in the necessity to elaborate coordinated criteria of quality estimation and, according to many
experts opinion, to the establishment of minimum standards. Therefore it is possible to expect that Bologna initiative
will enter questions of accreditation into the centre of discussions about higher education in Europe.
At present initiatives going “from below” push development of this question. The introduction in Germany of the
programmes providing reception of a degree of the bachelor/master, initiated the establishment of Accreditation
Council. Similar offers now are developed in the Netherlands. The government is considering possible aspects of
cooperation with Germany and Great Britain. Other initiatives “from below” come from the European professional
organizations and from a network of establishments of the European higher education. In addition, in Europe lays the
way the international accreditation. Therefore it is possible to make the conclusion: numerous accreditations are
becoming a widespread phenomenon in Europe.
European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues
135
Thus, in questions of accreditation students and employers will play an important role. It is important to mention
that the first European conference to debate the influence of Bologna Declaration on the process of accreditation in
Europe was organized Association of National Unions of the Students in Europe (ESIB). Conference participants
focussed on the importance of cooperation between governments, on the establishment of system of higher educa-
tion. (Council of Europe, 04.2003)
Ukraine’s participation in the Bologna process is a difficult matter.
3. The characteristic of the Ukrainian educational system
INSTITUTION TYPES & CREDENTIALS (IAU, 2004)
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STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION SYSTEM
Pre-higher education:
Duration of compulsory education:
- Age of entry: 6
- Age of exit: 15
Structure of school system:
- Elementary
o Type of school providing this education: Elementary School
o Length of program in years: 4
o Age level from: 6 to: 10
- Lower Secondary
o Type of school providing this education: Lower Secondary (Osnowna Serednia Shkola)
o Length of program in years: 5
o Age level from: 10 to: 15
o Certificate/diploma awarded: Swidoctwo Pro Nepownu Seredniu Oswitu/Lower Secondary School
Leaving Certificate
- Upper Secondary
o Type of school providing this education: Upper Secondary Special School (Licei)
o Length of program in years: 3
o Age level from: 15 to: 18
o Certificate/diploma awarded: Atestat/Matriculation School Certificate
- Upper Secondary
o Type of school providing this education: Upper Secondary School (Starsha Serednia Shkola)
o Length of program in years: 2
o Age level from: 15 to: 17
o Certificate/diploma awarded: Atestat/Matriculation School Certificate
- Special Education
o Type of school providing this education: Upper Secondary Special School (Gimnazia)
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o Length of program in years: 3
o Age level from: 15 to: 18
o Certificate/diploma awarded: Atestat/Matriculation School Certificate
- Vocational
o Type of school providing this education: Vocational Secondary School (Technikum)
o Length of program in years: 5
o Age level from: 15 to: 20
o Certificate/diploma awarded: Atestat, Diplom Technika/Matriculation School Certificate,
Professional Secondary School Leaving Diploma, Junior Specialist
- Vocational
o Type of school providing this education: Vocational School (Profesijno-Tecnichne Uchylyshche)
o Length of program in years: 4
o Age level from: 15 to: 20
o Certificate/diploma awarded: Atestat, Swidoctwo Pro Zakinchennia Uchylyshcha/Matriculation School
Certificate, Vocational School Leaving Certificate
School education:
All children 7 to 15 years old attend the nine year compulsory school. If parents so wish, the child may start from
the age of six. Options after the comprehensive school are upper secondary school or vocational education. Upper
secondary school: 2-year general school leading to the Matriculation Examination, giving successful students access
to university and other higher education schools. The present vocational education system covers both general
secondary and vocational programmes, with separate tracks for comprehensive school leavers and matriculated
students. The system is being reformed.
Higher education:
The Ministry of Education that coordinates and supervises the activities of higher schools administers higher
education in Ukraine. According to the “Law on Education”, higher education includes the following levels and
categories of establishment: level I - vocational schools and other HEIs of a corresponding level; level II - colleges and
other HEIs of a corresponding level which teach Bachelor and junior specialist courses; level III - institutes, conser-
vatories, academies and universities that teach Bachelor’s and Specialist, as well as junior specialist courses and ; level
IV - institutes, conservatories, academies and universities which teach Bachelor’s, Master’s and Specialist courses.
The degree system is under reform: The old system had only one stage of undergraduate studies, the degree of
“Specialist”, awarded after 5 years of study. The new system comprises two stages: undergraduate and graduate,
with several degree levels. A Union of Rectors was created in 1993.
Stages of studies:
Post-secondary studies (technical/vocational type):
Non-university level:
Since 1992 the whole system of Ukrainian postsecondary education is considered “higher education”. According
to the “Law on Education”, the following levels and categories of establishments offer higher vocational education:
level I - technical and vocational schools; level II - technicums and colleges. They award the qualification of Junior
Specialist. Level III institutes are university-level institutions. Graduates from post-secondary vocational schools
must sit for final examinations and defend a graduation thesis/work. The Diploma confers a right to employment at
a pre-set level or the right to continue training in institutions of a higher level.
University level studies:
University level first stage: Bakalavr, Specialist:
The academic and professional diploma of Bakalavr (BA, BEd., BMed.) is generally awarded after four years of
successful study (six years for Medicine). The Bakalavr programme comprises basic higher education and professio-
nal training in a given professional field. It is an intermediate degree. The degree (Diplom) of Specialist is awarded
after five or six years of study, depending on the type of institution.
University level second stage: Magister:
The Magister (Master’s Degree) is awarded on the basis of a Bachelor’s Degree or Specialist’s qualification
generally one to two years after the first degree. Students must pass final examinations and defend a thesis.
University level third stage: Doctoral Degree-1:
Ukraine keeps a two-degree system at doctoral level: Kandydat nauk (Candidate of Sciences, comparable to the
Ph.D.), and Doctor nauk. The first qualification is obtained after three or four years of study by submitting and
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publicly defending a thesis and passing the required examinations. The candidate’s thesis can be prepared while
following various forms of post-graduate studies.
University level fourth stage: Doctoral Degree-2:
The “Doctor nauk” is the highest scientific degree in Ukraine, comparable to “Habilitation” in some Western
countries. It is awarded to candidates already holding a “Kandidat nauk”, on the successful presentation and defence
of the “Doctor nauk” (habilitation) dissertation. The Habilitation dissertation should represent a major contribution
to the development of a given field or branch of learning, and has to be published entirely or at least its main parts.
Teacher education:
Training of pre-primary and primary/basic school teachers
Pre-primary and primary school teachers are trained in teacher-training institutions of Levels I, II, and III of
accreditation (vocational schools, technikums, and colleges). Practical training at kindergarten and primary schools
are part of the teacher training programme.
Training of secondary school teachers
Training is provided by higher education institutions of Levels III and IV of accreditation (institutes and univer-
sities), in different faculties (Education, Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Physical Education, etc.). The program-
me for teachers includes standard topics of education and psychology. Teachers of practical/vocational courses are
trained in the technical education institutes.
Training of higher education teachers
There are no special forms of training for higher education teachers. Teachers of higher education are recruited
among university graduates holding a Magister or Kandidat Nauk Degree who have followed special education
courses through various types of assistance.
Non-traditional studies:
Distance higher education
A network of correspondence and evening courses is intended for persons who are already employed. Candidates
for such courses must not only pass an entrance examination, but also prove they effectively worked for a certain
time.
Lifelong higher education
Some institutions of higher education (mostly private) have departments of continuing education providing
teaching based on the principles of general higher education. Obtaining Diplomas depends on credits obtained in
required topics, as well as on the presentation of a memoire.
Higher education training in industry
A certain number of higher education institutions organize evening classes in industry that are of the same level as
full-time studies.
Other forms of non-formal higher education
The television of Ukraine broadcasts educational programmes of different levels for students and teachers in
schools ranging from primary to upper secondary. These programmes are designed to introduce teachers to new
pedagogical methods.
ADMISSIONS TO HIGHER EDUCATION
Admission to non-university higher education studies
- Name of secondary school credential required: Atestat/Matriculation School Certificate
- Minimum score/requirement: satisfactory
- For entry to: all higher technical/vocational and professional non-university studies
- Alternatives to credentials: none
- Numerus clausus/restrictions: These studies are intended for graduates of general secondary schools holding
the Matriculation School Certificate. However, graduates with other secondary school certificates may be accepted.
Admission to university-level studies
Name of secondary school credential required: Atestat/Matriculation School Certificate
Minimum score/requirement: satisfactory
For entry to: all institutions of higher education
Alternatives to credentials: none
Entrance exams required: Entrance examination, qualification test or qualifying interview for some university level
studies. Each institution or department determines marks.
Numerous clausus/restrictions: Specific ability requirements are set for artistic studies, physical education and
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architectural preservation studies. A certain age limit is also set.
Other admission requirements: Physical and mental predisposition of candidates to work in a certain professional
field must first be ascertained
Foreign students admission
Definition of foreign student: A person not having Ukrainian citizenship.
Admission requirements: Students must hold a secondary school leaving certificate giving access to higher educa-
tion.
Entry regulations: The possession of a student visa is necessary. The Rector of the chosen institution must
officially admit students.
Health requirements: Candidates seeking admission to higher studies should submit a health certificate.
Language requirements: Students must be proficient in Ukrainian or Russian. A 9 to 10 month course is offered in
each university or institution. They then sit for an examination that gives entry to the institution.
Recognition of studies & qualifications:
Studies pursued in home country (System of recognition/accreditation): Institutions award degrees according to
the decision of the authority appointed by the Ministry of Education
Deals with credential recognition for entry to: University and Profession
Services provided & students dealt with: Information and guidance.
Other information sources on recognition of foreign studies: Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Ministry of
Transport/Division of Education, The Vice-Rector for International Affairs of the higher education institutions
4. Steps of Ukraine in a direction Bologna process
With the purpose of realizing Bologna Declaration goals, Ukraine Ministry of Education and Sciences (Orders ¹
48 and 49, 23.01.2004) in January 2004 accepted the appropriate Action Program for 2004-2005 and began the
realization of pedagogical experiment on credit-modular system of organization of educational process. (MESU,
2004)
The overall objective of the Action Program is the integration of the national system of education into the
European space. Thus requires the realization of the following criteria and standards:
- constant training during all life;
- students’ attraction to training;
- competitiveness of European space of higher education and science for other regions of the world.
For realizing Bologna process’ objectives in Ukraine it is necessary:
- to improve two-step structure of higher education;
- to accept transparent and clear gradation of the diplomas, degrees and qualifications;
- to use uniform system of credit units and Appendices to the Diploma;
- to take into account  European practice of organization of accreditation and quality surveillance of education;
- to support and to develop the European quality standards;
- to liquidate obstacles for students, teachers and researchers’ mobility;
- to introduce a modern approach of integration of higher education and sciences with business, preparing
masters and post-graduate students;
- to ensure the further development of autonomy and self-management of higher education and science.
The realization of this Action Program will give an opportunity:
- to lead the national educational system to modernization;
- to improve quality of education, through the adoption of  standards, which will be developed by the
European Community by 2010;
- to introduce in Ukraine the all-European system of scientific degrees;
- to introduce system of credits compatible with ECTS;
- to promote Ukrainian citizens’ (which receive education or give educational services) mobility.
These results are planned to be reached by pedagogical experiments on the introduction of credit-modular system
of organization of educational process in higher educational institutions III-IV levels of accreditation.
A first stage of experiment (2003-2004 years) regards the development of educational-methodical materials,
contents of education, forms of educational process organization, approbation in experimental groups, definition of
directions of preparation, specialities.
The second stage (2005-2008 years) aims at entering corrective amendments into experimental materials and their
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approbation on the large file of the experiment participants.
Ukraine needs to fulfil conditions allowing it to take part in the uniform European educational and scientific space,
introducing the basic ideas generated from the Bologna Declaration and other documents that constitute the Bologna
process:
• construction of the European zone of higher education so as to develop citizens’ mobility increasing their
employment chances;
• formation and strengthening of Ukrainian intellectual, cultural, social and scientific and technical potentials;
• international and national competitiveness increase;
• competition with other systems of higher education, for influence and prestige;
• increased role of higher educational institutions in development national and European cultural values.
59 state and not state higher educational institutions have been indicated to participate in experiment that allow
to reach the following results:
- increase of higher education quality, graduates competitiveness and national higher education prestige ;
- introduction of the standards higher education in view of specificity of credit-modular system;
- creation of a system of quality estimation of students’ education, which is most adapted to the requirements
Bologna Declaration;
- creation of normative-methodical maintenance of academic students’ mobility in domestic and European
educational space;
- creation of a mutual recognition of the diplomas of a state sample about higher education on principles
stipulated ECTS.
Among the participants of this experiment, there is also Donetsk National University.
5. Educational aspects of the European Neighbourhood Policy
The European Neighbourhood Policy pays little attention to education. EU and Ukraine educational cooperation
will be actively carried out within the framework of the special EU Programs: TEMPUS, Erasmus Mundus, Jean
Monnet Project and others. The basic ENP documents provides us with not too much information on the education
issue.(COM-104, 2003; COM-393, 2003; COM-373, 2004)
Spreading the benefits of increased economic growth to all sectors of society requires positive action to promote
social inclusion via mutually reinforcing economic, employment and social policies. Attention to areas including
education, health, training and housing is equally important.
EU programmes and activities in research, education, culture and bilateral visitor programmes should be expanded.
Exchange programmes between youth and universities, the creation of European studies courses and the opening of
new Euroinformation centres, ‘people-to-people’ activities, including professional exchange/visit programmes, acti-
vities in the field of media, training and journalists exchanges merit close consideration.
Ideas circulated by the new member states should be looked upon favourably. Exchanges on a regional level
regarding governance and human rights training issues have proven beneficial and should be explored further.
For Russia and the WNIS, community, EBRD and EIB supported initiatives should be further developed. While
the central role played by the EBRD should continue to be supported, the EU could also consider the progressive and
targeted increase of EIB lending to Russia, and its extension to Ukraine, Moldova and, eventually, Belarus. The EU
should ensure the IFIs take adequate account of the importance of spending on education, health and social safety net
provisions in their policies towards the neighbouring countries.
Promoting local, “people-to-people” type actions bearing in mind the long-standing social and cultural links
across the external borders of the Union, it is important that the new external EU border is not seen as a barrier to
existing contact and co-operation at the local level. This type of cooperation has a long-standing tradition in particular
on the land borders of the enlarged Union. Therefore, cross-border contacts at regional and local level should be
encouraged, enhancing exchanges and deepening economic, social, cultural and educational co-operation between local
communities.
The Neighbourhood Programmes will cover a broad range of actions flowing from the objectives in point above
and may include, for example, infrastructure in the sectors of transport, environment, energy, border crossings,
electronic communications; investments in economic and social cohesion (productive investments, human resource
development, business-related infrastructure, cooperation in the fields of research and technology and innovation);
people-to-people actions (like cultural and educational exchanges and co-operation); promoting the management of
the movement of people and support to institution building (including justice and home affairs, border and customs
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management and meeting other common challenges).
Added value
The ENP brings added value, going beyond existing cooperation, both to partner countries and to the EU. This added
value takes a number of forms:
The Commission is examining the possibilities of gradual opening of certain Community programmes, promoting
cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links.
People-to-people, programmes and agencies
An effective means to achieve the ENP’s main objectives is to connect the peoples of the Union and its neighbours,
to enhance mutual understanding of each others’ cultures, history, attitudes and values, and to eliminate distorted
perceptions. Thus, in addition to contacts between public bodies or businesses, the ENP will promote cultural,
educational and more general societal links between the Union and its neighbourhood.
The European Neighbourhood Policy envisages the gradual opening of certain Community programmes, based on
mutual interests and available resources. Areas to be explored include education, training and youth, research, environ-
ment, as well as culture and audio-visual. The YOUTH programme, which already promotes people-to-people contacts
and co-operation between civil society actors in the youth field, should be further enhanced. The Tempus and Erasmus
Mundus programmes offer possibilities to strengthen contacts between students and teachers. The Action Plans will
identify concrete opportunities for partners to participate in such programmes.
As participation in programmes designed for Member States can pose practical difficulties to third countries, the
creation of dedicated programmes geared specifically to meeting partner countries’ needs should also be explored. For
instance, the Commission has proposed to create “Tempus Plus”, a dedicated programme addressing the education and
training needs of the countries covered by the ENP (COM-156, 2004). The reform and modernisation of learning
systems is a sine qua non condition for the economic competitiveness and the social and political stability of partner
countries and Tempus Plus could play a crucial role in this respect.
Regional cooperation on the EU eastern borders
Initiatives should focus on issues of common concern, which would benefit from a multilateral approach. As shown
by the experience in other geographical contexts (including the Northern Dimension area), regional fora could in many
cases offer substantial added value to bilateral efforts. Priority cooperation sectors include:
• People-to-people issues, including civil society development, activities in the fields of media and journalists’
exchanges, promotion of good governance and respect for human rights, professional, academic and youth
exchanges, visit schemes, cooperation in the sectors of education, training, science and culture, twinning between
local and regional administrations as well as civil society organisations. Due attention should be paid to public
health issues and to tackling effectively the spread of communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and TB.
In the Report on Ukraine (COM-SEC-566, 2004) some attention to the system of education and its development
opportunities is also given at the expense of cooperation with EU universities. Some fragments of this report are
reported below (they deal with the Ukrainian educational system project of reform).
Ukraine participates in the YOUTH programme which promotes people-to-people contacts and co-operation
between actors of civil society, such as associations and NGOs in the youth field. Regarding higher education, Ukraine
is eligible for participation in the Community programmes Tempus and Erasmus Mundus.
Ukraine’s female labour force participation rate is high (64% compared with 73% for men). Despite similar
education levels, women tend to have lower-paid jobs and there are slightly more poor female-headed households than
poor male-headed households.
In recent years, Ukraine has made significant efforts in developing reform strategies and undertaking reform policies
in the human development sector. The country continues to face challenges, however, and in the education sector these
translate into unequal access, eroding quality and low efficiency in the use of resources.
A Law on Education (2001) increased compulsory education to twelve years. A Government education reform
strategy (the “National Doctrine for Development of Education in Ukraine in the XXIst Century”) approved in 2001,
included redefined priorities for the sector and improved strategies for service delivery from preschool to tertiary
education. Vocational education and training reform is based on a law passed in February 1998 which aims at the
decentralisation of a system still heavily oriented towards training specialists in industry and agriculture. Eradicating
outdated specialisations and attracting private sector support are among other government aims for Vocational and
Educational Training reform.
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6. Facts in issue of development of education of the European countries and cooperation with Ukraine
1) According to 2000 data, in EU countries more than 75 % of young people has successfully finished secondary
education. As a result of 70 % of the representatives of age group 25-34 years had, at least, complete secondary
education. Data about previous generation, (age group 55-64 years) is 50 %. (Council of Europe, 02.2003)
2) Unemployment among owners of complete secondary education is twice lower than among young people
which received incomplete secondary education. Graduates in schools with professional training detain an even
better position in the labour market. Practically in all countries educational system provide with both funda-
mental general educational preparation and opportunity to receive secondary educational professional training.
3) In 2000, in 30 countries of Europe 16670 thousand students were trained. Among them more than 78 % are
educated in EU countries. The average parameter of students in structures of tertiary education is 15 %.
4) Great Britain, Germany and France have the most advanced systems of tertiary education with a number of
students exceeding of 2 million and approximately by identical proportions of representation of the students in
total of learning youth: 13 %, 12 % and 14 % accordingly. Spain and Italy have a quota of students of 1,8 million,
but with higher proportions of representation of the students in structure all learning, accordingly 21 % and 17
%.
5) The number of students in EU countries has grown more than twice. In Greece, Spain, Ireland, Finland and
Portugal it has even trebled. The lowest growth in the number of students was observed in Germany - 50 %.
6) The average age of students in tertiary education is 22 years and changes from country to country within the
limits of 20 - 25 years. The basic reasons that explain the students’ population “aging” are: à) excess of
normative terms of training; á) extensive courses duration (till 13-14 of years), and tertiary education. A
conspicuous part of the students’ population  do not finish their  programmes 5-6 years of tertiary education,
because of financial difficulties. They are compelled to work, and come back to study later. (Zgaga, 2003)
7) Introduction of new national structures of education aiming at the reduction of “student’s career”, providing
students with the appropriate professional qualifications, after 3 years of training.
8) 2 % of European students in tertiary education and 5 % of university students participate in the Trans-
European academic mobility. Bologna process supports the measures to stimulate further growth of academic
mobility. In particular, in EU countries teachers’ preparation programme provides obligatory training in another
European country for one semester. This programme pursues the following goals: reception of thorough
language knowledge and achievement of mutual understanding, formatting the all-European market of work.
Adaptation of educational courses, mutual recognition of results of intermediate examinations and all kinds of
diplomas/qualifications, are called to stimulate movement of the students through borders. Transition by all
European countries to comparable structures of higher education, acceptance of the systems of educational
credits (test units) will strengthen these tendencies. (Council of Europe, 04.2003)
9) According to 2000 data, the average parameter of the governmental charges on education (all steps) in EU
countries is 5,5% of the Total Internal Product. There is, however, a great degree of differentiation. Denmark,
Sweden, Norway and the Estonia show the best percentages- 8,1 %; 7,7 %, 7,6 % and 7,4 % respectively. In
Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria percentages are: 3,4 %; 3,6 % and 3,8 %. Among the conducting countries only
France reaches 6% of the Total Internal Product. Great Britain, Germany, Spain and Italy run from 4,5 % up to
4,7 %.
10) For the period since 1995, when in EU countries the historical maximum of an average parameter of a share of
expenses in Total Internal Product was fixed, for 2000 the steady tendency to its decrease is observed. The
insignificant gain of a parameter (5 %) was marked in Denmark, Portugal and Sweden. The gain of the given
parameter on 25 % in Greece has allowed this country to reduce sharp backlog from other members of EU. Was
characteristic for other countries of EU the reduction of a parameter on 10 %, and in Great Britain even on 15 %.
Economic recession has fixed this tendency.
11) Budget charges on education differ strongly from country to country: in Denmark - 14,5 %, in Greece - 6,4 %.
In 2000 the average parameter has been 11,2 %, but was a little bit lower in Germany, Italy and Netherlands,
accordingly: 9,5 %, 9,3 % and 10,2 %. Except for Cyprus (15,6 %) and Denmark (14,5 %), budget charges on
education are above the average of the European level in Austria, Finland and Sweden (11,7 %, 11,9 %, 12,9 %).
12) On the basis of data collected in 30 countries, the structure of charges on education is characterized by the
following proportions: 28 % - initial education, 48 % - secondary education, 24 % - tertiary education.
Ukraine Ministry of Education and Sciences carries out cooperation with EU within the framework of the
Programme of the Trans-European Cooperation (Higher Education - TEMPUS (TACIS) and on a bilateral basis with
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EU countries’ higher educational institutions. EU invested in Ukraine, within the framework of the Programme TEM-
PUS, more than 35 millions EURO in the process of reforming national higher education. 126 projects in 40 higher
educational institutions were launched. Since 2003, 14 projects have been realized in Ukrainian universities. Within the
realization of the Programme TEMPUS (9 years) 500 applications for projects were sent which included more than
1000 Ukrainian higher educational institutions and EU countries.
Projects address the following objectives: introduction of modern educational technologies, creation and use of the
newest methods of management of educational process, restoration of close joint work between universities and
industry.
The project TEMPUS “European economic studies and relation in sphere of business” resulted in the creation of the
Centre of the European and International Studies. It is start preparing, for the first time in Ukraine,  masters on European
studies, on a speciality “State service” (specialization “Global and European Integration”), “International Economy”
(specialization “European economy”), “Finance” (specialization “European finance”).
The Ministry intends to consider Ukraine’s opportunities of participation in joint programmes and projects with the
EU, such as SOCRATES (European programme of education directed at development of European increase of quality
of education by encouragement of cooperation between the countries- participants); Leonardo da Vinci (programme in
the sphere of vocational training and improvement of professional skills directed at  developing opportunities for
training in the European companies). The program Youth-mobility and informal education directed to youth from 15 till
25 years is an interesting opportunity for young people to take part in group and individual educational programs and
voluntary works. (COM-156, 2004)
7. Strategic directions of modernization of education of Ukraine
The strategic directions of modernization of education, which are of primary importance for Ukraine public develop-
ment, define both objective tendencies of general educational development and state processes closely connected to
them. (Kuchma, 2002).
Transition of mankind from industrial manufacture to scientific - information technologies, and then to a community
of knowledge objectively put forward a science as the greatest priority. Any industrial activity, and in general any sphere
of ability to live, will depend on the level of human development.
Taking into account the growth of globalization, which means an aggravation of competition between states-nations,
it is obvious that only those countries able to develop education and sciences can hope for a worthy place in the world.
The first strategic purpose in reorganizing education and science is to develop societal understanding of their
relevance.  Last years data showed a growth of workers’ wages with better education and science only in 2003 - in the
beginning of 2004 on 44 % and in unknown, not only for years of independence, and willows the Soviet period to
increase twice since July 1, 2004 of the grants to the students.
But all these actions can be considered only as first steps. In the coming years it will be necessary to finance scientific
and technical sphere up to 1,7 % of the Total Internal Product, so as to come closer to the EU countries expenditure
levels. They fixed, in fact, for 2010, a total expenditure of 3 % of the Total Internal Product. In education, we should
practically double present 4,3 % Total Internal Product to be competitive with the countries of EU.
The second strategic purpose consists in modernizing educational activity to provide those necessary capabilities to
live in XXI century. On this basis the National doctrine of development of education was approved by congress of the
workers of education and was authorized by Decree of the President of Ukraine two years ago. (MESU, 2004)
What tasks is it going to address?
1) It is essential to correct an orientation of educational process. The world has entered in a period in which change
of ideas, technologies and knowledge occurs faster than change of generations. Therefore it is impossible to reduce
training only to the development by a schoolboy sum of knowledge. Except for this function of educational process
there is a task to learn independently to study, to take possession of the new information.
Education should prepare men to perceive changes, to create changes, to estimate variability as an organic component
of their own way of life. Modern civilization and modern economy requires an innovation in men, which can be brought
up only by education.
On this basis, practical changes in education are also addressed.
2) Modernization of education. Globalization links each man to the incomparably large, complex system of mutual
relation, that essentially complicates vital behaviour of man.
Therefore education should prepare advanced, independent, self-sufficient persons, which are guided not by fear, but
by their own beliefs and independent conscious analysis. That is why we carry out transition from authoritarian
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pedagogic to pedagogic of tolerance, which implies respect for each student’s natural abilities and psychological features.
We can talk of a democratization of school life.
Without forming self-sufficient persons it is not possible neither stable and democratic society, nor effective market
economy, which requires active and  responsible person.
3) The third task in modernizing education consists in translation of material base of educational process on a modern
level. School, which has in a class only board, tables and textbooks departs in the past. Today’s education is impossible
without modern computers, electronic textbooks, modern physical, chemical, biological studies with the evident equip-
ment.
During last year an essential shifts in computerization has been registered: at the expense of the central budget 1835
computer classes have been realized. Today 54 % of high schools in the country are computer aided, village - 45 %.
Government fixed the objective to provide each school I - III levels with a computer class.
Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Sciences finished the program “Educational equipment” to adjust manufacture
and deliver modern devices for study in educational institutions.
4) The fourth task consists in realizing language break in education, and then  in the Ukrainian society. Here two
questions. One consists in maintenance of knowledge of the state language. Today 75 % of children at schools are trained
in the Ukrainian language. Though it is a lot of problems here in a line of regions of Ukraine. The problems are caused first
of all by absence of environment, talking on the Ukrainian language.
And second, in the globalized world man cannot work effectively if he can not support his professional competence
with a wide dialogue. Therefore, near to thorough study of Ukrainian language, steps on maintenance the study of foreign
languages are carried out.
The study of foreign language begins with 2 class. According to the new educational plans there will be an opportu-
nity to study from 5-th class one more foreign language, or language of national minority. It creates a relevant opportu-
nity to learn Russian, a knowledge that Ukrainian society should not lose.
About higher education. The strategic purposes of its development are caused by its new functions in the
modern world. It not only way of preparation of the experts, as spoke earlier, for a national economy. The reception
of higher education, besides, becomes a more and more obligatory stage in the development of man. In a society,
intellectual potentials are necessary conditions for introducing scientific and information technologies.
In Ukraine last years essential parameters have been achieved. In 1990 in Ukrainian SSR 176 students on 10
thousand population were trained. Today they are 385. An important problem is higher education quality. Ukraine
Ministry of Education and Sciences stopped the activity of 60 separate divisions of higher educational institutions.
During its last session, State Accreditation Commission decided  to enter the moratorium not only on opening of new
branches, but on licensing those already existing.
The works on optimization of a parity of preparation of the experts are continued. All additional places of the
state order, and for last 3 years their number has grown on 15 %, are allocated for specialities connected to scientific
and information technologies and real manufacture. Development of technical education was discussed during the
recent meeting of rectors of technical universities and during the meeting of directors of technical schools and colleges.
One of the important task to carry out is the connection with the Bologna process, which aims at the creation of
a single European educational space within 2010. 40 countries participate in the process, including Russia. There is
no choice but to join the process if we do not want to become educational farms on borders of Europe.
Bologna process and national interests push for an increased role of a university science. Its financing is linked to
financial maintenance of other scientific structures.
Inclusion of technical schools in the structure of higher education has resulted, on one hand, in self-discredit of
domestic higher education. On the other hand, it has reduced opportunities for successful work of technical schools.
Therefore Ministry of Education is going to bring to Government the offer of withdrawal of technical schools from
the structure of higher education, giving them an independent status - probably it is necessary to name them as base
vocational training. In this framework preparation of young experts will be between professional technical education
and higher education.
There many problems concerning an innovative development of economy in a context of scientific and technical
activity:
• Low demand on scientific - capacious domestic production both on internal, and in the external markets;
• Both state, and non-state financial institutions are very poorly focused on investment innovation;
• Insufficient experience of effective protection of intellectual property;
• No system of improvement of professional skills, which would react to the modern requirements, strengthe-
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ning the ability of introducing innovation.
In order to attract domestic and foreign investors in scientific researches, it is particularly important to introduce new
scientific production and technologies in manufacture. They are necessary for improving legislative base, preferential
taxation, transfer of technologies, intellectual property.
New efforts for integration of education and science are certainly required. There is a good level of cooperation
between Ukrainian Ministry of Education and National Academy of Sciences. But it is not enough: cooperation of
different research institutes and other higher educational institutions is required.
These and other actions will certainly promote an increase of the contribution of education and science in the
structural economy reorganization of they will ensure Ukrainian society’s sustainable development.
Conclusions
After having compared Ukrainian systems of higher education to EU countries systems, and after having estimated
progress made by Ukraine in the framework of educational European integration, it is possible to make the following
conclusions:
- It will be difficult for Ukrainian education to proceed from a multilevel system (younger expert - bachelor - expert
- magister - candidate of sciences - doctor of sciences) to the European integrated system, which is envisaged by the
Bologna process (bachelor - master - doctor of philosophy);
- Transition to the European system of higher education should be supported by the European Commission, opening
access of Ukraine universities to a line of new programmes of cooperation between universities, and expanding students,
teachers and researchers support;
- Realization of Ukrainian plans of participation in Bologna process will allow Ukraine to more widely use oppor-
tunities provided by the new European Neighbourhood Policy.
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Ever more explosive conflicts seem to surround the European continent. The past war in Iraq, the conflict over
Palestine, the welfare border at the Straits of Gibraltar are just examples. At the same time, and seemingly against all
odds of the ‘conflict between the civilizations’, the European Union continues its policy of the Mediterranean
partnership1. The European Commission considers Turkey – a secular country with an overwhelming Muslim
population majority, with good reason as candidate for membership in the European Union, all the more so since the
far-reaching reforms enacted by the Turkish Parliament in Summer 2002.
It will be shown in this essay that summarized research on the theme of the European Neighborhood policy over
the last years and presents new results on the issue of South-North migrations, featuring so prominently in the essays
by Haffad and Kudrina in this volume that not a Huntingtonian development failure of “Muslim culture” is to blame
for many of the ills of the region, but that policies, based on the “Washington Consensus”, have reached their limit.
When Boabdil, the last Muslim ruler of Spain, handed over the keys of the city of Granada to the Catholic rulers
in 1492, it was perhaps for the first time in history that the keys to the European common house figured prominently.
Are we Europeans entitled to keep these keys in our hands forever, and to exclude the neighboring world of Islam?
Europeans should remember that the keys of the ‘common European house’ do not belong to one cultural tradition
only. The world of Islam was pivotal to the European path to the Renaissance and to the re-discovery of classic Greek
philosophy. Muslim tolerance and knowledge enabled us Europeans to develop. While there were terrible persecu-
tions of Jewry in Europe, the world of Islam was generally tolerant towards Jewry and to Oriental Christianity, and
even provided a safe heaven of refuge for the Sepharadic refugees, expelled from Spain in 1492.
An EU-25-Europe, comprising now 25 states, and stretching from the doors of Saint Petersburg to the Straits of
Gibraltar, and from the western shores of Ireland to Cyprus, Crete, and Sicily, not too many miles away from major
population centers of the Arab world, has to systematically think about its long-term neighborhood and its relations
to the “outside world” (see especially the contribution by Manuela Moschella to this volume). This essay now
systematically tries to link results, presented in this volume, to ongoing debates in the empirical world system
debate2 .
A successful integration of the Mediterranean South would have tremendous and positive repercussions for
regional and world peace. And this question is made all the more relevant by the expected demographic shifts in the
vicinity of Europe until 2050.
A brief look at the multivariate results that justify a certain optimism
Many authors would agree on the hypothesis that development in the Muslim world is deficient. However,
various factors insufficiently understood by existing theory combine to explain why pessimistic visions do not
correspond to the complete reality.
Well, first of all, with rising levels of purchasing power parity gross domestic product, the today existing world
of Muslim countries had much a higher positive correlation with rising income levels than the entire world economy
(n = 174 countries with UNDP data) for the following indicators:
• growth of female economic activity (1975=100)
• female tertiary students as % of males
• % immunization against TB
• % female administrators and managers
• % immunization against measles
• gender empowerment
• % female professional and technical workers
1 See also: The Barcelona process and Euro-Mediterranean issues from Stuttgart to Marseille / edited by Fulvio Attinà and
Stelios Stavridis. Milano : Giuffrè, 2001, and Manuela Moschella’s paper in this volume
2 See also: Il sistema politico globale : introduzione alle relazioni internazionali / Fulvio Attinà, Roma: Laterza, 2003, and
Peter Herrmann and Arno Tausch (Eds) “Dar al Islam” at:
http://www.gallileus.info/gallileus/members/m_TAUSCH/publications/107892609054/107892622908/
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• male life expectancy
• female life expectancy
With rising income levels, the world of Islam also much better avoided the following negative phenomena of the
development process than the entire world economy:
• divorce rate as % of marriages
• % population, aged >65y, 1998
• male suicide rate per 100.000 inhabitants
• female suicide rate per 100.000 inhabitants
• juvenile convictions as % of all convictions
• % population, aged >65y, 2015
• HIV rate
• maternal mortality ratio
• central government expenditures as % of GDP
• infant mortality rate
• % people not expected to survive age 60
• rapes per 100.000 women aged >15 y.
With that methodology, it is also possible to indicate along which indicators the UNDP considers to be positive
performance criteria the Muslim nations were outperformed by the rest of the world:
• % parliamentary seats held by women
• % women in government, ministerial level
• % women in government, all levels
• economic growth, 1975-98
• female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate
• public health expenditure per GDP
• % women in government, subministerial level
• contraceptive prevalence rate
• maastricht budget criteria
• daily supply of calories, 1998
• female economic activity rate
• male literacy
• gross domestic savings rate
• human development index
• female literacy
• gross domestic investment
• doctors per 100.000 people
• women’s GDP per capita
The UNDP philosophy would expect that with rising per capita income levels, certain negative social phenomena
disappear. However, the member states of the Islamic Conference reduced more slowly than the entire ‘world control
group’ (n = 174 countries) the following social deficits:
• injuries and deaths from road accidents per 100.000 inhabitants and year
• average cigarette consumption per adult and year
• teen-age mothers as % of all mothers
• TBC cases per 100.000 inhabitants
• % infants with low birth-weight
• female unpaid family workers as % of all unpaid family workers
Several of the negative effects which we above described, and which the UNDP Arab Human Development
Report 2002 calls the three deficits of human development in the region, might still be caused by other influences, and
not the status of a country as an Muslim nation.
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Questions of measurement of the multivariate analysis
The choice of the 109 countries for our multivariate analysis3 was determined by the availability of a complete
data series for the independent variables (if not mentioned otherwise, UNDP data):
• % population, aged >65y, 1998
• % women in government, ministerial level
• (I-S)/GDP (calculated from UNDP)
• state interventionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal website for
economic freedom4, 2000)
• EU-membership
• Islamic Conference membership (OIC website5)
• ln (GDP PPP pc)^2
• ln(GDP PPP pc)
• military expenditure as % of GDP
3 As to the analysis with 109 countries, see the complete download at:
http://www.gallileus.info/gallileus/members/m_TAUSCH/publications/107885009366/107885016639/ interpretation)
and
http://www.gallileus.info/gallileus/members/m_TAUSCH/publications/107900624503/10790063671/ (EXCEL data file)
4 http://www.freetheworld.com/; also: http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/. We used the latter website as the
source of our data. It has to be kept in mind, that the “worst” countries on the economic freedom scale have the
numerically highest values, while the best countries have the numerically lowest values. Lao People’s Dem. Rep. – the
economically “unfreest” country in our sample - has the numerical value 4.6, while the economically freest country,
Singapore, scores 1.45. We thus decided to call our indicator “state interventionism”
5 http://www.oic-oci.org/ there the icon “members”
6 A rising degree of monopolization in the leading center countries over time determines that, in order to keep the share
of wages at least constant, a rising exploitation of the raw material producers sets in to offset the balance. There is a
massive, internationally published evidence that speaks in favor of dependency theory. However, it would be wrong to
portray dependency simply in terms of MNC penetration, and to neglect other aspects of that relationship. Such
authors as Singer and Tausch have put emphasis on the resource balance as an indicator of the weight of foreign
saving. Other formulations of dependency insisted on ‘unequal exchange’ which, according to one such formula-
tion, hampers development (i.e. double factorial terms of trade of the respective country are < 1.0; see Raffer, 1987,
Amin, 1975). Labor in the export sectors of the periphery is being exploited, while monopolistic structures of
international trade let the centers profit from the high prices of their exports to the world markets in comparison to
their labor productivity. Since double factorial terms of trade are simply net barter terms of trade weighted by
productivities (F) of X, exports, and M, imports, the formula
((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = 1 denotes the conditions of ‘equal’ exchange as opposed to unequal exchange:
((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = < 1.0
Nations with
((PX * FX)/(PM*FM)) = > 1.0
are the countries that benefited from unequal exchange.
Empirical support for Raffer’s and Gernot Kohler’s reformulation of the theory of unequal exchange is overwhelming.
Losses or gains from unequal exchange are calculated as the difference between a “fair value” of exports/imports and the
“actual (unfair) value” of exports/imports. The estimation formula is:
T = d*X - X
where
d = the exchange rate deviation index (also designated as “ERD” or “ERDI” in the literature)
X = the volume of exports from a low- or middle-income country to high-income countries (valued at the actual
exchange rate)
T = the unrecorded transfer of value (gain or loss) resulting from unequal exchange
The transfer of value from the peripheries to the center, according to this reasoning, is gigantic:
Unequal Exchange 1965 and 1995, by Center/Periphery
      Unequal Exchange
       Gain (+)
Loss (-)
    CENTER    PERIPHERY
   (% of OECD GDP)  (% of NON-OECD GDP)
1965   +1.4%         - 1.8 %
1995   +8 %           -24 %
(Number of countries: OECD N=19 (1965) and N=22 (1995); NON-OECD N=88 (1965) and N=97 (1995)) (see Kohler/
Tausch, 2002). As the data series by Kohler and Tausch shows, unequal exchange especially negatively affected the
countries of Eastern Europe outside the EU-25 and the countries of the Arab world.
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• MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD)
• public education expenditure per GDP
• unequal exchange (calculated from UNDP, concept: 1/ERDI6)
The following dependent variables were used; with pair wise deletion of missing values each time determining the
number of countries entering into the 14 final regression equations:
• % people not expected to survive age 60
• CO2 emissions per capita
• development stability (year with highest real income minus year with lowest real income) since 1975
(calculated from UNDP)
• ESI-Index (Yale/Columbia environment sustainability index project website7)
• Factor Social Development (Tausch, 2001b, calculated from 35 UNDP social indicators, SPSS factor analy-
sis8)
• female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate
• female share in total life years (calculated from UNDP – share of female life expectancy in the sum of male and
female life expectancy)
• GDP output per kg energy use (“eco-social market economy”9)
• GDP per capita annual growth rate, 1990-98
• human development index
• life expectancy, 1995-2000
• Political rights violations (Freedom House, 200010)
• share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%
• unemployment (UN social indicators website)
The following countries featured in the analysis: Albania; Algeria; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azer-
baijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi;
Cambodia; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Côte d’Ivoire; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark;
Egypt; El Salvador; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece;
Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep. of; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Jordan;
Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People’s Dem. Rep.; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Lithuania; Luxembourg;
Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mexico; Moldova, Rep. of; Mongolia; Namibia; Nepal;
Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania;
7 http://www.ciesin.org/indicators/ESI/ We have chosen the 2001 data series at http://www.ciesin.org/indicators/ESI/
archive.html. The general description of this indicator says that the ‘Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) is a
measure of overall progress towards environmental sustainability, developed for 142 countries. The ESI scores are based
upon a set of 20 core “indicators,” each of which combines two to eight variables for a total of 68 underlying variables.
The ESI permits cross-national comparisons of environmental progress in a systematic and quantitative fashion. It
represents a first step towards a more analytically driven approach to environmental decision making.’
8 Female life expectancy; life expectancy, 1995-2000; life expectancy, 1970-75; male life expectancy; human develop-
ment index; female literacy; male literacy; contraceptive prevalence; daily supply of calories; immunization against
measles; public health expenditure; doctors per inhabitants; average cigarette consumption; female tertiary students as
% of male tertiary students; parliamentary seats held by women; gender empowerment; women’s GDP per capita in
purchasing power; growth of female economic activity; public education expenditure; women in government, ministe-
rial level; women in government, all levels; female share in professional and technical workforce; women in govern-
ment, sub-ministerial level; female share in administrative and managerial workforce; female economic activity rate as
% of male economic activity rate; teen-age mothers; food import dependence; share of top 20% compared to bottom
20% in income distribution; female economic activity rate; TBC cases per 100,000 inhabitants; HIV rate; infants with
low birth-weight; maternal mortality rate; infant mortality rate; % of people not expected to survive age 60.
9 This term is most probably an Austrian invention. The governing Conservative People’s Party – to be precise, its
former Chairman Dr. Josef Riegler – seems to have invented this term in the late 1980s. For more on that debate: http:/
/www.nachhaltigkeit.at/bibliothek/pdf/Factsheet11OekosozMarktw.pdf; and Michael Rösch, Tubingen University at
http://tiss.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de/webroot/sp/spsba01_W98_1/germany1b.htm. As an indicator of the reconciliation betwe-
en the price mechanism and the environment we propose the indicator GDP output per kg energy use; the term ‘eco-
social market economy’ neatly grasps all the aspects of this empirical formulation
10 Taken here from Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, edition 2002. The political freedom data referring to the year 2000
can also be downloaded at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm
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Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden;
Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; United Kingdom; United States;
Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe
We have to start here from the assumption that the basic tools of multivariate macro-quantitative analysis in
political science and sociology are known to the audience of this article (for further literature on the subject, see
Achen; Clauss and Ebner; Huang; Jackman; Kriz; Krzysztofiak. and Luszniewicz; Lewis - Beck; Microsoft Excel;
Opp and Schmidt).
A sophisticated re-analysis of the tendencies of world development in the 1990s should start from the assumption
that the development level has a decisive, non-linear trade-off with subsequent development performance: poor
countries increase rapidly their average life expectancy or economic growth and they quickly reduce their income
inequality etc.
Social scientists interpreted this effect mainly in view of an acceleration of economic growth in middle-income
countries vis-à-vis the poor countries and in view of the still widening gap between the poorest periphery nations
(‘have-nots’) and the ‘haves’ among the former Second and Third World (Tausch/Herrmann, 2002):
(Equation ) development performance = a1 + b1* ln (PCItn) - b2* (ln (PCItn))2
The same function is also applied to income inequality and the rest of our 14 indicators, following a famous essay
published by S. Kuznets in 1955. Growth and development accelerate with redistribution, and then stagnate. In
general terms, we explain development performance by the following standard multiple cross-national development
research equation:
(Equation ) development performance 1990 - end 1990s = a1 +- b1*first part curvilinear function of development
level +- b2*second part curvilinear function of development level +- b3...*transnational investment per GDP
(UNCTAD) mid 1990s +- b4...*unequal exchange (1/ERDI) +- b5...* foreign saving +- b6...* military expenditures
per GDP +- b7...* aging +- b8...* public education expenditures per GDP +-b9 * membership in the Islamic
Conference +- b10 * European Union membership +- b11 * absence of economic freedom (state interventio-
nism)
In the following, we will present our results about the effects of globalization in a multi-variate perspective. We
are then able to tell, whether “Muslim culture” or “dependency” or the absence of “economic freedom” are to be
blamed for the lack of growth, for inequality and deficient human development in the countries of the Mediterranean
and in the world system in general.
The final results for 109 countries
In general terms, several but not all aspects of the presented theories are confirmed, while other central assump-
tions of both the “Washington Consensus” and of its dependency theory counterpart are rejected11. Also, theories
about aging; feminist theories; human resource theories; military Keynesian theories/peace theories (i.e. theories
maintaining that militarism has a very bad effect on long-run development); globalization critique and international
economic integration theories have to tally with both positive and negative effects of their key indicators on different
measurements of social, environmental and economic welfare, indicating that the time of the “quick fixes” has
definitely gone and that contemporary development realities are very complex indeed. It should be noted that in this
and in the following presentations, we already considered duly that “good effects” are “good effects” and that “bad
effects” are “bad effects” when presenting our results; i.e. a development strategy that increases, say, under 60
mortality rates, is a bad strategy and thus has “negative” effects.
Our results can now be summarized briefly as follows:
Aging is part and parcel of the structure of industrialized societies, East and West. Aging contributes to a
generalized scarcity of labor, which in turn leads to improved distributive relationships between the rich and the poor.
However, several negative effects must also be considered properly – especially the negative effects of an aging
11 presentations are rather brief here, since downloadable results are available from:
http://www.gallileus.info/gallileus/members/m_TAUSCH/publications/107892609054/107892622908/
The book by Peter Herrmann and Arno Tausch (Eds.) should be available in print by fall 2004.
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population structure on the process of human development, which is basically the dire consequence of unreformed
pension systems (Tausch, 2003).
Political feminism has an aggregate positive effect on many phenomena of human and ecological development,
but it fails to transform political power into improved employment and distribution structures. This is due mainly to
the process of distribution coalition formation, featuring so prominently in neo-liberal theories of economic growth
(see especially, the writings of Weede).
As one of the three main indicators of dependency, the reliance on foreign savings eases the distribution burden
against the poorer segments of society during the accumulation process, but it has several negative effects on a variety
of other development processes, including the environment and political democracy.
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Absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim), paradoxically enough, increases the rationality of the
societal resource allocation and leads towards an improved development stability but it fails to resolve two basic
issues: overall environmental stress and societal sexism in the employment sphere. State interventionism has negative
consequences for women as the more vulnerable group in society.
Military expenditures have a certain Keynesian effect but they contribute towards a worse environmental
balance. Military expenditures lead towards a drying up of what Marxists term “the reserve army of labor”, which,
in turn, leads to a certain better social cohesion and employment gender balance. But militarized structures consume
large amounts of fossil fuel, with advanced air forces especially contributing to that process.
MNC penetration contributes to an improved ESI Index and towards better female employment, but it has
negative consequences for human survival and life expectancy. In addition, an interesting phenomenon worthy of
further research is the interconnection between decaying public services, decaying public transport and decaying
public health services in the host countries of transnational investment on the one hand and the strategic policies of
transnational corporations on the other hand, concentrated on the private sector, private transport, private medical
services and the private automobile. The strengthening triple alliance between the MNCs, local capital and the state
is a net result of the globalization process, and it still has dire social consequences as well.
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Human resources and human development investments ever since the publication of the first United Nations Human
Development Reports in the early 1990s are regarded as the key towards a socially equitable and sustainable develop-
ment. However, as often happens in development theory, the early optimism regarding the effects of one variable has
soon to be qualified.
In our sample, the countries with the best public education expenditure record were: Namibia Botswana Lesotho
Sweden Denmark South Africa Jordan Tunisia Uzbekistan Israel Finland Poland Saudi Arabia Norway New Zealand
Estonia Zimbabwe Yemen Kenya Latvia France Ireland-
There are very surprising clear-cut negative interactions between public education expenditure and an eco-social
market economy and political democracy. Positive effects exist as well, but they are not statistically significant. A
plausible intervening variable, which we did not as yet consider in our investigation, could be the years of experience of
a country as a centrally planned economy.
Unequal exchange has the most clear-cut negative results of all dependency indicators on the process of develop-
ment, as understood in this investigation; especially on democracy, the environment, gender justice and employment.
The positive effect on income redistribution has to be seen in the context of the siphoning-off of the surplus value from
periphery countries that reduces the share of the richest 20 % in total income distribution.
There are very diverse views nowadays on the European Union. As a recent paper, published in the journal
“Parameters” of the US Army maintains (Wilkie, 2003): “Still, there are those on both sides of the Atlantic who believe
that the European Union, as an old-fashioned socialist bureaucracy, is “fundamentally unreformable” and also cultural-
ly hostile to the United States” (Wilkie, 2003: 46)12
12 http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/wilkie.htm
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There is a wide range of literature now available that highlights the negative effects of European integration in a
globalized world economy (for a survey of the literature and politometric evidence, see Tausch and Herrmann, 2002; for
a detailed discussion about the Freedom House Indicators and East Central Europe, see Elena Baracani’s paper in this
volume; for a debate on the external economic relationships of greater Europe with Russia, see Oleg Akatov’s essay to
this volume). In the present research design, the most considerable effect is the negative trade-off between EU member-
ship and political democracy, once you control for the other intervening variables that together explain jointly 66.1 % of
political rights violations.
Our results about the European Union might be considered more provocative still, when we also consider that –
contrary to popular assumptions – membership in the Islamic Conference is not an impediment against political
democracy. Our results clearly contradict many of the expectations inherent in the writings of Professor Samuel
Huntington. 4 development indicators – 2 for the environment, 1 on human development, and 1 on democracy – are
positively and significantly determined by membership in the Islamic Conference, once you properly control for the
effects of the other influencing variables. However, gender justice and redistribution remain the “Achilles heel” of
today’s members in the Islamic Conference, strengthening the cause of those who advocate – like in the United Nations
Arab Human Development Report – more social inclusion and more gender justice in the region.
The well-known acceleration and maturity effects of development have to be qualified in an important way. Ever
since the days of Simon Kuznets, development researchers have applied curve-linear formulations in order to capture
these effects. However, the results for our equation above are not as clear-cut as one might have expected; and – in
addition – the direction of the influence does hardly correspond with the equation. The curve-linear function of growth,
being regressed on the natural logarithm of development level and its square, is sometimes called the ‘Matthew’s effect’
following Matthew’s (13, 12): ‘For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but
whosoever hath not, for him shall be taken away even that he hath’
Social scientists interpreted this effect mainly in view of an acceleration of economic growth in middle-income
countries vis-à-vis the poor countries and in view of the still widening gap between the poorest periphery nations
(‘have-nots’) and the ‘haves’ among the semi-periphery countries (Jackman, 1982). Their hypothesis is only partially
confirmed here – there is no significant acceleration at low levels of development, but a significant econonmic growth
stagnation/saturation effect. The first expression - + b1* ln (PCItn) – yields the following results:
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The second part of the “Kuznets-curve” - b2* (ln (PCItn))2 - has today the following results:
Implications for policy in the Euro-Med region
By far the most negative influence on development is wielded by unequal exchange, followed by the aging
process (especially without pension reform) and certain negative aspects of feminist distribution coalitions in
society:
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By far the most positive effects on social, ecological and economic development come about by the maturity
effects of development, followed by the positive aspects of feminism, the aging process and membership in the
Islamic Conference:
With all the talk about dependency, globalization or the “Washington Consensus” notwithstanding, it is shown
that feminism, pension reform, the maturity effects of capitalism as well as unequal exchange open up new
horizons of future development debates. The variables
• political feminism % women in government, ministerial level
• aging % population, aged >65y, 1998
• maturity effects development ln (GDP PPP pc)^2
• unequal exchange
are far more relevant in explaining our 14 development dimensions than the traditional “stars” of the debate, the
political and left and right, pro- and anti-globalization movements, culturalist development theories etc. notwithstan-
ding. The variables
• Islamic Conference membership
• absence of economic freedom (state interventionsim)
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• foreign saving (I-S)/GDP
• military expenditure as % of GDP
• dependency on foreign capital MNC PEN 1995
• public education expenditure per GDP
• acceleration effects development ln(GDP PPP pc)
• EU-membership
on the other hand do not have so many significant effects (insignificant effects > 50 %) as the “new” variables
(insignificant effects < 50 %), which were analyzed in this article and which will determine future development
outcomes in a decisive way:
The (meager) effects of the “Washington Consensus” variables on development are the following. Relationships,
contradicting the basic assumptions of the theory, are printed in bold letters:
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In addition, it should be noted that a central assumption of the “Washington Consensus” – competitive exchange
rates – could be operationalized by “1/ERDI” and amounts to “unequal exchange”.
The results for the dependency explanation of world development are the following. Relationships contradic-
ting the theory are printed in bold letters:
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Let us turn to issue of Islamic development efficiency. The empirical record, presented in this essay, speaks a clear
language in favor of Islamic democracy and against those in the West that attempt to treat Islamic cultural heritage as
a general development burden. A careful reading of what theologians – most notably, also leading Christian experts on
Islam among them – positively have to say on Islamic humanism and its interesting institutions of zakat and
sadaqat13 is in stark contrast to the contemporary rhetoric of cultural warfare; basic Islamic institutions have
enormously many aspects to offer to world development. A glance at the literature could easily convince anyone
about the richness of Islamic social doctrine and Islamic social philosophy (Abdullah and Khoury, 1984; Armstrong,
2001; Khoury, 1980, 1981, 1991; Kunzmann and associates, 1996; Russell, 1999; Tibi, 1985, 1992, 2001). Zakat is
the first institution of social security in the world system. Payment of 2 ½ percent of savings of the zakat fund is one
of the fundamental duties of a Muslim. The State is responsible to collect zakat and makes arrangements for its
distribution; while sadaqat is paid at no fixed rate (see also: The Light of Islam website at http://home.swipnet.se/
islam/articles/Non-Muslim.htm).
Our evidence shows that the majority of Islamic countries transformed their “growth” much better to the benefit
of “life quality” (average life expectancy) than most other societies around the globe.
At the same time, the UNDP data set shows that life expectancy as the most direct indicator of life quality in the
world system has dramatically increased in the regions of the Middle East and in the Andean countries of Latin
America, while in Southern Africa and in Eastern Europe there was a stagnation over the long period 1970 – 2000.
Seen in such a way, the contrary of common beliefs is true: “Kemalism”, “Arab socialism” and other “isms” were
quite successful, while the “Washington Consensus” strategies put in place after 1989 in Eastern Europe and the
former USSR proved to be one of the utmost development failures in human history.
The following graph shows that a non-linear formulation for the trade-off between historic life expectancy levels
and subsequent life expectancy increases is more adequate than a linear one:
Graph : life expectancy levels in 1970/75 and life expectancy increases 1970 - 2000
It emerges that the Islamic countries are among the best performers on this scale (i.e. as measured by the residuals
from the non-linear equation in the entire world system. The countries in the Map marked in dark colors are really those
where growth (or stagnation) was in benefit for the poor, while the countries, marked in white colors, are the ones where
growth (or stagnation) did not benefit the poor, irrespective of life expectancy levels reached back in 1970.
13 In the framework of the ecumenical dialogue between Christianity and Islam the prayer meeting of His Holiness the




Map : human development efficiency in the world system
Legend: there are missing data for Greenland, Cuba, Dominica, Guatemala, Poland, West Sahara, Chad, the Czech
Republic, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, the Congo, Eritrea, Tanzania, Yemen,
Qatar, Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan
Development is a contradictory and dialectical process. There is no single strategy, that has only positive
results, and there is no strategy, that has only negative results. No single development theory today captures all these
negative and positive effects that interact together. At this stage, perhaps, the question will arise – what are the real
policy implications, then, of this kind of analysis for the Mediterranean region? It should be clear that a reliance on
the “Washington Consensus” alone will not “fix” the performance of countries beyond a better and more predictable
“development stability”. The most consistent consequence of the “dependency” analysis of this essay is the
realization that a reliance on foreign capital in the short term might bring about positive consequences for employ-
ment – especially female employment – but that the long-term negative consequences of dependence in the social
sphere, but also for sustainable development, outweigh the immediate, positive effects. Our three-fold empirical
understanding of the process of globalization – reliance on foreign savings, MNC penetration and unequal exchange,
- goes beyond the average analysis of the workings of dependency structures and shows how different aspects of
dependency negatively affect development performance. The integration of the countries of the periphery into
larger currency blocs – quite contrary to what the “Washington Consensus” has to say about “competitive
currencies” - will be one of the most important tasks for international development strategies for years to
come. Left for themselves in the capitalist world economy, the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery will
always be victims of international currency instabilities. In the light of earlier published analyses, it is no surprise that
“unequal exchange” (1/ERDI; ERDI being the exchange rate deviation index) is again established to be the most
important dependency variable, far more important in its negative effects on social and sustainable development
than the UNCTAD data series on MNC penetration. European Union integration, this analysis again shows, on
the other hand is not a quick fix for many of the social ills of the periphery and semi-periphery. The EU under present
conditions fails to have sufficiently enough dynamic effects and its democratic deficits become ever more clear. In
terms of the size of the quantitative effects on the 14 dimensions of development under investigation here, it is shown
that the new political structures associated with political feminism that substituted patriarchic structures inherent
in practically all world regions for much of the 19th and the early 20th Century have a very considerable effect on the
development outcomes of today. As we have outlined above, feminism in power – i.e. the share of women in positions
of political decision making - achieves to transform many aspects of development, but, as other “distribution
coalitions” before it, creates certain aspects of stagnation as well and thus is not free from the effects of the logic of
“collective action” that is at the heart of the neo-liberal doctrine of today (see especially the works Olson and Weede).
In the 21st Century, the process of aging and the necessity of pension reform, closely linked to that process, also
cannot be overlooked anymore. In our analysis, unequal exchange, aging, and political feminism achieve the majority
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of the significant effects on the 14 development dimensions under investigation here, i.e. far more than the “master”
variables of earlier debates, like “economic freedom” versus “MNC penetration”. As has been argued elsewhere, globaliza-
tion critics especially must start to look at pensions and pension funds seriously – because the way, in which you manage
the savings of society for old age, you also manage technological innovation and world systems position in general (Tausch,
2003). It is also evident from the analysis presented in this article that Islamic culture is not a development blockade; on
the contrary. Membership in the Islamic Conference has – ceteris paribus – a very positive effect on political democracy,
on life expectancy, and on our indicators of the Kyoto-process and the eco-social market economy. Far from being a
“religion of the Middle Ages” Islam has an important message for the 21st Century. It is to be hoped that socially progressive
forces in the MENA countries will achieve a better monetary distribution of incomes and a better gender distribution of
work in the societies concerned in the future.
Looking back on short-run dynamics and long-term stagnation
There is a considerable interest in the research literature on FDI’s in the lesser developed regions of our globe (see Ali
Hemal’s contribution to this volume). As we said, a constant feature of the world system approach, and in particular Volker
Bornschier’s development theory, is his idea that penetration by transnational capital causes short-term dynamism but
long-term stagnation. Transnational capital decreased its MNC penetration in the Muslim host countries considerably
since the mid 1990s. The long-term negative effects of MNC penetration, the empirical world systems argument goes,
should be felt however in the region. Now this is what exactly happened in the Mediterranean world in the 1970s and 1980s,
with the effects still being relevant today. In general terms, we observed at the beginning and in the mid 1990s high levels of
existing penetration in the “dominion economies” like Australia and Canada, in Western Europe, in many parts of Latin
America, Southern and Western Africa, in Egypt, in Tunisia and on the Arab Peninsula, and in China and Southeast Asia.
In order to test the relevance of the dependency model proposed by Volker Bornschier and his associates, based on
MNC penetration and its increases over time, with the new data series provided by UNCTAD (independent variables
MNC penetration 1995 and increases of MNC penetration 1995 - 2000) and the UNDP (HDR, 2000; independent
variables: development level and all dependent variables), we calculated the multiple regressions for 14 development
dimensions:
development performance = a1 +- b1*first part curvilinear function of development level +- b2*second part curvilinear
function of development level +- b3...*transnational investment per GDP (UNCTAD) mid 1990s +- b4 * DYN transnatio-
nal investment per GDP (UNCTAD) 1995-2000
n = 164 countries14 complete data for GDP PPP, MNC Penetration, DYN MNC Penetration, unequal exchan-
ge
This leads to the following results. Bornschier’s theory receives only partially a standard 5 % error probability
confirmation by the reported dynamic performance of the human development indicator and the growth of female economic
activity indicator, and the economic growth theory is also only partially confirmed here as well.
14 The countries with complete data were: Albania; Algeria; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; Australia;
Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Botswana;
Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Cape Verde; Central African
Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo; Congo, Dem. Rep. of the; Costa Rica; Côte d’Ivoire;
Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial
Guinea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Grenada; Guatema-
la; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hong Kong, China (SAR); Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia;
161
A world system view on South-North migration and the Barcelona process
In this book, two authors, Tahar Haffad, and Liudmila Kurdina, look at the issue of South-North migration in the
framework of the Mediterranean region. Most neo-classical economists regard migration as a process of poverty reduction
in the migration sending countries. A prominent econometric and politometric analysis to maintain such a hypothesis is the
work of Adams and Page15, published by the World Bank.
In this contribution, we re-analyze the Adams and Page paper and apply their data set on worker remittances per GNP
as a main indicator of dependency of a country on migration with our 109 country analysis, presented earlier.
Historical data compiled by Aghion and Williamson16, re-analyzed in Kohler and Tausch, highlight the importance of the
Adams and Page approach, which maintains that the freedom of migration is an important element in poverty reduction.
From 1870 to 1995, the European South had a divergent development path that would at least justify certain optimism
regarding the Mediterranean partner countries. Williamson shows on the basis of large scale historical evidence that Atlantic
migration reduced the poverty gap between Europe and North America, while barriers to South-North migration in Europe
maintained what there remained in terms of the welfare gap between Northern and Southern Europe:
World system researchers take a more pessimistic view. They would tend to take a sober view of the process of
convergence and migration in Europe. Regional data17 for the Single European Market with its 4 freedoms show that many
of the Southern member regions of the EU-15 that were poor in the mid 1990s, i.e. with a per capita income of less than 80
% of the EU-15 average, had no convergence of incomes or no falling unemployment – or even worse, they faced decreasing
incomes and rising unemployment rates, although the 4 freedoms were implemented on a continental scale. In Italy, which
is a member of the European Union since the very beginning, the Southern Mezzogiorno regions – with the exception of
Molisse and Basilicate -, experienced no real double convergence of incomes and employment with the European centers.
Köhler G. and Tausch A. (2001) ‘Studies on Unequal Exchange’ Huntington, NY: Nova Science
Iran, Islamic Rep. of; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea, Rep. of; Kyrgyzstan;
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia, TFYR; Madagascar; Malawi;
Malaysia; Maldives; Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova, Rep. of; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique;
Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New
Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and
Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Samoa (Western); Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Seychelles; Singapore;
Slovakia; Slovenia; Solomon Islands; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab
Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania, U. Rep. of; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan;
Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Venezuela; Viet
Nam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe
15 http://econ.worldbank.org/files/31999_wps3179.pdf
16 see also http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jwilliam/
17 http://www.gallileus.info/gallileus/members/m_TAUSCH/publications/107883913831/108996532111/?msg=2 with the
entire freely available EXCEL file of the European regional data, based on
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/repor_en.htm
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Poor regions in the EU-15 that even saw their meager relative incomes diminished between 1995 and 1999 were:
France Guyane
Belgium Hainaut
UK TeesValley&Durham, Highlands&Islands, NorthEast, Northern Ireland










Greece Attiki, Dytiki Ellada, Dytiki Macedonia, Ionia Nisia, Ipeiros, Kriti, Notio Ai gaio, Peloponnisos, Thessalia,
Voreia Ellada, Voreio Aigaio
Italy Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Sardegna, Sicilia
Portugal Açores
Spain Galicia, Principado de Asturias
A number of authors from the dependency/world system tradition observed dramatic shifts in the location and
organization of international production since the mid 1960s. While the traditional division of labor between the center and
the periphery implied industrial production in the centers and raw material production in the peripheries, linked to each
other via the mechanism of unequal exchange and oligopolistic competition, these structures began to change, the argument
of Froebel et al. and Ross goes, in favor of global shifts of the sites and organization of production: the old, classic working
class of the centers is ‘substituted’ by a) the re-location of industrial production to the semi-periphery and b) by the
massive process of migration of peripheral labor that set in North America and Western Europe since the 1960s. Although
there are quite a number of systematic studies on the impact of capital penetration on the host countries in the periphery,
the impact of migration on the development process of the sending and recipient countries has been less at the center of
attention of world-system and dependency-oriented development research. Our hypotheses are more pessimistic than
usual neo-classical models of growth suggest.
Mass migration, as Amin (1997) reminded us, is part and parcel of the process of transnational capitalism. The market
economies of western Europe first imported labor; now, with the transfer of production away from the European central
zones, second generation foreigners become increasingly marginalized. In the inner cities of countries like France, Germany,
and Britain, real ‘ghettos’ develop, a process that began in the United States of America three or two decades ago. Women
also have to suffer from these tendencies, as their jobs are being exported away to the still much-lower paid labor power of
the periphery and the semi-periphery (as already predicted by Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 1993). Migration is even
part of the five pillars of international inequality (Amin, 1997):
i. unequal exchange: the gaps in wages are much greater than the gaps in productivities
ii. capital flight from the peripheries to the centers
iii. selective migration from the peripheries into the centers
iv. the monopoly position of the centers in the international division of labor
v. the control of the centers over the earth’s natural resources
Following research contributions, which linked the patterns of international migration to the overall patterns of the
center-periphery relationship, we try to develop here some hypotheses in the framework of the larger Mediterranean. For
several scholars in the world systems tradition, the impact of migration on the sending countries under such conditions will
be increasing the patterns of unequal exchange and the peripheral role in the world economy. It might be that income
distribution, the argument goes, will become perhaps less unequal under the impact of the absence of millions of unskilled
laborers from their home countries, but many other phenomena of peripheral development will be intensified; such as the
deficient structures of agriculture and the dependent character of accumulation, leading to slower economic growth and
increased capital imports. World system oriented empirical research on migration confirmed, by and large, such a somber
perspective (Amankwaa, 1995; Arrighi/Silver, 1984; Boehning and Schloeter-Paredes, 1994; Elsenhans, 1978; Parnreiter,
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1994; Stalker, 1994; Stark and Taylor, 1991; Tausch, 1997).
Semi-peripheral and peripheral decision makers, world system scholars further maintained, largely representing the
import-dependent, urban elites, - and here, they say, there is no basic difference between the Philippines and Poland,
Morocco or Egypt - demand semi-peripheral or peripheral access to the labor markets of the centers, but they overlook the
dire sociological implications of mass migration on the sending countries (Tausch, 1997, with a detailed debate about mainly
ILO research). Econometric models, reviewed by Breuss (1997), could show that, in the case of EU-recipient countries with
relatively high rigidities, immigration leads in turn to higher unemployment, lower wage growth, but also a slightly lower
inflation rate. Wage ‘dumping’ indeed is a problem on a European scale. These tendencies could even increase in the 21st
Century, basically because the problem of millions of small-scale peasants in East-Central Europe and the Mediterranean
is unresolved. Unimpeded competition by high-tech and high-subvention Western agriculture will ruin millions of jobs in
the peripheral rural structures of the East (Tausch, 1997).
In the centers, inequality will increase under the impact of mass migration, while at the same time, mass demand and
technical progress, the ‘twin engines’ of auto-centered development, will suffer under the impact of the evolution of an
unequal “2/3-society” in the center countries.
It is, world system scholars argue, the case that world capitalism is on its way towards an anti-egalitarian, and de-
regulatory phase which will do away with many of the social advances that characterized the corporatist economic cycle
of the post-World-War-II period. South Asia’s and Latin America’s inequality will decline, while in Sub-Saharan Africa, in
the industrialized countries, and in Eastern Europe inequalities will increase considerably, and in the Middle East and North
Africa there will be only a slight reduction of inequality rates (Tausch and Herrmann, 2002). The growth of inequality in
Eastern Europe, in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the industrial countries might herald the advent of a ‘Latin-American’-style
capitalism of the Southern Cone in Latin America during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s that goes hand in hand with mass
migration, the growth of transnational corporations penetration, short-term spurts of growth and long-term stagnation, and
protected markets and economic distortions. The imperative of ‘balanced budgets’, ‘financial markets’ and ‘de-regulation’
in the European center might, in the end, undermine the very logic of economic growth that the anti-Keynesianism of the
1990s maintains to uphold.
Samir Amin and Giovanni Arrighi most vocally proclaimed today the idea that there has never been any ‘catching up’ of
the semi-peripheries and peripheries, and that there is a fairly constant real gap between the rich and the poor regions in the
world system. Passive, selective migration increases, rather than decreases, the argument goes, the wealth gap between rich
and poor lands.
The hope of many semi-periphery and periphery nations to change their weak position in the world-wide structure of
the division of labor by mass migration to the developed countries is also, world system researchers hold, not realistic.
Migration greatly increases, the argument runs, inequality in the migration recipient countries, without really solving the
long-run weak position of the sending countries in the international economy. If the ‘migration industry’ were right, then
Jordan, Mexico, Jamaica, ex-Yugoslavia, Greece, Portugal and other highly migration-dependent countries would be ‘eco-
nomic miracles’. In the migration recipient countries, environmental decay increases as one of the main consequences of the
process of international migration, due to mass traffic and the consumption model that mass migration induces. For most
world systems thinkers migration is - above all - an expression of a peripheral position in the world economy. At first sight,
migration has practically no positive or negative effect on economic growth (Tausch, 1998).
The dominant countries, like Japan or the United States, send their managers abroad, but never, the world system
argument runs, their workforce (Tausch and Herrmann, 2002). It is a sign of world economic weakness, they say, to be a net
exporter of labor force. Poor and peripheral countries, like Jordan, Pakistan, Ireland, Portugal, or nowadays Poland, send
their workers abroad, and import their managers, and never the other way around. In the old colonial days, priests and
soldiers were imported, timber, ivory, copper, slaves and bananas were exported. Still, the structure exists, but at a much
higher level, with a lot of ‘soft body’ components as well. Interestingly enough, the effect of government size on growth
becomes significantly and highly negative, once we consider the effect of migration on development.
Commenting on politometric results, presented in Tausch/Herrmann, it was said that migration conserves economic
structures that inhibit world economic adjustment. The greatest proponents of mass migration, it was further argued,
from the semi-periphery and periphery are in reality those very social strata, that represent the powerful urban
power monopolies at home: instead of bringing their monopolies under the discipline of the market and
allowing their agricultural regions to prosper under a system of export-led growth and mass-demand at home,
they are inclined to send a considerable part of their talented work-force abroad so that it does not constitute
any threat to the elites’ privileged social position at home. State sector expenditures and a reliance on foreign aid
will be part and parcel of a such a migration-driven development model.
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Well, the empirical evidence that was achieved by combining available data for worker remittances in over 60 countries
with our 109 country sample with complete data for other background variables produced the following results for exactly
59 countries with complete data for worker remittances and the other explanatory variables of the general model, mentioned
earlier that do confirm some of the neo-classical arguments and some of the world system arguments:
1. dependency on worker remittances of a country is in turn highly influenced by the supply of free and relatively
high standard education in many of the semi-periphery countries, that is reflected in the public education
expenditure per GDP indicator. This argument would tend to be compatible with standard neo-classical analysis.
But the status of a country as a guest worker economy is also greatly influenced by the “flows of unequal
exchange”, or – to put it in the language of the neo-classics, exchange rate under-valuation; and ceteris
paribus Muslim nations have a significantly higher propensity for a dependency of their economies on
outward migration. It should be emphasized however, that also a neoclassical interpretation could explain the
phenomenon. For the neoclassic school, the ERDI index of unequal exchange is nothing bit a reflection of the role
of non-tradables and thus, general market failure, in the economy18. Labor scarcities in the center, that drain up the
“industrial reserve army”, like those induced by high military expenditures, certainly contribute significantly
towards the status of a country a net s a labor importer. The push and pull factors of migration in the world system
are:
2. outward migration eases to a great extent the national sending country gap between rich and poor, but it
significantly (5 % level) is associated with slow economic growth. Outward migration reduces unemploy-
ment in the sending countries, but the effect is not significant. There are very significant positive effects on
female shares in total life years and female economic activity rates (very well explainable by arising scarcities
on the labor market caused by massive male outward migration), as well as on combined indices of development
(the Human Development Index and our own “Factor Social Development”). There is also a 12.5 % significant
positive effect on female life expectancy. The effect of migration on the environment is contradictory: on the
one hand, outward migration increases the transport intensity of a country, and thus reduces the GDP output
18 see also http://www.american.edu/cas/econ/faculty/isaac/wp/rrpe0009.yotopoulos.htm. As Professor Alan G. Isaac from
American University quite correctly remarks on the path-breaking book by Professor Pan J. Yotopoulos from Univer-
sita degli Studi in Firenze (retired from Stanford): “Exchange Rate Parity for Trade and Development: Theory, Tests,
and Case Studies. “ Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 323 pp. +xvii, $54.95 hb., the core argument
of Yotopoulos as the “main prophet” of the 1/ERDI “school” is that apparent exchange-rate overvaluation is often
good for efficiency and for growth in developing countries. Professor Isaac says: “Conversely, free currency markets are
argued to distort resource allocation in developing countries. Yotopoulos’s core econometric finding is that the real
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efficiency of energy use (significant at the 12.5 % level). Outward migration is therefore also associated with
higher CO2 emissions per capita (not significant at the 12.5 % level), but the Yale/Columbia overall environ-
ment sustainability index is significantly better at the 12.5 % level (most probably, because the pressure on farm
land and other resources, especially in the rural regions, decreases with massive outward migration). Interestin-
gly enough, also the other conjecture is of course true: countries at the receiving end of international
migration flows will be tending towards unequal growth, with deficient gender development and human
development. They will experience a socially polarized development pattern, characterized by high gaps
between rich and poor, but by a rapid rate of economic growth. Although the present paper cannot analyze
these trends in more detail, it might be sufficient to mention here the works by the California economist Deborah
Reed on conditions of poverty and income polarization in the state of California, which is most probably the
region of the world economy with the most massive long-term inflows of migration today19.
3. The comparison with the effects of EU membership and Islamic Conference membership can only be partial.
The 109 country analysis above has to be given preference to the 59 nation comparison on the effects of Islamic
Conference, EU-membership and worker remittances. Ceteris paribus, it emerges that under due consideration
of the effects of migration, the EU has positive effect on growth and income re-distribution, but the gender
balance as well as the environmental balance (ESI-Index, CO2, GDP per energy use) is problematic. Under
due consideration of the effects of migration, it also emerges that Islamic Conference even reduces unemploy-
ment, while the effect on political rights violations is contradicted by results from the larger sample of 109
countries, and hence, the results reported here are not considered to be final ones.
Table::The multivariate influence of worker remittances per GDP (t-values and the direction of the influence in
multiple regression)20 in comparison to Islamic Conference and European Union membership
exchange rate–defined as the price of tradables relative to nontradables – is negatively correlated with the growth rate
of income as well as with the level of income. Yotopoulos argues that undervaluation causes slower growth. Additional-
ly, Yotopoulos finds that openness reduces growth (inward looking strategies are more successful), that rising inflation
is negatively correlated with growth, and that nominal devaluations have only partial and short-lived effects on the real
exchange rate. In addition to his econometric work, Yotopoulos supports his case with a sequence of short case studies.
He begins with Japan, arguing that prescient, inward looking government intervention and institutions that limited rent
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Without doubt, migration propensity is highest at a human development level that corresponds to the value 0.6 to
0.7 of the HDI (Human Development Index); i.e. countries like the Ukraine, the Philippines, Indonesia, Mongolia,
Albania, Armenia, China, Egypt, El Salvador, Morocco, Vietnam. Countries in the vicinity of HDI = 0.900 or more, like
Portugal, Chile, Singapore, Italy, or Greece, cease to be the source of mass migration. The three-layer structure, reported
in Tausch and Herrmann corresponds also to careful interpretation of different migration ‘waves’: the migration of rural
laborers, the migration of industrial workers, the migration of service-personnel, and the migration of intellectuals at all
three phases. Instead of leveling-off international hierarchies, migration is indeed, as Samir Amin foresees it, one of the
5 pillars of international inequality, cementing the unequal positions in the world system instead of leveling them off. It
was shown in our analyses (Tausch and Herrmann, 2002) that a large number of the new EU members already fulfill the
conditions of the West European countries by 1980.
Legend: Human Development Index by 2000, as expressed in a percentage of the level Human Development Index
= 0.900, which can be regarded as a level, beyond which hardly any significant net outward migration takes place. The
map shows that the Ukraine, Albania, the FYR of Macedonia, Turkey, and the EU-Mediterranean partner countries will
be significant sources of outward migration to Europe for years to come, while the new member countries of the EU, the
candidate countries Romania and Bulgaria, and Russia will be less significant sources of net outward migration in the
early parts of the 21st Century for the EU. No data for Greenland, West Sahara, Bosnia and Hercegowina, Iraq and several
African countries. Source: our own compilations from UNDP HDR 2002.
Both in demographic as well as in sociological terms, much of West European fears about East European migration
at least conceal the real issues of the future migration processes. An analysis of world population growth trends shows
that Africa, West Asia and Southeast-Asia become the real future sending countries, while the demographic structure
of East Central Europe more and more resembles the countries of Western Europe. The enlarged Europe becomes
California, and the Mediterranean countries become “our” Mexico. That is the structure of the 21st Century.
seeking combined to produce the “miracle” of Japan’s development. Yotopoulos argues that Japan’s early industria-
lization was extremely inward looking, and that it was supported by an apparently overvalued exchange rate (…)
Yotopoulos picks the Philippines for his case study of a development failure. The Philippines is particularly interesting,
since it looked so promising from the end of World War II to the time of the second oil price shock. (…) The most
important suggestion is that undervaluation of the Philippine peso proved an important barrier to growth. “ The work
of Professor Yotopoulos is at the basis of the development of the theory of unequal exchange by Professor Gernot
Kohler, see also Kohler/Tausch, 2001
19 http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/CC_204DRCC.pdf
20 for 30 degrees of freedom, significance at the 5 % level is reached at a t-value of > 1.70, for 40 degrees of freedom the
t-value has to be > 1.68, and for 60 dergrees of freedom > 1.67.
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